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Iulian SANDU-POPA




My first thanks go to my advisors without whom most of this work would not have been
possible (or, at least, much less thorough): Luc and Iulian. These last three years taught me
a lot, they were also both challenging and fulfilling, and you played an important part in me
getting through them. I will particularly remember the numerous discussions involving non
politically correct examples and I sincerely hope no one ever recorded us. . . !
This PhD would also have not been possible without the involvement of Cozy Cloud and
more particularly Benjamin, its CEO: thank you for giving me this opportunity!
However important and gratifying achieving this PhD was, what I will remember the most
from this period is definitively the people that were with me during these past three years:
Paul — who showed me both Cozy Cloud and SMIS/Petrus, with whom I had lengthy (and
gossipy) discussions in the parking lot, who reminded me what seriousness means; Riad —
who, despite my french origins, accepts me as a “kho”, who never backs down from anything,
whose blood will always be green (one, two, three. . . !), who is the one and only spirit of the
team; Dimitris — who can’t quite help himself from pointing out all the greek words we use,
who is (almost) always joyful and unaffected by events, who never complained whenever I
couldn’t stop talking about my personal life; Aydogan — whose mustachy dream I wish to
never have but whose calves I envy; Zoé — who always gave me a listening and supportive
ear, who valiantly and consistently refused to help me with my state-of-the-art (despite how
interesting of an offer it is!); Robin — the tallest kid among us all, who understands why the
Zelda games are the greatest, whose PhD will (maybe) go smoothly; Laurent — “ma chérie”
whom I always enjoyed disturbing; François — our own (super) handsome data-scientist;
Gaëlle and Matthew — my two favorites rosbeefs who always helped me correct my english
in my darkest hours; the Petrus team: Athanasia, Emmanuelle, Guillaume, Julien, Ludovic,
Moeen, Nicolas, Philippe, Poulmanogo, Razvan; all the “Cozy family”: Aeris, Aurore, Bren-
dan, Bruno, Caroline, Cédric (and Latifa), Céline, Christophe, Claire, Clochix, Drazik, Éric,
Erwan, Fabien, Florent, Frédéric, Grégory, Gooz, Joël, Joseph, Luc, Lucas, Martin, Matthias,
Matthieu, Maxime, Nicolas, Nina, Patrick, Pierrot, Pierre, Quentin, Rémi, Romain, Sébastien
B., Sébastien N., Simon, Thomas, Yannick, Yannou; my entire family who heard me going
on and on and on about the PhD and never complained too much (I’m looking at you Ma’ !);
the “extended” LSI family: Djibril, François, José, Jérémy, Mohammad, Selma, Vaiyee; and
all my other friends I did not mention: Aurélien and Isaline, Évrim, Kévin, Raphaël, Juba,
Sébastien C., Suchet, Sylvain, Thomas, Valentin and Katerina.
Contents
1 Introduction 2
2 Background Knowledge and Related Works 7
2.1 Personal Cloud Solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.1.1 Online Personal Cloud Solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.1.2 Zero-Knowledge-Based Personal Clouds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.1.3 Home-Cloud Softwares . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.1.4 Home-Cloud Plugs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.1.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.2 Means for an Increased Security in Data-Oriented Tasks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.2.1 Trusted Execution Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.2.2 Secure Hardware Based Distributed Computations . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.2.3 Encryption-Based Solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.2.4 Privacy-Preserving Data Publishing techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.2.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.3 Peer-to-Peer Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.3.1 Unstructured Peer-to-Peer systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.3.2 Structured Peer-to-Peer Systems: Distributed Hash Tables . . . . . . . . 25
2.3.3 Considered Attacks on Peer-to-Peer Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.3.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3 Secure Actor Selection 34
3.1 Architectural design: objectives and threat model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.1.1 Base System Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.1.2 Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.1.3 Threat Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.1.4 Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.2 SEP2P: Secure Actor Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.2.1 Effectiveness, Cost and Optimal Bounds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.2.2 Overview of the Proposed Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.2.3 Providing Probabilistic Guarantees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.2.4 Verifiable Random Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.2.5 Distributed Secure Selection Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.2.6 Protocol Implementation Details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.3 Experimental Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.3.1 Experimental Setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
i
Contents ii
3.3.2 Security Effectiveness versus Efficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.3.3 Scalability and Robustness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
4 DISPERS 57
4.1 Query and Data Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
4.1.1 Data Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
4.1.2 Query Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
4.2 Naive Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
4.3 Compartmentalized protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
4.3.1 Knowledge dispersion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
4.3.2 Task Atomicity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
4.3.3 Compartmentalized Query Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
4.4 DISPERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4.4.1 Splitting the Target Finder Role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4.4.2 Hidden Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
4.4.3 DISPERS: Core Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
4.5 Additional Protections and Optimizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
4.5.1 Setting and Validating the Query . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
4.5.2 Query Replay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4.5.3 Timing Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.5.4 Targets Lower Bound . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.5.5 Additional Protections: Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.5.6 Optimizing the Execution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4.5.7 DISPERS: Complete Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
5 Security Analysis, Evaluation and Proof-of-Concept 88
5.1 Security Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
5.1.1 Definitions and Analysis of the SEP2P Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
5.1.2 DISPERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
5.2 DISPERS Security and Performance Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
5.2.1 Security Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
5.2.2 Considered Alternative Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
5.2.3 Performance Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
5.3 DISPERS: Proof-of-Concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
5.3.1 DISPERS Demonstration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
5.3.2 Integration of DISPERS into Cozy Cloud . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
5.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
6 Conclusion 114
6.1 Summary of the Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
6.2 Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
A Detail of the information accessed by each Actor 118
A.1 Querier Q . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
A.2 Concept Indexor CI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
A.3 Concept indexor Proxy CP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
A.4 Profile Sampler PS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
A.5 Share Recomposer SR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
A.6 Before Proxy BP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
A.7 Target T . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
A.8 After Proxy AP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
A.9 Data Aggregator DA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
A.10 Main Data Aggregator MDA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
B Résumé en Français du manuscrit 129
List of Figures
2.1 Routing from node a to d in a Chord network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.1 Sketch of verifiable selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.2 Verifiable random . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.3 Sec. Effectiveness vs Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.4 Setup asymmetric crypto-costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.5 Setup communication costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.6 k versus C (N and α vary) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.7 Setup costs varying R3 size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.8 Maintenance overheads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
4.1 Naive Query Execution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
4.2 Example of CI index entries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
4.3 Insertion of a concept in the DHT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
4.4 Compartmentalized Query Execution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
4.5 New version of the CI index entries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4.6 PS and SR roles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
4.7 Final CI index entries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
4.8 DISPERS core protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.9 Augmented SEP2P setup phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.10 DISPERS complete protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
5.1 Enhanced Naive Query Execution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
5.2 Oracle Query Execution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
5.3 Crypto. latency vs C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
5.4 Crypto. total work vs C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
5.5 Comm. latency vs C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
5.6 Comm. total work vs C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
5.7 Comm. latency vs N . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
5.8 Crypto. latency vs nb of actors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
5.9 Crypto. total work vs nb of actors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
5.10 Comm. total work vs nb of actors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
5.11 Nb of asymmetric crypto. operations per actor (varying PS ,SR,DA) . . . . . . 103
5.12 Nb of exchanged messages per actor (varying PS ,SR,DA) . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
5.13 Crypto. tot. work vs nb of targets vs C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
5.14 Comm. tot. work vs nb of targets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
5.15 Crypto. total work w.r.t. Shamir’s Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
iv
List of Figures v
5.16 Crypto. total work, Setup vs Execution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
5.17 Demonstration platform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
5.18 DISPERS Execution: SL nodes are highlighted. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
5.19 DISPERS Execution: CI and TF nodes are highlighted. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
5.20 DISPERS Execution: TF nodes and the targets are highlighted. . . . . . . . . 108
5.21 DISPERS Execution: the targets and DA nodes are highlighted. . . . . . . . . . 108
5.22 Cozy-DISPERS protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
List of Tables
2.1 A 2-anonymous data set on (Age, Zip code) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.2 Illustration of attacks on k-anonymity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.1 Main notations for SEP2P . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.2 Main notations for Sections 3.2.3 to 3.2.5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.3 Strategies, parameters and metrics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
4.1 Information accessed by the actors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
4.2 Notations of Figure 4.10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
5.1 Average disclosure per strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94





As technology keeps improving, more and more “everyday-tasks” are automated, ranging from
autonomous hoovers taking care of cleaning our homes to our web mail creating events in our
calendar to remind us of an incoming trip. From a data-oriented point of view this translates
into the generation of more and more structured personal information: the layout of our home,
the dates and location of our holidays. Taken as is, this statement is not frightening: as data
are structured, they are more easily processed by machines which leans toward an even better
integration of these new technologies in our lives. However, the situation is not idyllic and
growing concerns for our privacy are formulated: most of the interactions with these new
technologies are centralized by the same actors, giving them a deep insight into our lives.
To illustrate this statement we can look at the numbers boasted by the “Internet Giants”:
Facebook announced in 2017 that it had 2 billion active users on its platform1; in 2019,
Google’s search engine accumulated more than 75% of the searches made on the Internet2;
WeChat has more than 1 billion active users in 20193; in 2017, 20 million units of the Amazon
Echo and 7 million of the Google Home have been sold4. Moreover, this only a first step in
the digitalization of our lives: autonomous cars, internet of things, home automation, . . . soon
we will constantly interact with our “smart” environment. Although, this is not intrinsically
problematic, leaving all the management of these devices to few, extremely powerful actors
is: they will centralize our personal data, opening up the way for profiling, misuse (i.e. not
in the interest of the users) and simultaneously increasing the appeal of an attack on their
infrastructure as a single breach leads to millions (if not billions) of information.
Fortunately, not everything is grim in the landscape of personal data: the most concrete
recent event has been the adoption of the General Data Protection Regulation by the European
Union which, for instance, forces actors manipulating personal data to state their intents and
explicitly ask for consent. More importantly, this regulation gives users legal grounds to
request a copy of their own data and even to require companies to delete them: it empowers
the users.









providing free geographic data, such as street maps, to anyone; Framasoft6 is a non-profit
organization providing free, privacy-friendly, open source alternatives to some well-known
(non-free and definitively not privacy-friendly) services; Qwant is a search engine that also
relies on advertisements for its business model but does not tailor them based on the users’
profiles. The initiative that concerns the most the work done in this thesis is the Personal
Cloud : the objective is to give to the users a digital home that they fully control and in which
they can import their personal data, use them, benefit from them, i.e. do as they see fit. Cozy
Cloud is one of the companies developing this type of solution and it is in collaboration with
them that this work took place. Indeed, Cozy Cloud proposes logically (if not physically)
separated single-user instances, which renders multi-user applications complex to implement,
even more so if the aim is to keep the data disseminated and while protecting the users’ privacy.
Hence, this work tries to give a first answer to this problem: how to build a fully-distributed,
generic, privacy-preserving framework to query a network a Personal Clouds.
This work is thus at the crossroads of three “domains”: Personal Data Management Sys-
tems (in which the Personal Cloud belongs), Privacy-Preserving Techniques and Distributed
Systems.
Several variations of Personal Data Management Systems exist: Online personal clouds,
Zero-knowledge-based personal clouds, Home cloud software, Home cloud plugs, Tamper-resistant
home cloud. These solutions address different functionalities and, more importantly, consider
different trust models: Online personal clouds legally and contractually commit to never use
the data stored on their servers, Zero-knowledge-based solutions assume the provider to be
untrustworthy and rely on the user to manage encryption keys, and Tamper-resistant solutions
delegate the management of the keys to dedicated hardware.
When referring to Privacy-Preserving Techniques we encompass two major topics of re-
search: encryption-based solutions and privacy-preserving data publishing. Both topics pro-
pose ways of manipulating data so as to minimize (or even nullify) the amount of sensitive
information disclosed. More specifically, encryption-based solutions such as multi-party com-
putation algorithms and specific encryption schemes (homomorphic, fully-homomorphic, func-
tional to only name a few) advocate for computing on encrypted data, while privacy-preserving
data publishing solutions like k-anonymity, l-diversity, or differential-privacy introduce a pre-
liminary step that aims at anonymizing the data before they can be used.
Distributed Systems is a topic that has been extensively studied and proposes two ap-
proaches to manage nodes in a network: either with an unstructured or with a structured
overlay. As the name implies, in an unstructured overlay nodes are not “strictly” organized
and strategies like flooding, random walks or expanding-ring are employed to discover new
peers or route messages. Napster, Gnutella and the Blockchain are examples of such over-
lay. In a structured overlay, nodes are organized in order to create efficient communication
paths which alleviate the overall load of the network but put (slightly) more strain on the
nodes. Distributed Hash Tables are the main representative of this approach: Chord, Content-
Addressable Network, Kademlia, Pastry.
As we can see, each of these technologies tackle a different problematic and in a context
that is neither similar nor necessarily compatible with ours. They thus possess limitations we
have to take into account: privacy-preserving techniques based on encryption generally do not
scale well, while privacy-preserving data publishing techniques are usually ad-hoc solutions
that depend on the nature of the data manipulated, not all Personal Cloud variations offer
6https://framasoft.org
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high security guarantees and, lastly, distributed systems focus on availability and scalability
rather than privacy.
Selecting the appropriate tools and correctly combining them in order to build a generic,
scalable, fully-distributed and privacy-preserving framework to query the Personal Clouds of
the users is the first gap in the current knowledge this work addresses.
More precisely, by generic we mean that we do not want to limit the capabilities of our
query framework (i.e. it should not depend on the nature of the data manipulated or the type
of computation), by scalable we mean that the query framework should be able to handle a
large and possible increasing number of nodes seamlessly (i.e. with a low and limited additional
cost), by fully-distributed we mean that no central server should be actively participating in
the execution of a query, and, finally, by privacy-preserving we mean that the query framework
should protect the data exchanged and ensure the anonymity of the nodes participating.
In order to conduct this study we only make the following assumptions: each user possesses
a dedicated device hosting her Personal Cloud instance, an instance is able to establish direct
communications with its peers and each device contains a secure component. Chapter 2 gives
a more in-depth view of this final assumption.
Our work also considers the following limitations: given that, to the best of our knowledge,
we are the first to tackle this problematic in this specific context, we solely focus on the
protection of the data exchanged and the anonymity of the participants. The information
leakage linked to the expressiveness of the query results is orthogonal to this work.
Hence, to answer the exposed problematic, we make four main contributions, listed in the
order they are introduced:
1. We propose a set of five requirements detailing the specifics any solution, evolving in the
same environment as the one we describe, should respect. Each of these requirements
deals with a specific aspect: preventing an attacker from influencing the query execu-
tion; preventing any node from concentrating information it does not own; splitting the
execution in independent tasks; and protecting the identity of the participants as well
as the content of their communications.
2. We propose SEP2P, a protocol that leverages the overlay organizing the network and a
distributed random generation algorithm to enforce the first requirement: preventing an
attacker from influencing the query execution. This protocol’s main advantage resides
in its ability to only require the participation of a limited set of nodes to achieve its
objective.
3. We propose DISPERS, a protocol that applies the last three requirements to split and
distribute the execution of a query. We define a query as a three parts structure, one
of which restrains the participants by specifying relevance criteria. We supplement
this selection by a sampling that not only enforces this limitation but does so while
preserving, to some extent, the quality of the result and actually limiting the impact of
a leakage.
We then successively apply the requirements which leads to the definition of three dis-
tinct “actor” roles, one for each part of the query. These roles are complemented by
additional protections to severely limit the scope of possible attacks.
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4. We finally propose an in-depth security analysis and performance evaluation of the
DISPERS protocol, as well as two proof-of-concepts. We notably show in the security
analysis that DISPERS achieves the optimal leakage.
The first proof-of-concept is an interactive graphical interface built for a demonstration
session during which attendees can try to bypass the security mechanisms present in
DISPERS, in order to better grasp our contribution. The second proof-of-concept takes
the form of a degraded implementation of DISPERS for the French ANR PerSoCloud
project. By adapting the requirements to a centralized context and bringing in secure
trustworthy external servers, called enclaves, we achieve a similar separation of concerns
than in DISPERS and bring community sharing capabilities to the Cozy Cloud service.
This thesis is organized in six chapters, starting with the introduction, the current chapter,
in which we detail the general context, motivations and contributions.
Chapter 2 draws up a panorama of the different subjects related to the thesis: we first
give a more precise definition of the Personal Cloud paradigm, we then continue with ways
of securing the data it contains and finally study the different manners we can organize a
fully-distributed system.
Chapter 3 introduces our first two contributions: the requirements our design follows and
SEP2P our protocol for generating a verifiable random list of actors. An evaluation completes
the description of the protocol where we assess its scalability, resilience and the impact of the
different system parameters.
The design and evaluation of the DISPERS protocol are respectively given in Chapter 4
and 5. Chapter 4 first assesses the feasibility of producing a fully-distributed protocol in our
context, and then progressively shapes our solution by introducing the different requirements
in the design. Chapter 5 follows up on this design by evaluating its security guarantees and
its performance. We then provide two proof-of-concepts implementation aiming at displaying
its capabilities during a demonstration session and fulfilling a use-case in the French ANR
PerSoCloud project.
Chapter 6 concludes this thesis by summarizing the contributions and giving some inter-
esting directions for future work.
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In this Chapter, we present the three main research areas related to our work: in Section 2.1
we discuss the different variations of the Personal Cloud starting with the more widely avail-
able online solutions and finishing up with self-hosted solutions hardened by tamper-resistant
hardware. In Section 2.2, we describe the available means that exist to increase the security
when performing data-oriented tasks: encryption, hardware-based protections and privacy-
preserving data publishing. Finally, in Section 2.3 we discuss the different ways of organizing
a fully-distributed network of nodes and explore some of the attacks these systems face as well
as their specific countermeasures.
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2.1 Personal Cloud Solutions
To give users the possibility to benefit from their data and to use them however they wish,
they have to be able to store them in a convenient manner. More and more academia projects
and industry led softwares propose credible solutions: Secure Personal Data Server[4], Open
Personal Data Store[27], Cozy Cloud[24], Nextcloud[69]. Their goal is to offer a digital place
owned and controlled by the user: her own Personal Cloud.
Hence, in this first section, we will provide a global picture of those solutions. Through
this global picture, we want to give the reader an understanding of what those technologies
offer, their architecture, their core functionalities, their trust model and their limitations.
Our study follows the thorough survey realized in [6], which sorts Personal Cloud solutions in
four categories: Online personal cloud solutions, Zero-knowledge-based personal clouds, Home
clouds software and Home cloud plugs.
2.1.1 Online Personal Cloud Solutions
This type of Personal Cloud is the most well-represented in today’s landscape: Cozy Cloud[24],
Digi.me[28], Meeco[59], Nextcloud[69], BitsAbout.me[14], and even governmental programs
like MyData[67] and MesInfos[62]. These different solutions help users gather their digital
data at the same place, in a usable format and thus make possible cross-computations of data
that are usually isolated. They claim to prohibit any secondary usage not specifically stated
in their terms and to never disclose anything to third parties unless asked for by the users
themselves.
Features. Online personal clouds typically offer three features: data collectors, cross-data
computations services and trusted data storage.
Data collectors offer users a way to automatically fetch data coming from online services.
At predefined time intervals, they connect to the online services, check if a new information
is available and download it to the personal cloud if so. Cozy Cloud offers the “harvest”
applications for that purpose, Digi.me proposes a catalog of connectors, and BitsAbout.Me
focuses more on web activity trails.
Cross-data computations services are made possible because data that are normally scat-
tered across the, closed, databases of service providers are now located at the same place.
Online personal clouds can then leverage these different sources to perform computations —
instead of doing the computation at each service provider (supposing this is a possibility).
For instance, Digi.me offers a transversal data search, in Cozy Cloud applications discuss with
the data system which exposes a number of “doctypes” corresponding to the different data it
stores, Meeco organizes the data in the form of web-tiles and life-tiles which respectively con-
sists in user-defined goals or activities on certain websites and user-defined data sets gathering
specific files or personal information.
The trusted data storage feature corresponds to the logical (if not physical) separation
of users’ data within the cloud provider’s infrastructure. Users can only access and perform
computations on their own data. Expert users can also choose, when applicable, to host their
instance on their own devices providing another separation. For example, in BitsAbout.Me, a
Personal Data Store is attributed to each user and stored encrypted. In Digi.me, the data are
encrypted and stored where the user wants. The encryption keys are derived from the user’s
password and deleted from the server at the end of each session, thus requiring the user to log
in before they can be deciphered and exploited.
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Trust model. Online personal cloud solutions make strong privacy promises in order to
gain the trust of their users. They ensure that they will never observe, exploit or disclose data
(unless asked for by the user). Three main arguments are put forward to nourish this trust:
(i) the use of the security standards of authentication, communication and data encryption,
(ii) legally binding contracts coupled with a respectful business model, and (iii) an accessible
and/or audited code base.
The first argument portrays a safe environment: accessing or storing data is done securely,
users can trust the platform, it respect the industry standards and thus no-one can snoop in
on what you are doing.
The second argument dons a more formal appearance: online personal cloud providers and
users are bound by a contract where all the treatments operated on the data are explicitly
stated, plus, because their business model is different, it is not in their financial interest to
deviate from it. Combined, these elements argue in favor of an environment where there is no
reason to spy on the users, proposing de facto a data safe haven.
The final argument is there to say that either anybody (including security experts) can
check or that security experts have checked the software. This means that any malicious code
can be rapidly detected, pleading once again in favor of a trustable platform that can be
verified.
Online personal cloud solutions cover similar functionalities: the collect of personal data,
an individualized storage, and the capacity to associate data that would have otherwise been
kept isolated. To gain the users’ trust they make strong promises backed by legal commitments,
a business model that is not data-oriented and good security practices.
However, although these promises are genuine, the extent to which they are actually bind-
ing is unclear. The security hypothesis on which these promises rely are also extremely strong:
they assume that the cloud provider and the employees are honest and that the code is trusted.
Moreover, as these solutions are centralized, if a leakage were to happen, the impact would be
important as potentially all the data could be disclosed.
To reduce the extent of the promises and the strong security hypothesis, other solutions
rely on encryption and a zero-knowledge approach.
2.1.2 Zero-Knowledge-Based Personal Clouds
Zero-knowledge-based personal clouds mainly possess architectural variations of Online per-
sonal cloud solutions. They consider that the service and cloud providers can be malicious and
ensure that no one, except the owner, can access the raw content. To do so, they encrypt the
data before sending it to the servers and they provide secure way to access them. SpiderOak
through its Share product[88] or Sync[92] are such examples.
Features. They focus on two features: secure storage and secure backup.
To provide secure storage, the data are stored encrypted on the cloud and the users inherit
the responsibility to store and manage the encryption keys. These keys are usually derived
from the users’ password to ease the management. For example, with Spideroak the cloud
provider only knows the encrypted data, with Sync the encrypted keys are derived from the
user’s password, and in Mydex the system is separated into two parts, the client side which
manages the keys during the duration of the session and the back-end storing the encrypted
files.
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Secure backup provides mostly recovery options and revision capabilities to retrieve a file
after a malicious or unintentional loss.
Trust model. Three threats are considered: (i) an attacker compromises the cloud
provider, (ii) the cloud provider uses the data in a way that was not intended and (iii) the
client device failed or was corrupted. Encrypting the data on the servers addresses the first
two threats while the secure backup feature prevents a device failure.
Zero-knowledge-based solutions offer a more secure approach as the data are not stored in
clear. However, they offer a limited set of features as the encrypted data cannot be processed
server-side. Another consequence of delegating the key management to the user and to a
client-side application is that it actually weakens the security model: users’ devices are more
easily infected.
At the same time, keeping the data at the users’ side permits more computations as they
can be processed in their raw format and if the users’ devices leverage secure hardware the same
security guarantees (as with Zero-knowledge-based solutions) can be provided: Home-cloud
softwares and Home-cloud plugs, which we detail next, respectively provide these elements.
2.1.3 Home-Cloud Softwares
Home-clouds (softwares or plugs) keep the data at the extremities of the network, as close as
possible to the user and to the device that produced them. One of the main rationale is to
effectively prevent any centralization.
More particularly, Home-cloud softwares mainly focus on how to properly share and mon-
itor the users’ data, to make sure that the privacy models they propose are respected. Open-
PDS[27] and DataBox[38] are prominent examples of Home-cloud softwares.
Features. Home-cloud softwares offers three core functionalities: trusted storage, cross-
computations and data dissemination.
Trusted storage is achieved by delegating the storage to the users’ devices: OpenPDS users
accumulate data about themselves on their personal devices (smartphone and/or computer)
and then explore it through a privacy-preserving framework; DataBox separates the storage
on different devices, called “stores”, where each store corresponds to a user’s device and is
responsible for a specific type of data.
Cross-computations in OpenPDS are done through a query-answering system called Safe
Answer that minimize the information disclosed by only answering precise questions and thus
not revealing the complete data set. DataBox creates new data stores that hold the results of
the queries and that are made available to third parties.
Data dissemination is a consequence of their query models: in both cases the users can
better control and understand which data are sent and to which third-parties. Users choose
how they disseminate their information.
Trust model. Their first assumption is that the devices which store the users’ data
are trusted. Their second is to assume that the different pieces of software they provide
is trustworthy: the data system, the audit functionalities, the query framework. DataBox
additionally advocates for the use of containers to isolate these different components to not
solely rely on this consideration.
Unfortunately, no solid proofs are given to back up the later assumption: no formal security
guarantees exist to demonstrate that the different elements respect the users’ privacy.
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Hence, Home-cloud softwares focus on providing querying and sharing capabilities that
respect the users’ privacy. To do so they store the data as close as possible to the users and
provide them with means to monitor and manage how their data are disseminated. However,
to provide these capabilities they assume that the devices and their software are trustworthy,
which represents a strong hypothesis.
2.1.4 Home-Cloud Plugs
Home-cloud plugs differ from their purely software variant because they also provide dedicated
hardware on which to host the Home-cloud software they developed.
Within the landscape of existing Home-cloud plugs we can differentiate two categories:
those leveraging tamper-resistant hardware and those which do not. We start by describing
the latter as its features and trust model are closer to Home-cloud softwares than the former.
Without Tamper-Resistant Hardware
The discontinued Lima and Helixee[70] projects were prime examples of the Home-cloud plugs.
They sold dedicated hardware on which users could “self-host”: they install a Home-cloud
software on it in order to store, manage and benefit from their personal data.
Features. The main functionalities are trusted storage and backup. The data are stored
encrypted locally and made accessible the users’ devices by the plug which holds the encryption
keys. Contacting the plug can be achieved by through a central DNS server which stores the IP
addresses associated to each plug. It can also act as a secondary backup service: an encrypted
archive is sent to the central server for a later recovery.
Trust model. Similar to the Home-cloud softwares, the main benefit of the Home-cloud
plugs is the absence of a central server storing all the data. However, like with Home-cloud
softwares, a strong assumption is made regarding the dedicated hardware and the software
that runs on it: no formal proof is given regarding its security or its respect of the users’
privacy, it has to be trusted. Although the attack surface is reduced because, normally, only
authorized applications can run on the hardware, the lack of guarantees is problematic.
Hence, Home-cloud plugs, like their software equivalent, focus on providing trusted storage
and backup capabilities as well as an eased accessibility from the different devices of the user.
The lack of formal proof concerning the security provided by the hardware and software
combination remains problematic even though the attack surface is constrained.
Leveraging tamper-resistant hardware to secure all the data-oriented operations is a way
to provide concrete guarantees to Personal Cloud.
With Tamper-Resistant Hardware
Enhancing Home-cloud plugs with tamper-resistant hardware is a proposal that comes from
research projects with the Personal Data Server[4] and Trusted Cells[7] as examples. Their
approach is to embed a minimal Trusted Computing Base (TCB) that acts as a database
management system within the secure element of the device, in order to form a decentralized
and secured data platform. Because of its strong security guarantees, the computing power of
the tamper-resistant hardware is usually limited.
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Features. Three functionalities are showcased: secure storage, secure cross-computation
and secure distributed computations.
Providing secure storage and cross-computations capabilities is relatively straight-forward:
as the database management system is embedded inside the secure element, it inherits the
security properties and can thus perform secure cross-computation. Encrypting the data on
the device is the next step to completely securing the storage.
Making secure distributed computations is achieved by relying on a untrusted central server
that possesses a much higher computing power compared to the tamper-resistant hardware.
The data are first sanitized (encrypted or anonymized) and then transferred to the server which
then realizes the computation or part of it. [98, 94] are examples of algorithms leveraging this
hybrid architecture.
Trust model. The devices holding the personal data of the users can be trusted as,
because they inherit the tamper-resistance of the hardware, software and hardware attacks are
rendered extremely difficult. Furthermore, as the embedded database management system is
relatively simple (due to the limited computing capabilities of the hardware), its administration
also is and can thus be done by the users themselves.
In this context, most of the threats come from the supporting infrastructure (the elements
directly around the secure element or the central untrusted server): it is considered as an
adversary with weakly malicious intents[13], meaning that it can deviate from the proposed
execution plan in order to learn sensitive information if and only if it cannot be detected.
Hence, associating a tamper-resistant hardware to a Home-cloud plug secures all the oper-
ations performed by a Home-cloud plug. However, because of the limited computing power of
the secure element, it is impossible to enjoy a full range of applications without relying on an
untrusted support server. Additionally, to formally prove the database management system,
its design must be minimalist and, as such, extending it later on proves to be difficult.
2.1.5 Conclusion
All Personal Clouds variations offer to store the personal data of the users on a trusted storage:
raw or encrypted on the servers of a cloud provider, on the users’ devices, or on dedicated
hardware. Depending on what can be done on this storage, i.e. depending on if it has the
capacity to operate on them, additional features can be proposed: cross-computations, data
dissemination, trusted backup, distributed computations.
Except for the last variant of Personal Cloud we described, strong assumptions regarding
the trustworthiness of the platform are made: the devices or the different softwares, all are sup-
posed to be trusted. Taking into account the recent breaches and attacks orchestrated against
major corporations (e.g. Equifax in 2017, Marriott in 2018, or Capital One in 2019), solely
relying on these assumptions is insufficient — especially more so if the data are centralized.
A Home-cloud plug combined with tamper-resistant hardware is the most adapted vari-
ation to our use-case: the data are close to the users and effectively decentralized, plus the
secure element and the Trusting Computing Base form a provably secure and thus trustable
combination. It is also the only variation that considers distributed computations, although
while relying on a central untrusted support server, which is the focus of this work. Hence,
in the remaining we consider that each user possesses a Home-cloud plug augmented with a
tamper-resistant hardware.
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The main reason for delegating part of the distributed computations is the lack of com-
puting power of the considered secure element. As we will see in the next section, not only
are there other ways of performing distributed computations, but not all secure elements are
severely limited but also widely available.
2.2 Means for an Increased Security in Data-Oriented Tasks
There are three main options to perform data-oriented task in a secure manner: as we just
saw we can rely on secure hardware, we can also compute over encrypted data, or we can first
“sanitize” the data and only make the sanitized data available.
We start this section by presenting two widely available Trusted Execution Environments
— Intel SGX and ARM TrustZone — that can be used as tamper-resistant hardware. We
then describe existing work relying on tamper-resistant hardware to perform distributed com-
putations. We follow up with encryption-based solutions: Functional Encryption, Multi-Party
Computations and Homomorphic Encryption. And we lastly explore Privacy-Preserving Data
Publishing options: k-anonymity, l-diversity, t-closeness, and ε-differential privacy.
2.2.1 Trusted Execution Environment
Secure Hardware (SHW) solutions are varied and widely used: the chips embedded in our
credit cards, the SIM in our phones, some hard-drives, identity cards or passports. Their
main feature is to securely store sensitive information but they can also provide some physical
protection or use cryptographic primitives for various usages. Unfortunately, as most of those
were developed for very specific use-cases, they are only appropriate for predefined scenarios.
Hence, what can we use in combination with a PDMS? Quite obviously, the SHW should have
some computing capabilities: if it only provides secure storage then, when doing distributed
computations, the exchanged data would need to remain encrypted which would force us to
use Homomorphic Encryption which we now know to be impractical. However, this constraint
is not enough: smart cards do have computing capabilities but they are extremely limited and
clearly not enough to permit generic computations efficiently. Thus, in addition to having
computing capabilities, those capabilities should not be too restricted so as to not hinder the
range of possible distributed computations.
Considering these elements, a certain class of SHW appears to match our needs: Trusted
Execution Environments (TEE). [80] gives the following definition of a TEE:
Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) is a tamper-resistant processing en-
vironment that runs on a separation kernel. It guarantees the authenticity of the
executed code, the integrity of the run time states (e.g. CPU registers, memory and
sensitive I/O), and the confidentiality of its code, data and run time states stored
on a persistent memory. In addition, it shall be able to provide remote attestation
that proves its trustworthiness for third-parties. The content of TEE is not static;
it can be securely updated. The TEE resists against all software attacks as well
as the physical attacks performed on the main memory of the system. Attacks
performed by exploiting back door security flaws are not possible.
Hence, a TEE is a hardware that provides isolation, from a potentially corrupted host
system, attestation, i.e. proof that it runs the code it is supposed to, and tamper-resistance,
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to both physical and software attacks. In the following we take a look at the two most widely
available TEEs: TrustZone developed by AMD and Secure Guard eXtension developed by
Intel.
TrustZone
TrustZone has recently been gaining traction both in academia and industry[73] with projects
such as Android’s Keystore[8], Open Portable TEE[51], Open-TEE[58] or TrustICE[90]. This
increase in the interest is mainly due to the widespread adoption of devices embedding Trust-
Zone compatible ARM processors: several billion mobile devices and more than half of the
Internet of Things[73].
TrustZone’s architecture can be summed up by the existence of two “worlds”: a secure and
a normal one. The secure world is isolated at the hardware level from the normal world: the
memory is partitioned into secure and non-secure sections, processors change state depend-
ing on the execution, special registers are protected and can only be accessed by processors
functioning in the secure state. To operate this “world transition” two strategies exist, de-
pending on the generation of the processors: Cortex-A processors possess an extra processor
mode that handles this task, the monitor mode; Cortex-M processors directly do this switch
in exception handling code. This second option induces faster context switch and a lower
power-consumption.
Applications using the secure world as a TEE can be separated into two, according to the
architecture they put in place[73]: TEE service or TEE kernel.
A TEE service implements a single specific function and does not need guidance to manage its
memory or cross-world communications. Each service is deployed on a single device so as to
prevent any interference. DroidVault[49] and the Android Key Store[8] are representatives of
this architecture: the first offers a trusted storage via a data protection manager that executes
in the secure world, the second provides a container to secure cryptographic keys that can
only be unlocked in the secure world.
A TEE kernel is much like a conductor: it implements a basic set of OS functions and
orchestrates several TEE instances by managing their memory in the secure world, handling
their communications or even providing them with APIs. Samsung Knox[83] and TrustICE[90]
are examples of such architecture: they respectively provide secure containers or isolated
computing environments in which “normal” applications are either executed or can access a
restricted part of the storage and memory.
SGX: Software Guard EXtensions
The Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) technology was first introduced in 2013[5]. The
objective is to give service providers and data holders the guarantee that their secrets and/or
sensitive content are protected, to let them know which software is using them and in which
environment. To do so, SGX generate protected software containers, called enclaves, that
are isolated from the operating system and the hypervisor. This material isolation is notably
ensured through encryption of part of the memory and the usage of specific parts of the
processor (e.g. “measurement” registers), both of which provides confidentiality and integrity
protections to the data. Several enclaves can be launched on the same platform, for example
one for each version of the same software, and are all isolated from each other.
In addition to being able to access hardware-based security mechanisms, SGX equips
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enclaves with two equally important features: attestation and sealing.
The attestation mechanism is there to provide a proof that a specific software is securely
running within an enclave. An attestation can be “local”, i.e. used between two enclaves
running on the same platform, or “remote”, i.e. for a third party outside the platform.
The sealing mechanism is used to persist the sensitive data once the enclave is destroyed.
Indeed, due to their nature, special precautions must be taken to store them outside of the
secure environment. SGX enclaves have access to Sealing Keys that they can use to encrypt
and integrity-protect them. The sealing can be bound to several enclaves through the use of
a Security Version Number: all enclaves possessing this number can unseal the data.
The scientific community has been extremely prolific with regard to the possible use-
cases for SGX: hardening already existing technology[16, 41], revisiting others[64, 74], or even
encrypting[33].
Weaknesses have also been highlighted by recent works[100, 25, 40]: for example, the
foreshadow attack[100] showcased that it is possible to retrieve sensitive information from
inside the enclave by speculating on the way it executes a program.
Trusted Execution Environments, through their two main representatives, offer a viable
and widely available option to secure the data at the user’s side. Hence, with little to no
effort, users could be paired with a secure PDMS: an ARM processor with TrustZone or an
Intel one with SGX. We make no further assumption regarding the type of TEE they use and
we do not require any additional security component or mechanism: as long as it provides
isolation and tamper-resistance to software and physical attacks, any TEE is suitable.
Hence, each user is equipped with a secure PDMS, with which we can ensure a global and
equivalent level of security. We can then safely make them exchange sensitive information,
effectively creating a fully distributed peer-to-peer system.
2.2.2 Secure Hardware Based Distributed Computations
PAMPAS[94] and the work by To et al.[97, 98] both leverage a decentralized network of nodes
reinforced by tamper-resistant hardware to perform privacy-preserving computations.
PAMPAS: Privacy Aware Mobile Participatory Sensing Using Secure Probes
PAMPAS[94] objective is to perform privacy-aware mobile participatory sensing to monitor, for
instance, urban activities such as noise, traffic, or air pollution. To do so they rely on a hybrid
architecture composed of a supporting server infrastructure (SSI) and secure probes (SP). The
role of the SSI is to coordinate the communications and computations between the probes.
A secure probe can be any portable device comprising a tamper-resistant secure element: a
phone with a new generation Sim card for example. This secure element is considered to offer a
high level of security and is thus assumed to be trusted (i.e. inviolable). This assumption also
comes at a price: the secure element usually has low power CPU and a tiny RAM, effectively
preventing any intensive operation.
The mobile participatory sensing is performed following a three phases protocol: (i) the
SSI collects all the encrypted updates sent by the probes, (ii) the SSI starts a processing
period during which a small subset of probes are randomly selected and are tasked to perform
a partial aggregation of the updates (after decrypting them), (iii) the partial aggregate are
sent to the querier which compute the final aggregation.
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A private symmetric key is shared between all the probes and stored within the secure
element (to prevent any malicious user or the SSI from accessing it), so that only the probes
can decrypt the updates.
This approach yields several benefits: delegating the private key management to the secure
element ensures that only these access the raw data of other users, relying on the SSI to
coordinate the computations frees the secure elements from the task of maintaining a peer-to-
peer overlay, and, except for intensive task, using secure elements yields no restriction on the
computations that can be performed.
Nevertheless, having only one private key to encrypt (although it is changed regularly and
propagated using asymmetric encryption) represents a single point of failure: if a single secure
element is compromised then all the information can be leaked. The SSI worsens this situation
as once it possesses the private symmetric keys it can decrypt all updates and even attribute
them to specific probes.
Privacy-Preserving Query Execution on a Secure Decentralized Architecture
In [98, 97] their objective is to show that global computation and privacy protection are
compatible concepts. They assume that the network is comprised of Trusted Cells [7] nodes —
personal clouds that are secured by a secure hardware — and they want to be able to compute
SQL-like queries on these, with a focus on joins and aggregates queries, while respecting the
privacy of the users.
For this they assume that each personal cloud is a Trusted Data Store (TDS): they offer
high security, low availability, modest computing resources, they all share the same database
scheme, are considered honest and the secure hardware inviolable. As with PAMPAS, they
also introduce an honest-but-curious supporting server infrastructure (SSI) in order to execute
a query.
The generic protocol for executing a query has three phases: a collection phase, an aggre-
gation phase (optional) and a filtering phase.
During the collection phase, the Querier first puts up its encrypted query on the SSI. The
TDS nodes download the query and either reply with dummy data or their local result if they
have or can produce one (an access control operation is first performed). The local results,
dummies or not, are encrypted using probabilistic encryption based on a shared symmetric
key k2 to prevent the SSI from conducting frequency-based attacks on the cyphertext. The
query itself is encrypted using a shared symmetric key k1. The key k1 is known to all the TDS
and the Querier, while k2 is only known to all the TDS.
During the aggregation phase, the SSI partitions the local results so TDS nodes — not
necessarily the ones that participated — can remove the dummy results and perform partial
aggregations iteratively until all results have been aggregated, leading to a Covering Result.
Partial results are encrypted using a shared symmetric key k2 known to all TDS except for
the Querier and the SSI.
Different ways of performing this phase are considered: instead of performing probabilistic
encryption to hide the results, a combination of symmetric encryption and noise can be em-
ployed to attain the same result. Indeed, in both cases the SSI cannot conduct frequency-based
attacks but in the latter it can help sort the results and speed up the aggregation process as
it can group the results based on the, deterministic, cyphertext.
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During the filtering phase, the SSI partitions once again the Covering Result so that TDS
nodes can filter out either the dummy results (if no aggregation phase was needed), or removing
the unwanted groups (for instance those that do not satisfy the HAVING clause of a query). At
the end of this phase the SSI informs the Querier that the final result is available.
Executing distributed queries leveraging this hybrid architecture shows that it is possible
to achieve a generic privacy-preserving query framework. However, similar to PAMPAS, the
security hypothesis are strong: if a single TDS node is compromised, the full set of encryption
key is divulged and the users’ data are all at risk. If the SSI colludes with this single corrupted
TDS node then every data of every query execution are disclosed, completely exposing the
users.
Another way to perform distributed computations that notably solves this key management
problem is to use encryption-based solutions.
2.2.3 Encryption-Based Solutions
There are three main encryption-based solutions to perform, generic, distributed computa-
tions: Functional Encryption that proposes an encryption scheme that only reveals the result
of a specific function, Multi-Party Computations that proposes ad-hoc protocols and Homo-
morphic Encryption that can perform any computation directly on encrypted data.
Functional Encryption
Functional Encryption (FE)[15] allows fine-grained access control and selectivity in the pro-
cessing of the encrypted data. The objective of a FE scheme is to provide a way to compute a
specific function f over some encrypted data c and to only reveal f(x), where x is the under-
lying plaintext associated to c. To achieve this, a public key and master secret key are first
generated, then a secret key, skf , for the function f is derived from the master key, and the
plaintext is encrypted using the public key. Using skf , f can be applied over the cyphertext
and yields f(x). This last operation is called decryption.
Although promising, Functional Encryption has two main drawbacks: (i) a different secret
key must be computed for each function, making a complex processing impractical; and (ii)
the data have to be encrypted with the same key, and thus the same party, the one possessing
the public key. These elements prevent all distributed applications where the participants do
not trust each other.
Multi-Input Functional Encryption[35] or Decentralized Multi-Client Functional Encryp-
tion[20] try to address these limitations but these solutions are not perfect either: their pro-
tection is either bound to the number of information the adversary has access to, or they are
simply not generic.
Hence, being an active research topic and considering its properties, Functional Encryption
will be an interesting approach to do distributed computations once these limitations are
alleviated.
Multi-Party Computation
Introduced by Yao in 1982 with its, now, famous question — How can two millionaires know
who is richer without disclosing their individual wealth to each other? — Multi-Party Com-
putation (MPC) provides means to compute over data (not necessarily encrypted) and only
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reveal the final answer to the participants. In other words, no participant knows more than
its input and the final output.
Two model paradigms exist in the literature to solve MPC problems: the ideal model that
supposes that there is at least one trusted third-parties among the participants and the real
model that makes no such assumption. Considering the objective of this work, only solutions
following the real model are applicable.
There are mainly three types of solutions to MPC problems[81, 85]: anonymization, ran-
domization and cryptography.
Anonymization relies on one or several trusted third parties to hide the identities of the
participants. It thus takes after the ideal model which we discarded.
Randomization consists in adding random values, “noise”, to hide the data. As an illustra-
tion, the following protocol is a trivial way of computing a secure sum using randomization:
(i) an initiator is first elected among the participants; (ii) this initiator adds a random number
to her input and transmits the sum to the next party; (iii) the next party then adds her own
number to this sum and sends the total to the next party; (iv) this procedure is repeated
until all parties have contributed; (v) the complete sum is finally transmitted to the initiator
who subtracts the random number and obtain the final result without revealing any individual
input.
Cryptography techniques assemble basic cryptographic tools to construct a secure compu-
tation. Some of the most important cryptographic tools are: Yao’s millionaires problem —
comparing values without disclosing them, Homomorphic encryption — a type of encryption
that preserves certain operation if they are performed on the cyphertext, Oblivious Trans-
fer — a type of information transfer in which the sender does not know which information
the receiver obtained, and Private Matching — an operation that lets two parties know the
intersection of their data sets without revealing them.
Despite their interesting properties, those strategies are for the vast majority ad-hoc solu-
tions for specific applications[23]: secure sum, secure set union, secure size of set intersection,
secure scalar product, privacy-preserving statistical analysis. This makes it difficult to produce
a generic framework that can be used in most situations.
More importantly, once an MPC protocol is devised in order to be computed it first has
to be transformed into a boolean or arithmetic circuit which is a complex, error-prone and
time-consuming task. Worst, its execution time can be extremely long, especially more so if
the number of participants increases: in [52] they have managed to compute a single AES-256
circuit in 33ms but in a 2-party setting, with a highly-optimized circuit and relatively powerful
hardware. These assumptions are not compatible with our desired setting.
Homomorphic Encryption
An encryption scheme is considered homomorphic if a certain operation is “preserved” when
applied on the encrypted data: if e(a) is the encrypted value of a and e(b) of b, then, if
e(a)⊗ e(b) = e(a⊗ b), e is considered homomorphic over the operation ⊗.
Since the breakthrough by Gentry[34], homomorphic encryption (HE) schemes can be
categorized into three groups[2]: Partially Homomorphic Encryption (PHE), Somewhat Ho-
momorphic Encryption (SWHE) and Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE). As the first two
groups can only perform a limited number of operations (PHE) or some operations but a lim-
ited number of times (SWHE), they cannot be applied in our context, since they would severely
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hinder our capabilities to perform generic operations. Hence, let us study Fully Homomorphic
Encryption.
The first FHE scheme developed by Gentry[34] opened a new research path for HE schemes
that were until then either PHE or SWHE. An FHE scheme supports an unlimited number
of operations for an unlimited number of times, meaning that any operation can theoretically
be computed on encrypted data. Unfortunately, despite the major advancement this repre-
sents and the successive improvements made over this leading work, FHE has an excessive
computational cost (in terms of time spent and resources required) which, in practice, makes
it far from applicable: it took 4 minutes for the most efficient implementation[2] to evaluate
the AES circuit homomorphically.1
Hence, state of the art encryption schemes and algorithms that stemmed from them offer a
secure but impractical approach to data sharing, especially in a fully distributed context where
no trusted third-party is available. Functional Encryption and Multi-Party Computations offer
solutions to specific use-cases that are complex to extend, while Fully Homomorphic Encryp-
tion schemes overcome these limitations but at the price of an extremely high computational
cost.
A way to alleviate this cost is to rely on Privacy-Preserving Data Publishing techniques
that, instead of encrypting the data, first sanitize them before publishing.
2.2.4 Privacy-Preserving Data Publishing techniques
The basic idea behind Privacy-Preserving Data Publishing (PPDP) is to protect the private
data, i.e. the user’s sensitive information, by “distorting” the data that will be made public
before its actual publication, at the expense of a loss of utility of the public data in the later
processing stages.
This distortion operation is not a straightforward task: correctly performing it is highly de-
pendent on the type of data to protect, on the background knowledge the attacker is presumed
to have and on other publicly available complementary sources of information.
In this section we explore the four main approaches to PPDP: k-anonymity, l-diversity,
t-closeness and ε-differential privacy.
k-Anonymity
Introduced by Samarati[82] and Sweeney[91], k-anonymity, aims at providing a measure con-
cerning the “disclosure risk” of a given data set. The main idea is to compute the number of
records that share the same values or subset of values: the more records there are and the less
discriminative those values are. This analysis arose after the identification of the Governor
of Massachusetts in a supposedly anonymized set of health records: the gender, zip code,
date of birth and diagnosis of state employees were revealed, which, by itself, did not disclose
any personally identifiable information but, once linked with the voters registration records,
uniquely identified the Governor.
The following definition was given to such subset of values:
quasi-identifier. A quasi-identifier (QI) is a set of non-sensitive attributes that, once
linked with external data, can uniquely identify an individual in the general population.
1The evaluation is: (i) a client sends the AES key k using FHE, i.e. FHE(k); (ii) the client uploads the data
encrypted with AES, AESk(m); (iii) the server computes FHE(AESk(m)); (iv) it homomorphically decrypts
it to obtain FHE(m) which it can use to compute any homomorphic operation.
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We also define an equivalence class as the set of records that share the same values for
a QI. In the Massachusetts example, the quasi-identifier was the tuple (zip code, birth
date, sex).
Deriving a definition for k-anonymity is then straight-forward:
k-anonymity. A data set satisfies k-anonymity for a given QI if and only if each equivalence
class for the QI appears with at least k occurrences in the data set.
Age Zip code Occupation
≥ 20 65200 Student
≥ 20 65200 PhD Candidate
≥ 30 69000 Cook
≥ 30 69000 Nurse
Table 2.1: A 2-anonymous data set on (Age, Zip code)
Although it yields interesting properties on the data and offers, to some extent, certain
guarantees on the privacy of the records, this method is not perfect. Indeed, very few data
sets naturally possess this property for any QI, that is why the data are first sanitized to limit
the possible QIs. Furthermore, as we will see next, in some particular cases the protection
can be non-existent.
l-Diversity
l-diversity[56] stems from two weaknesses of the k-anonymity model: (i) an attacker can
infer sensitive information if there is little diversity in the data set, and (ii) if attackers
possess background-knowledge, k-anonymity cannot ensure privacy. Both those attacks can




Female 2* Heart Disease
Female 2* Viral Infection
Table 2.2: Illustration of attacks on k-anonymity
Let us assume that this data set contains the “anonymized” records of the recently admitted
patients of the nearby hospital. If a curious citizen knows that one of her male friend is in
that list, she knows he has cancer since all male patients are treated for that condition. This
is an illustration of attack (i), known as an homogeneity attack.
Suppose now, that the curious citizen also has a female friend in her twenties that was
recently admitted. She knows that this friend is a talented athlete, subject to regular tests
(included cardiac ones). Given this history she can infer with a relatively high probability
that she was admitted for a viral infection. This illustrates attack (ii), called a background-
knowledge attack.
To overcome those weaknesses, [56] proposed the l-diversity principle:
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l-diversity principle. To any set of values for a quasi-identifier (QI) should be associated,
at least, l “well-represented” values for the sensitive attribute S.
The notion of “representation” is left to an instantiation of the principle. A simplistic
approach would be to require that each equivalence class has l distinct values for the sensitive
attribute. Being simplistic, this approach has a quite obvious limitation: if a value is much
more frequent than others, an attacker can do probabilistic inference attacks. [56] gives two
additional and less trivial examples: Entropy l-Diversity and Recursive (c, l)-Diversity. As the
name implies, Entropy l-Diversity views the representation of a sensitive value as its entropy
and enforces that each should exceed a lower bound, log(l). The Recursive (c, l)-Diversity
stipulates that the most frequent sensitive values should not appear too often and the least
frequent ones no too infrequently: the number of times, r1, the most frequent value appears




t-closeness[48] proposes a model that, in the same vein as l-diversity for k-anonymity, aims at
overcoming certain limitations of l-diversity. Indeed, l-diversity is (i) difficult and sometimes
unnecessary to achieve and (ii) it does not always prevent attribute disclosure.
Limitation (i) is illustrated by a scenario where there are only two sensitive values and
one is much more present than the other (e.g. HIV test results). Any record that has the less
represented value is all the more sensitive, making a 2-diverse table extremely lossy as the
upper bound of the number of equivalence classes would be equal to the number of records
having the less represented value (to be unable to distinguish a record with one or the other
value).
The same scenario can be used to explain (ii): any equivalence class containing the same
number of sensitive values yields a probability of having the less represented value of 50%,
which is much higher than in the overall population and thus presents a serious privacy risk.
To prevent those limitations, t-closeness considers the information gain relative to both
the whole population and the current equivalence class:
t-closeness principle. An equivalence class is said to have t-closeness if the distance
between the distribution of a sensitive attribute in this class and the distribution of the attribute
in the whole table is no more than a threshold t. A table is said to have t-closeness if all
equivalence classes have t-closeness[48].
To measure the distance between two distributions, the Earth Mover’s distance (EMD)[79]
is employed as it also captures, with a little bit of tweaking, the semantic distance between
values.
ε-Differential Privacy
Proposed in [30], the core mechanism behind ε-Differential Privacy can be roughly summed
up as: the addition, deletion or modification of a single record should have no significant effect
(i.e. “less than ε”) on the results of any analysis. To showcase this property, one could think
of an insurance provider not being able to modify its attribution policy depending on whether
or not the individuals are present in the database they consult to reach a decision.
A formal definition, given in [30], is:
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ε-differential privacy. A randomized function K gives ε-differential privacy if for all
data sets D1 and D2 differing on at most one element, and all S ∈ Range(K),
Pr[K(D1) ∈ S] ≤ exp(ε)× Pr[K(D2) ∈ S]
The probability is taken over the coin tosses of K.
This definition only provides a condition to respect, that is to ensure that the result of
a randomized computation does not differ more than ε for two extremely close inputs. To
achieve it, random noise is added to the query function — transforming it into a randomized
function.
2.2.5 Conclusion
In this section we saw three ways of performing distributed computations while preserving
(or, at least, trying to) the users’ privacy.
Continuing on the previous section and the Home-Cloud plugs enhanced with tamper-
resistant hardware, we started by detailing two widely available Trusted Execution Environ-
ments, ARM TrustZone and Intel SGX, that can be used as tamper-resistant hardware. We
then saw two works that leverage a hybrid architecture composed of a supporting server in-
frastructure and a decentralized network of secure elements to perform privacy-preserving
distributed computations. These solutions have two identical main drawbacks: (i) they are
not fully decentralized as a support server is mandatory to coordinate the computation and
(ii) their security model assume that the secure elements cannot be compromised, which leads
them to share an encryption key that protects the exchanged data, thus forming a single point
of failure.
We then explored encryption-based solutions: Functional Encryption that only discloses
the output of a function while keeping the input data encrypted, Multi-Party Computation
protocols that offer ad-hoc solutions to specific problems and Fully Homomorphic Encryption
schemes that can compute any function on encrypted data (provided they are encrypted
appropriately). These approaches also have limitations: Functional Encryption and Multi-
Party Computations are not generic and hard to extend (if not hardly extensible), while the
generic Fully Homomorphic Encryption schemes are far from scalable.
We lastly discussed Privacy-Preserving Data Publishing techniques: k-Anonymity, l-Diversity,
t-Closeness, and ε-Differential Privacy. They offer ways of measuring the privacy leaks and
means to contain them so that, in the end, the disclosed information is not enough to single
out a user. Again, these strategies all have an intrinsic limitation: they assume knowledge
on the entire distribution of the data (or at least to a sizable subset), an assumption that is
relatively hard to materialize in a fully-distributed environment without a trusted third-party.
Furthermore, making use of these solutions implies a trade-off in terms of utility: either we
increase the privacy guarantees and loose quality or we reduce the privacy guarantees and
increase quality.
Hence, no current solution satisfies our requirements of only relying on a fully-decentralized
network of Home-Cloud plugs secured with tamper-resistant hardware and assuming that some
can be corrupted. However, with the development, wide availability and reasonable computing
power of recent Trusted Execution Environments, an architecture where the computations is
distributed between the nodes and performed inside the secure element becomes feasible. This
architecture is thus the one we choose to rely on in this work.
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In order to efficiently use this network the first step is to properly organize it. Peer-to-Peer
systems perfectly suit our needs: they leave the organization of the network to the peers.
2.3 Peer-to-Peer Systems
Peer-to-Peer (P2P) systems were popular at the beginning of the internet, at a time where
hardware was not powerful enough to handle the data and interactions of a multitude of
users. In this configuration, each node has the same importance and can play any role — an
important aspect in a distributed computation.
The properties we are looking for in such system is the capacity to store and retrieve an
information in an efficient manner, i.e. in as little communications as possible while storing
as little information as possible. Indeed, as a PDMS is first and foremost the personal digital
space of its owner, this primary features must remain unhindered.
In this section we will first take a look at the already existing solutions for organizing such
network, from “unstructured” to “structured” techniques, which will lead us to Distributed
Hash Tables, a solution that we will explore in more details. We will then explicit the typical
threats faced by those systems: Sybil attacks — where an attacker floods the network with fake
malicious nodes, and Byzantine Fault Tolerance — where, if an attacker controls a sufficient
portion of the network, an honest node cannot function properly anymore.
2.3.1 Unstructured Peer-to-Peer systems
As stated previously, peer-to-peer systems are commonly divided into two categories: unstruc-
tured and structured.
As the name indicates, unstructured systems are not “strictly” organized: flooding, random
walks, or expanding-ring time-to-live (TTL) techniques are used to query the graph of nodes
composing the network. Indeed, as the nodes are not organized, they form a graph with no
specific or predetermined shape thus rendering any globally efficient optimization impossible.
Hence, in order to obtain an answer a sufficient portion of the network — if not all — must
be interrogated.
Gnutella[95], Freenet[21] and the Blockchain[68] are iconic representatives of such system.
Let us see how they operate.
Gnutella
The Gnutella protocol is rather simple: a node in the network is called a “servent” (a mix
of server and client, “serv”–“ent”, as nodes can play both roles) and has at its disposal five
“descriptors”: Ping — to discover new servents, Pong — to answer a Ping descriptor, Query
— to search for some keywords, QueryHit — to answer a Query descriptor with relevant files
names, and Push — to send a set of files to another servent (usually in reply to a QueryHit
descriptor).
Being the first of its kind and because of its popularity and its simplistic design (and
the resulting shortcomings), Gnutella has been extensively studied and several improvements
have been proposed and implemented: Ultrapeers[87] to increase the routing performance, [37]
measured key network metrics and showed that Gnutella is deeply heterogeneous, [19] describes
a modified Gnutella, called Gia, that brings flow control, dynamic topology adaptation to
render P2P system scalable.
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Freenet
The first white paper describing Freenet dates back to 19992 and, to the day of this writing,
Freenet’s network is still active. Freenet[21] is a self-organizing and completely decentralized
network that uses the free disk space of the participants to share files while, at the same
time, protecting the privacy of its users, maintaining data integrity and adapting itself to the
current usage patterns. As we will see later with the Distributed Hash Tables, Freenet uses
Globally Unique IDentifiers (GUID) to assign a location to nodes and files in the network. In
the case of files, this identifier is obtained by computing a secure hash of the file to be stored.
The objective is to ensure uniqueness and integrity: identical files will receive the same GUID
and once the file is received the GUID can be computed once again to check that the file was
not altered. For nodes, the identifier is collaboratively generated following a “cryptographic
protocol for shared random number generation that prevents any participant from biasing the
result”. With that number, the new node is assigned responsibility for a region of the key
space.
Based on those GUIDs, the routing, be it for storing or locating a file, is made possible:
the GUID is computed and the nodes transfer to the closest3 node they know the request until
it either reaches its destination or fails. If the request is successful, the result is transferred
back following the same path (in reverse direction) so that each node on the way can learn
who is responsible for that GUID and enrich their routing information. The request fails if no
contacted node manages the given GUID and the Time-to-Live (TTL) counter reaches zero.
This counter is used to avoid flooding the network by killing requests after a certain point.
Freenet also requires each node to generate a pair of asymmetric keys before it can join
the network. These keys are used to create “pointers” that indirectly reference files and ensure
that only the creator can update these pointers.
Blockchain
The last example of unstructured peer-to-peer system is the blockchain. The blockchain tech-
nology came to light after the publication of [68], published under a pseudonym. The core
idea is to solve the “double-spending problem” without relying on a trusted third-party. To
do so, peers generate proof for each operation, the so-called blocks, which, once linked, form a
chain tracing all operations: a “blockchain”. This chain of proofs can then be checked by any
peer and prevents any double-spending.
To generate a block, peers must mine. The mining operation is a costly CPU intensive
task which consist in solving the following problem: given an input i, find a complementary
data n (a nonce) such that h(i + n) starts with δ leading zero bits — where δ is a constant
fixed by the system, h a cryptographic hash function and + a simple concatenation. Finding
a solution requires an average work that is exponential with the number of zero bits required.
Once a solution is found, the block, i.e. its input and the corresponding solution, is broadcast
to all the peers in the network. As no solution is unique, several valid blocks, potentially
attesting different inputs, can cohabit. To elect one, a longest chain policy is applied: each
block references4 a predecessor and the longest chain in the network is chosen as “correct”.
Proofs generated in that manner are deemed proofs-of-work.
2https://freenetproject.org/assets/papers/ddisrs.pdf
3The notion of “closeness” is left to implementation and is obtained by comparing two GUIDs.
4Chosen by the miner.
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Each block contains a hash of the previous block and a list of transactions. A transaction
stipulates the previous and the current owner for the resource, r, it is attached to: (r) Alice
→ Bob. For later checks, each resource keeps the list of all its previous owners. Whenever a
transaction occurs, it is broadcast to the entire network so that miners (possibly all the nodes
in the network, hence the broadcast) can work on a next block.
The most famous blockchain is the one used by Bitcoin, named after the paper and the
resource it proposes. In Bitcoin, whenever a block is mined, a certain quantity of resources is
created and attributed to the peers that mined it. Other alternatives exist and rest upon the
same principles such as Ethereum[31, 32], Litecoin[53], or Zcash[103, 104].
Due to its public nature, where all transactions are broadcast and recorded inside blocks
that are also broadcast, it is with relative ease that one can make a compelling case against
it for a privacy-respectful context. Nonetheless, a public record is not the only issue (even
though it is still enough to disregard it): the creation of blocks demands resources thus turning
PDMS into miners and potentially costing users a substantial amount of money, eventually
preventing a mass adoption from the public.
2.3.2 Structured Peer-to-Peer Systems: Distributed Hash Tables
Organizing the overlay network mainly yields two advantages: firstly and most importantly it
reduces the flooding of the entire network by creating efficient communication paths; secondly,
it reduces the amount of additional “load” each node has to deal with to maintain a coherent
overlay network (e.g. reduced routing tables, optimized redundancy, optimized storage).
To achieve it, a Distributed Hash Table (DHT) is usually created: unique keys are asso-
ciated with data and nodes, these keys are then used to construct a structured graph and to
assign data to nodes. In the remainder of this section we describe the most well-know DHT:
Pastry[78], CAN[75], Kademlia[57] and Chord[89].
Pastry
Pastry[78] organizes the network following a circle. A random 128-bit unique numeric identi-
fier, a nodeId, which ranges from 0 to 2128−1 is attributed to each node. The actual generation
of those identifiers is left to implementation but it is assumed that it gives a uniform distri-
bution (e.g. using a cryptographic hash function). The randomness in the attribution is to
bring diversity to the set of neighbors each node has (e.g. in terms of geography, jurisdiction,
ownership).
Pastry achieves on average a routing of dO(log2b(N))e steps, where N is the number of
nodes in the network and b is a system parameter — usually equal to 4. The routing is
achieved by comparing the digits of the key of the destination to the key of the, successive,
nodes. For example to route a query to 1234, it would go to any node matching ∗ ∗ ∗4 then
∗ ∗ 34 (e.g. AE34 matches ∗ ∗ 34), ∗234 and finally 1234. The routing also takes into account
network locality by considering a proximity metric and always favoring the “closest” node.
To store a file in the network, a hash of the file’s name and owner is computed and used
as a fileId. The k nodes having the numerically closest nodeIds to the fileId will store the
file.
To correctly forward look up queries each node maintains three sets of nodes: a routing
table, a neighborhood set and a leaf set. The routing table contains dO(log2b(N))e rows of
2b − 1 nodes, where the entries in row n refer to nodes that share the first n digits of the
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current node’s nodeId and not the n + 1 digit. The value of b involves a trade-off: a higher
value reduces the number of hops required to reach the destination at the cost of an increased
size of the routing table. The neighborhood set regroups the M closest nodes, according to
the proximity metric. This list helps at providing only “close” nodes in the routing table:
it buffers the closest nodes, regardless of their nodeId, by regularly probing its neighbors’
neighborhood sets. The leaf set contains L nodes divided into two groups: |L|/2 nodes that
have the numerically closest larger nodeId and |L|/2 nodes that have the numerically closest
smaller nodeId. This set ensures appropriating routing if the routing table fails at providing
the next link in the chain of forwarding.
To join Pastry, a new node starts by computing its nodeId and then asks a node already
belonging to the network a “join” query providing its nodeId. All the nodes on the path of
that query, which ends once the closest node to its nodeId is reached, return their sets to the
new node so that it can build its own.
When a node leaves the network, all the nodes update their different sets whenever the
departure is detected. For the leaf set, the node with the largest nodeId on the side of the
node that left is asked for its leaf table and an appropriate replacement is found there. For
the routing table, one of the node belonging to the same row is asked for the entry it has at the
same spot. Finally, for the neighborhood set, the node asks its neighbors for their neighborhood
tables, checks the distance and picks the closest node.
Content Addressable Network
The Content Addressable Network structures the overlay network following a multi-dimensional
cartesian coordinate space on a multi-torus. Each node is assigned a zone in this space ac-
cording to a unique identifier that is hashed, usually its IP address. Once placed, the nodes
construct their routing table that contains all the nodes that share a common edge along, at
least, one of the dimensions of the virtual coordinate space. Each entry in the routing table
contains the address and the coordinates of the zone controlled by the neighbor.
Like Chord[89] and Kademlia[57], CAN stores {key, value} pairs in the network. When-
ever a node wants to store an object, it first computes a hash of that object to obtain its key
and then associates a value that leads to its retrieval.
To route a query towards a destination each node on the path computes the distance
between the zone of each of its neighbors and the destination, and forwards it to the closest
one. This routing mechanism is used both for insertion and look up.
CAN achieves a routing performance of O(d×N1/d)—where d is the number of dimensions
and N the number of nodes — and each node has to keep a routing table with, on average,
2× d entries.
To join the network a new node contacts a node already present (relying for example on
bootstrap peers) and gives it a random point P . This point is looked up in the CAN network
as if it were a look up query. Once at its destination, the node managing the zone containing
P will hand over half of the zone to the new node, the keys belonging in that zone and the
list of its neighbors.
Leaving the network results in the execution of a takeover algorithm by the neighbors of
the departing node. The neighbor with the smallest region will inherit the zone, so as to keep
all the zones roughly at the same size.
To increase the performances of the routing CAN proposes a number of enhancements: by
permuting the dimensions of the coordinate space, (x, y, z)→ (y, x, z), independent coordinate
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spaces can be created where each node is assigned a zone in those spaces, called realities. Data
are replicated in each of the realities, thus providing even more routing paths. For further
data availability improvements, several hash functions could be used to insert data in as much
locations of the virtual space. To reduce the latency between nodes, landmarks can be placed
at strategic points in the virtual space such that new nodes first measure the round-trip-
time they have with them, then sort the landmarks in ascending order, and finally inherit
a zone associated to that ordering. For a more uniform partitioning of the virtual space,
optimization strategies can be employed. For instance, instead of inheriting the zone pointed
to by the (random) point P , a new node could first check if a larger zone exists in the vicinity
and inherit half of that larger zone instead.
Kademlia
Kademlia[57] takes the same approach as CAN: nodes are assigned a 160-bit unique identifier
using a hash of another value, {key, value} pairs are stored and a routing based on the
identifiers of the nodes is used to efficiently locate a provided key.
Nodes in a Kademlia DHT are treated as leaves in a binary tree where the position of a
node is determined by the shortest unique prefix of its identifier. Kademlia ensures that each
node knows at least another node in any of the subtrees in which it is not included (see the
circles in the figure below). For this purpose, whenever a node transmits a message it also
includes its identifier, permitting the recipient to record it if necessary.
Leveraging this property, any node can find a key by successively querying the closest
node·s known: node A asks the α closest nodes it knows to locate a key, which either return
the possessor or the α closest nodes (α is a system-wide concurrency parameter). To obtain
the distance between two keys, Kademlia computes the exclusive or, XOR, and interprets the
result as an integer: d(x, y) = x ⊕ y. Like CAN and Chord, this metric is symmetric but,
unlike CAN, it is unidirectional which means that all lookups for a key will converge along
the same path, no matter the origin.
Each node maintains a routing table composed of k-buckets. A k-bucket is a set of at-most
k nodes, sorted according to the time of the last communication. The nodes contained in the
i-th k-bucket are all at a distance comprised between 2i and 2i+1 to the current node. The
system parameter k is chosen so as to ensure that for any given set of k nodes, it is very
unlikely that they will fail within an hour of each other.
When a node joins the network the most crucial part is for it to generate its k-buckets. It
first contacts a node already presents, inserts that node in the appropriate bucket, then looks
up its own key to make a first update, and finally updates, if necessary, the buckets located
further away.
Chord
Chord[89] represents the network as a circle where each node is attributed a unique position
given by its identifier. To generate identifiers Chord uses a variant of consistent hashing to
uniformly distribute the load among the nodes as they are assigned roughly the same amount
of keys. Like CAN and Kademlia, {key, value} pairs are stored, the routing is based on
the identifiers, every look-up is resolved in O(log2(N)) messages (where N is the number of
nodes) and requires information about only a fraction of the nodes to be performed.
To join the network, a node hashes its IP address to obtain its identifier and thus deduce
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its position on the circle. The key k of an object is assigned to the first node which identifier
equals or succeeds it in the identifier space. In that scenario, the node is called the successor





Figure 2.1: Routing from node a to d in a Chord network
To efficiently route look-up queries in the network, nodes in Chord maintain a finger table.
The ith entry in the finger table contains the identity of the first node that succeeds the current
node by at least 2i−1 on the identifier circle. If the identifier circle ranges from 0 to 2m then
there are at most m entries in the finger table. By construction of that table, each nodes
knows more about its direct vicinity than about nodes farther away. This property ensures
that once a request is near its destination it will be correctly routed.
As nodes come and go, each node remaining in the network must be certain that its finger
table is up to date. To do so, Chord uses a stabilization protocol: all nodes periodically run a
stab procedure to learn of recent changes. This procedure consists in asking its successor for
its predecessor: node n asks node s for its predecessor p, if p 6= n and p is closer to n than s
(s could have an outdated predecessor value) then n updates its successor to p.
To further negate the impact of node failures, each node maintains an additional list of suc-
cessors, containing the first r successors. The value of r is chosen such that the simultaneous
failure of the r successors is extremely unlikely.
To sum up, the different flavors of Distributed Hash Tables all offer the same features:
a scalable, efficient, fault tolerant, and adaptable solution to the problem of organizing a
fully-distributed network of nodes and of storing and retrieving information.
Although possessing the desired properties, Distributed Hash Table were not built with
security nor privacy in mind: they lack protections when faced with malicious nodes. We thus
discuss next the most important threats they can face as well as possible countermeasures.
2.3.3 Considered Attacks on Peer-to-Peer Systems
Distributed Hash Tables have shown to be relatively difficult to protect against security at-
tacks. In the following, we present the three most important attacks that malicious nodes
belonging to the network can launch as well as the main countermeasures for each: the Sybil
attack, the Eclipse attack (or Routing table poisoning), and Routing and Storage attacks. Be-
fore concluding this section, and even though it is not a direct attack against DHT, we finish
by discussing an issue related to our topic: how to reach consensus in a “Byzantine” setting.
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Sybil Attack
When joining a network comprised of unknown nodes the first problem that one is faced with
is that of trustworthiness — especially more so if you are supposed to exchange personal
data with them. In our specific case, we partially solve this issue by associating each node
with a hardware-based Trusted Execution Environment, meaning that as long as the sensitive
manipulations are done by that unit the node is trustworthy5. However, how can we be sure
that this node possesses such device? And if we can be sure that a node possesses a TEE,
can we be sure that another node (or more) that also possesses one is not, in fact, the same?
This attack, forging several identities, is called a Sybil Attack [29].
To perform a Sybil attack, a malicious party creates “bogus” nodes and makes them interact
with the rest of the network as if they were distinct peers. Once implanted, they can disturb the
normal flow of events: in our case, they could log all transmissions going through them (DHT
lookup or storage operations), isolate and monitor specific nodes, or drastically increase the
probability of being selected as actors in a distributed computations (by flooding the network).
To cope with this threat a globally accepted strategy[29, 99] is to rely on a central trusted
identification authority. This authority produces for each node a cryptographic signature of a
distinctive element it possesses. Paired with the public key of the authority, this signature is
sufficient proof to attest the identity and the uniqueness of the node — as long as the authority
is not corrupted. The ICANN is an example of such authority for the Domain Name System.
The authority can either be online or offline, however an online authority constitutes an ideal
target for attackers. Moreover, this hypothesis contradicts our targeted system as it would be
the equivalent of a supporting server.
Other renowned strategies only partially eliminate sybils, only tackle a subpart of the
problem (provide a correct routing despite sybils) or do not offer as strong guarantees as a
central authority[72]. To do so they either make use of a social network providing trusted
relationships between nodes like Whanau[47], Persea[3] or X-Vine[63]; test the resources the
peer has at its disposal[86, 29]; or use redundancy mechanisms[26].
Preventing Sybil attacks is an important step to accomplish in a fully-distributed system
as this attack opens up the way for more.
Eclipse Attack
To efficiently route queries, nodes maintain links to other peers — commonly referred to as
neighbors — creating a routing table. The idea behind an Eclipse attack is to pollute the
routing table of honest nodes in order for malicious nodes to “eclipse” other honest nodes in
the network, i.e. erase them from the routing table of their neighbors. This attack is also
known in the literature as routing table poisoning.
Networks that do not have special verifiable requirements for their neighbors are the most
susceptible to this: whenever an honest node is updating its routing table, malicious nodes
can falsify their information so as to insert themselves in the honest node’s routing table.
Another attack scenario is to place malicious nodes close to each other and from there on they
can collude and attack neighboring honest nodes. Note that this attack does not necessarily
have to be widespread but can be localized so as to isolate few selected nodes.
Similar to the Sybil attack, the most basic and most effective line of defense is to provide
5Strictly speaking, it is as trustworthy as the TEE.
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nodes with random and stable identifiers[99]. Relying on a central authority to issue them is
the preferred and most robust approach.
The main downside of this strategy is that it prevents performance optimization: the nodes
present in the routing table are not selected because of their close geographical proximity. The
majority of the literature about Eclipse attacks focuses on how to preserve these optimizations,
unfortunately none of these solutions guarantee proper operation of the DHT unless they
are associated with other mechanisms, which introduce a trade-off between performance and
complexity[99].
Now that an attacker cannot flood the network with false nodes or poison the routing table
of honest nodes, its remaining strategy is to provide false answers to query lookups.
Routing and Storage Attacks
Routing and storage attacks directly disrupt the execution of a DHT: once a malicious node
receives a lookup request it can forward it to a non-existing, incorrect or malicious node,
pretend to be the node responsible, claim that the object does not exist or answer with fake
data.
The most common defenses are based on two mechanisms[99]: redundant storage and
redundant routing.
Achieving redundant storage is done by replicating data at several places in the DHT: at
nodes that are numerically close in the identifier space[89, 18], or at locations spread over
the identifier space[105]. Having close replicas ease the maintenance of these replicas but it
requires the malicious nodes to be spread over the identifier space. This means that nodes
cannot control where they are inserted in the identifier space, once again prompting for a
random and stable identifier.
Redundant routing can be implemented using multiple paths[18], wide paths[101] or mul-
tiple wide paths[11]. Multiple paths routing consists in sending copies of the lookup message
to either the different replicas or to the initiator’s neighbors if the replicas are close to each
other. Wide paths routing returns at each step of the routing the k closest neighbors instead
of the closest one, hence only requiring one honest node at each step. Multiple wide paths
combine both approaches, trying wide paths successively.
In all these strategies having the malicious nodes evenly spread over the identifier space
ensures a better probability of successful routing: they cannot isolate a node or a key if they
cannot control their location to block all possible routes.
In addition to these mechanisms, some protocols[102, 101] also use an active central au-
thority: Myrmic[101] makes the central trusted authority sign the routing table of the nodes,
while Octopus[102] makes honest nodes actively detect their malicious counterpart and uses
a certificate authority to issue and revoke the nodes’ certificates.
Hence, having an offline central authority provide random and verifiable identifier is the
best approach to successfully prevent an attacker from disrupting a DHT.
To finish up this section, and even though it is not a direct attack against distributed
systems, we lastly want to discuss how to achieve consensus in this setting.
Byzantine Fault Tolerance
Agreeing on a common value or on a set of actions becomes mandatory whenever we have to
answer some of the questions: which node·s take·s care of which action·s? In which order?
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For which computation?
Byzantine fault tolerance (BFT) deals exactly with this: how to reach consensus in a
distributed system in spite of a certain number of “faulty nodes” — that have either truly
failed or are malicious. BFT was first formally studied in [71] and later introduced as the
“Byzantine Generals Problem” in [46]. The conclusions of both are identical and expose two
scenarios: (i) if the messages are not signed, can be forged but the absence of one can be
detected (i.e. messages are time-bounded) then this problem finds no solution if one-third
or more of the nodes are “faulty”, (ii) if the messages are signed and cannot be forged, the
problem becomes simpler and consensus can be reached for any number of attackers.
In the first case, a possible solution consists in considering a majority with a fail-safe:
nodes will keep the value that has the most votes or, if no value appears more than the others,
a pre-established fail-safe.
In the second case, the decision is left to a function choice (computed by all nodes) that
either returns all the valid values obtained or, if no value was provided, a pre-established
fail-safe.
M. Castro and B. Liskov proposed PBFT [17] an algorithm based on state machine repli-
cation that overcomes the time-constrained and inefficient solutions proposed in earlier works
— meaning that it can function on an asynchronous network such as the Internet — at the
cost of not being able to solve the consensus problem. Indeed, it focuses on providing the
core functionalities of an online information service: as long as less than bn−13 c nodes are
faulty, PBFT ensures “safety” and “liveness”. That is, operations are executed atomically and
sequentially, and clients eventually receive an answer to their requests. PBFT roughly works
as following:
1. A client asks a primary node a request;
2. the primary forwards it to all the replicas;
3. they all execute and send their answer to the client;
4. the client waits for f + 1 identical answers before accepting it as the result.
More recent works build on and/or improve PBFT : Q/U [1] uses quorum-based protocols
to reduce the number of nodes involved in the processing of a query but with an increased
overall cost, Zyzzyva[42] leaves to the client a part of the process to alleviate the charge on the
servers, Aardvark [22] creates a “Robust-BFT” and uses game-theory strategies to anticipate
failures and optimize for those worst-case scenarios, and Abstract [9] proposes an abstraction
that can be used to help design resilient systems that are comprised of ad-hoc components —
Abstract instances — used to handle specific conditions, hence not limited to a unique “flavor”
of PBFT.
As discussed in the next chapter, despite their benefits, these solutions are not sufficient:
even if it is possible to reach consensus and agree on a value if certain conditions are met,
they cannot guarantee nor prove that this value was randomly generated. This last property
is indeed a crucial component in the architecture we propose. Moreover, in our context, our
proposed solution is much more efficient as it involves very few nodes.
2.3.4 Conclusion
In this section we saw two ways of organizing a fully-distributed network of nodes: using an
unstructured or a structured peer-to-peer system.
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Unstructured peer-to-peer systems have the advantage of requiring the nodes to store and
compute very little information: they mainly have to forward requests. Operating this way is
however inefficient and can even be extremely costly: broadcasts, flooding, or random-walks
strategies are used to route queries within the network.
Structured peer-to-peer systems prefer the opposite strategy: by putting slightly more
strain on the nodes and making them maintain routing tables and neighbors’ lists, they can
efficiently route the queries. Indeed, for most considered DHT an average of log2(N) (N
being the total number of nodes) messages is needed in order for a lookup query to reach
its destination. Thus, to organize our network of home-cloud plugs augmented with tamper-
resistant hardware we choose to rely on a Distributed Hash Table. Considering that no
variation of the DHT emphasizes on protecting the privacy of the users we do not advocate
against any and remain agnostic on the variation of DHT to use in our system.
We lastly saw the typical threats faced by a DHT system: Sybil attacks, Routing table
poisoning, as well as Routing and Storage attacks. The main teaching this study provided is
that to properly prevent these attacks, a central offline authority that delivers certificates offers
the best defense mechanisms. These certificates first prevent malicious nodes from spawning
fake nodes as they cannot counterfeit the certificates. Second, we can leverage these certificates
to place the nodes on the overlay network and ensure a random and uniform distribution of
the malicious nodes. As they cannot control their location on the overlay, their leeway to
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In the related work we depicted the landscape in which this thesis takes place: we provide
each user with a PDMS that contains most of their digital life, we secure them thanks to a
Trusted Execution Environment and we finally organize them in Distributed Hash Table to ease
the discovery of other peers while keeping a lightweight structure (i.e. the DHT does not need
impose a heavy toll). As we also saw, no current framework allows the creation of a scalable and
privacy-preserving distributed query system: cryptography-based solutions do not scale, non-
interactive privacy-preserving data publishing technologies do not offer sufficient protection.
Then, in this context, how can we build a scalable and privacy-preserving distributed query
system?
This chapter lays the foundations of the solution we propose. To do so, we start by
analyzing in details our problematic: what are we trying to achieve? What do we protect?
Against whom? What are the requirements that a solution we deem acceptable should meet?
How can we implement them? To answer these questions, we have to precisely define the data
34
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we manipulate and the threats we want to defend against. In turn, formalizing those aspects
leads to two subproblems: (i) randomly choosing PDMS nodes to act as actors in the query
and (ii) assigning specific roles to ensure the “safe” execution of the query. Indeed, in a fully
distributed system, relying on a single node would be contradictory meaning that we have to
distribute the computation. However, an inappropriate distribution of the tasks and/or of the
assignments would be equally disastrous: we have to assign both carefully. Formalizing these
elements paves the way for our core design principles: knowledge dispersion, task atomicity,
hidden communications and imposed randomness.
We follow these explanations, and conclude this chapter, with our first contribution:
SEP2P [55] — a Secure and Efficient Peer-to-Peer protocol to randomly select nodes. This
protocol leverages properties of the DHT (uniform distribution of the nodes, measuring the
distance between them) to propose an algorithm that selects nodes in a distributed system in
a way that is, at the same time, secure, random and efficient. The security and randomness
stem from the fact that we know, with a high probability, that at least one honest node con-
tributed to the creation and attestation of this list of nodes; while the efficiency stems from
the fact that very few nodes are involved in this process.
3.1 Architectural design: objectives and threat model
3.1.1 Base System Architecture
As we evolve in a peer-to-peer system and only rely on the PDMS nodes, this means that each
node may play several roles:
Node role 1: Each node is a potential data source. For instance, producing sensed geo-
localized data about the local traffic speed, or sharing grades used to compute recommendations.
Node role 2: Given the fully-decentralized nature of our system, each node is a potential
data processor, also called actor, providing part of the required processing.
Node role 3: The initiator of a distributed processing is called the Querier (Q). Q could
be any node with participatory sensing applications, or the query issuer in distributed query or
data diffusion applications.
Relying on a fully-distributed system induces several problems, e.g., integrating new nodes,
maintaining a coherent global state, making nodes that do not know each other interact, han-
dling churn, maintaining some metadata. It thus requires a communication overlay allowing
for efficient node discovery, data indexing and search. Fortunately, as stated in the previous
chapter, these problems have already been extensively studied in the literature and the Dis-
tributed Hash Tables (DHTs) appear to be the solution reaching consensus. Hence, we leverage
classical DHT techniques as a basis for communication efficiency and scalability.
3.1.2 Security Considerations
We use the terminology of ARM[93] to designate the three attack levels on a PDMS node,
i.e., hack, shack and lab attacks. A hack attack is a software attack in which the attacker
(the PDMS owner or remote attacker) downloads code on the device to control it. A shack
attack is a low-budget hardware attack, i.e., using basic equipment and knowledge. Finally,
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a lab attack is the most advanced, comprehensive and invasive hardware attack for which the
attacker has access to laboratory equipment, can perform reverse engineering of a device and
monitor analog signals. Note that shack and lab attacks require a physical access to the device
and that TEEs are designed to at least resist hack and shack attacks.
Our threat model considers four security assumptions:
Assumption 1: Each PDMS is locally secured by using TEE-like technology flourishing
nowadays (e.g., [36, 45, 74]).
This assumption is reasonable considering that a PDMS is supposed to store the entire
digital life of its owner. A major security feature of TEE technology is to provide isolation,
i.e., strong guarantees that the local computation inside the TEE cannot be spied upon, even
in the presence of an untrusted computational environment. Hence, to break to confidentiality
barrier of a TEE, a lab attack is mandatory. This has an important consequence: an attacker
cannot conduct a successful attack on a remote node, i.e., not under her possession.
Assumption 2: Each PDMS device is supplied with a trustworthy certificate attesting that it
is a genuine PDMS.
Without this assumption, an attacker can easily emulate nodes in the network, and conduct
a Sybil attack[18], mastering a large proportion of nodes (e.g., playing the role of data processor
nodes), thus defeating any countermeasure. Note that this does not require an online PKI:
the certificate can be attached to the hardware device and not to the device owner.
Assumption 3: Corrupted nodes by a lab attack behave like covert adversaries.
In other words, they derive from the protocol to obtain private information only if they
cannot be detected[10], as detected malicious behavior leads to an exclusion from the sys-
tem. This exclusion can be enforced by fairly efficient and scalable revocation mechanisms
such as: Merkle Hash Tree based certificate revocation[66], efficient distribution of revocation
information over P2P networks[50], or scalable PKI based on P2P systems[65].
Assumption 4: The communications of a node can be spied upon by either its owner or a
remote attacker.
Considering this kind of attacks is motivated by two main reasons. First, network port
spying does not require a lab attack but merely a hack or shack attack which makes it (i)
easier and thus more likely and (ii) doable locally and remotely. Second, in a purely distributed
system, even though node communications are ubiquitous, they can reveal private information
to an attacker: either through the data itself — sensitive information are sent unencrypted
and are de facto subject to interception; or through the metadata — two specific nodes are
exchanging messages at a specific time.
3.1.3 Threat Model
The above considered assumptions already offer a certain level of security at the node and
system levels. Yet, no hardware security can be described as unbreakable. Therefore, our
threat model considers that an attacker (e.g., one or several colluding malicious users) can
possess several PDMSs and conduct lab attacks on these devices, thus mastering several
corrupted nodes which can collude. For simplicity, we call them colluding nodes.
It is important to notice that the worst-case attack is represented by the maximum number
of colluding nodes in the system (i.e., controlled by a single entity). Corrupting few nodes
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can lead to some private data disclosure, but this disclosure is very limited in a well-designed
system with a large number of nodes. Therefore, an attacker needs to increase the collusion
range to fully benefit from the attack (i.e., access a significant amount of private data).
Thereby, the remaining question is: how many colluding nodes could an attacker control
in the system? The main difficulty for an attacker is that colluding nodes must remain
indistinguishable from honest nodes (see Assumption 3). Since PDMSs are associated to
“real” individuals (e.g., by delivering the device only to real users proving their identity),
collusions between individuals remains possible (hidden groups) but such collusions cannot
scale without being minimally advertised, hence making them distinguishable and breaking
their cover. Thus, wide collusions are extremely difficult to build since it requires significant
organization between a very large number of users, which in practice requires an extremely
powerful attacker as well as extreme discretion, and are thus the equivalent of a state-size
attack. Although worrisome, a situation with such a large proportion of colluding nodes does
not prevent our system from functioning and from completing our objective: as we show in
the experiments (see Section 5.2.1) we satisfy the requirements while maintaining an average
leak that is under-linear with regard to the maximum number of colluding nodes controlled by
an attacker — no matter that number. However, do note that considering a large proportion
of colluding nodes (e.g., 10%) in a fully-distributed system is vain as it would inexorably
lead to large disclosure whatever the protocol having a reasonable overhead (e.g., outside the
MPC scope). Hence, we consider that a very powerful attacker could control up to a small
percentage (e.g., up to 1%) of the nodes, which corresponds to a wide collusion requiring a
lab attack on these nodes as well as a highly organized collusion between the owners of the
nodes.
What does the system protect? Our objective is to offer the maximum possible
confidentiality protection of the user private data under the above considered threat model.
Many other issues related to statistical databases (e.g., inferences from results, determining
the authorized queries, query replay, fake data injection, etc.) or to network security (e.g.,
message drop/delay, routing table poisoning[99]) are complementary to this work and fall
outside of the scope of this paper.
Confidentiality with partial integrity? Although TEEs have the means to attest that
the intended computations were performed by the different nodes[44, 43], we cannot hope to
maintain those capabilities when the TEE is fully compromised. Thus, in this conditions,
we do not claim to offer integrity. Therefore, assuming that a proposed computational plan
is guaranteed to offer confidentiality, it is debatable whether this confidentiality can still be
achieved when the computation is altered. Assessing the loss of confidentiality is no easy task
as there are numerous cases to consider: the type of data manipulated, the computations, the
distribution of the data, the envisioned collusions. Note that in our context, not every and all
aspects of the execution can be modified, the leeway an attacker has is limited to the addition
of bogus results or the inclusion of more nodes in the query execution process. This restrained
scope pleads in favor of a reduced impact but this study, mainly due to its sheer size, falls
outside of the scope of this work.
3.1.4 Requirements
Given the considered threat model, we derive in this section the requirements that any solution,
in this specific context, must address to protect the data privacy of the users. Since we cannot
exclude having colluding nodes in the system and since the colluding nodes behave like covert
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adversaries, private information leakage is unavoidable. Under these conditions, the best
countermeasures one can take are: (i) minimize the risk of a data leakage, i.e., reduce at
most the probability of a leakage to happen; and (ii) minimize the impact of a data leakage,
i.e., reduce at most the leakage size. Obviously, these countermeasures should not generate
overheads that render the system unpractical. This leads to:
Requirement 1: (security) Random actor selection. Ensure that colluding nodes
cannot influence the selection of the data processor nodes.
As evident as this may be, it is crucial that colluding nodes cannot favor themselves in the
attribution of the roles: even if those roles are extremely well thought and disclose the absolute
minimum amount of information, not preventing this behavior changes the probability of a
leakage for any and all queries from “unlikely” to “absolute certainty”.
Requirement 2: (security) Knowledge dispersion. No single node (or few nodes)
should store a significant amount of sensitive data, unless it owns these data.
The rationale behind this requirement is straightforward: to not create a “central” point
in the network as it would drastically increase the benefits of compromising this particular
node (compared to compromising a large portion of the network).
Requirement 3: (security) Task atomicity. Data tasks should be atomic, i.e., re-
duced to a maximum such that it minimizes the required sensitive data to execute the
task.
This requirement is similar to the principle of compartmentalization in information security,
which consists in limiting the information access to the minimum amount allowing an entity
to execute a certain task. Typically, a node can execute a subtask without knowing the
purpose or the scope of the global task. Dividing a given distributed computation in atomic
tasks obviously depends on the precise definition of that computation. Hence, we restrict our
analysis in to sketches of solutions for the three application classes considered in this paper.
Requirement 4: (security) Hidden communications. Sensitive data and meta-
data should be protected such that no attacker can gain knowledge by listening to the
communications of a limited set of nodes.
In our context “hidden” can either mean encryption, i.e. relying on cryptography to protect
the content of the exchanged messages, or anonymous communications, i.e. hiding the origin
or the destination of a communication to an attacker spying on the network. Saying that an
attacker spies on a “limited” set of nodes excludes state-size attacks where the communications
of all the network are spied upon. As we consider network that can possibly house hundreds
of thousands or millions of nodes, spying on all of them would require tremendous resources.
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Requirement 5: (efficiency) Security overheads. Minimize the number of costly
operations, e.g., cryptographic signature verifications or communication overhead, and
ensure system scalability with an increasing number of nodes or colluding nodes.
The need for efficiency stems from two fundamental prerequisites for mass adoption: ob-
taining a result in a matter of a few moments and making sure that PDMSs are not over-
whelmed by the distributed computation. Giving the end-user the result in a short span
makes for a viable user experience: if the results come “late” (although this notion is purely
subjective) then no user will use this system. Not overwhelming the PDMSs means that they
can perform their primary functionality unhindered, once again making for a viable user ex-
perience: if, because of the distributed computations, the users cannot properly benefit from
their PDMS, then they might block distributed computations.
Independently of the distributed protocol chosen to implement some given application, the
system must delegate the data-oriented tasks to randomly selected nodes, in accordance with
our first requirement. Therefore, the random selection protocol is generic and constitutes the
security basis of any distributed protocol in our system. However, given the considered threat
model, it is challenging to design an actor selection protocol that is both secure and efficient.
In the rest of this chapter we detail SEP2P, our first contribution, which specifically addresses
this problem.
3.2 SEP2P: Secure Actor Selection
Let us first detail some useful classical cryptographic tools focusing on the properties used in
our protocol.
A cryptographic hash function[60] is a one-way function that maps a data of arbitrary
size to a fixed size bit string (e.g., 224 bits) and is resistant to collision. An interesting
property of hash functions is that output distribution is uniform. In the following, hash()
refers to a cryptographic hash.
A cryptographic signature[60] can be used by a node n to prove that a data d was
produced by n (authentication) and has not been altered (integrity). The signature is
produced by encrypting hash(d) using the private key of n. Any node can verify the
signature by decrypting it using the public key of n and comparing the result with hash(d).
The signature includes the signer public key certificate, certn (see Assumption 2).
We consider a system of N nodes, in which we want to randomly select A actors, de-
spite wide collusion attacks from C colluding nodes. The main notations are summarized in
Table 3.1.
3.2.1 Effectiveness, Cost and Optimal Bounds
Ideally, we would want to ensure that all A actors are honest, but this is impossible, since
colluding nodes are indistinguishable from honest nodes. Therefore, the best achievable pro-
tection is obtained when actors are randomly selected and the selection cannot be influenced
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Notation Explanation
N Total number of nodes in the system
A Number of actor nodes (data processors)
C Maximum number of colluding nodes (C ≥ 1)
AC Average number of corrupted actors for a given protocol
AidealC Average number of corrupted actors for an ideal protocol
Q Querier (starting the execution)
k Security degree
α Security threshold
S Execution Setter node, computing the actor list
Ri, rsi DHT region Ri of size rsi
Table 3.1: Main notations for SEP2P
by C colluding nodes, i.e., the average number of corrupted selected actors in the ideal case is
AidealC = A×C/N (AidealC > 0). Thus, the impact of a collusion attack remains proportional
with the number of colluding nodes, which is the best situation given our context. This guar-
antees that the attacker cannot obtain more private information than what she can passively
get from observing the information randomly reaching its colluding nodes.
The following definitions quantify the security effectiveness and security cost of an actor
selection protocol.
Definition 1. Security effectiveness. The security effectiveness of an actor selection
protocol is defined as the ratio between AidealC and the average number of corrupted selected
actors for the measured protocol (AC), i.e., security effectiveness = AidealC/AC . The security
effectiveness has maximum value (i.e., 1) when AC = AidealC and minimum value (i.e. C/N)
when all the actors are corrupted.
Definition 2. Verifier node. A verifier node is a node who needs verifying the actor list
before delivering sensitive data, e.g., a data source.
Definition 3. Security cost. The security cost of an actor selection protocol is defined
as the number of asymmetric cryptographic operations, e.g., signature verification, required by
verifier nodes to check the selected actor list.
Note that the security cost considers only the verification of the actor list and not the cost
of building the list. The rationale is that the verification cost has a larger impact on the overall
performance since the number of verifier nodes can be high in a large distributed system: data
sources need to verify the actor list before delivering their data. Other performance related
issues (cost of the actor list generation, load balancing, maintenance costs) are discussed in
Section 3.3.3.
Optimal bounds. The best possible case one could expect in terms of security effective-
ness and cost in our context can be achieved using an idealized trusted server that knows all
the nodes and provides a different random actor list for each system computation. This ideal
solution reaches a maximal security effectiveness and a security cost of 1, since any verifier
node must only check the signature of the trusted entity.
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Evidently, this solution in not acceptable since it represents a highly desirable target for
attackers, i.e., a central point of attack and contradicts the fully distributed nature of SEP2P.
Therefore, we need distributed solutions relying only on the nodes. To underline the existing
tension between security effectiveness and cost, we discuss two basic distributed protocols for
the actor selection, focusing either on the security cost or on the security effectiveness. To
simplify the protocols description, we initially assume a full mesh network overlay, i.e., each
node knows the complete list of nodes in the system and its evolution over time.
Baseline cost-optimal protocol. The Querier (Q) selects randomly the actors. The
security effectiveness is minimal: AC = min(A,C) since Q may be corrupted (which is the
case when any node can trigger a computation). There is thus no necessity to provide any
signature: the security cost is 0.
Baseline security-optimal protocol. Proposing an optimal protocol in terms of secu-
rity is challenging in a decentralized architecture (without any supporting trusted party) and
considering covert adversaries. This conjunction leads to a situation where no single node in
the system can claim to securely provide a list of actors (the provider itself can be corrupted).
The work in [12] proposes the CSAR protocol which provides a secure way to generate a
verifiable random value under the condition that there is at least one honest node participat-
ing in the distributed protocol — a more detailed explanation is given below. Applying to
our context, we can ensure generating a real random value only if there are at least C + 1
participating nodes. Also, once we obtain a verifiable random value, we can derive up to A
random values by repeatedly hashing the initial value A − 1 times. The final step is to map
the set of A random values to the nodes. This can be easily done, e.g., by sorting the nodes on
their public key and associating the random value to a rank in the sorted list. This protocol
has an optimal security effectiveness, i.e., 1, since the actors are guaranteed to be selected
randomly. On the other hand, checking the CSAR results requires one signature verification
per participant. Thus, the security cost is C + 1 asymmetric cryptographic operations per
verifier node. Since C can be large, such a solution cannot scale with large systems and wide
collusion attackers as it would lead to an extreme verification cost.
CSAR is a technique for generating Cryptographically Strong, Accountable Ran-
domness. It proposes a pseudo-random generator that (1) outputs cryptographically
strong randomness, (2) is accountable, i.e. after each random value r is generated, it
should be possible to generate a proof that this value was correctly derived from a given
seed, (3) ensures that future random values are unpredictable, and (4) ensures that the
previous properties hold even if malicious nodes are present while the seed is computed
(and that, in particular, no node should be able to influence the output). Additionally,
both the generation of the randomness and its verification are efficient, in order to limit
the cost of accountability.
CSAR achieves these goals with a two steps protocol: the first step is the setup where
a seed an a permutation are generated, and the second is the actual generation of random
values.
Our work only leverages the coin-toss subprotocol, part of the setup and responsible
for the generation of the seed, that “can easily be shown to produce a random value s,
provided that at least one entity is honest”[12]. Its process is:
3.2. SEP2P: Secure Actor Selection 42
Entities P, P1, . . . , Pk choose random values r, r1, . . . , rk. Then each entity Pi
computes ci := hash(ri) and produces a signature σi on ci. Next, all (ci, σi)
are sent to P . P sets c := hash(r), h := (c, c1, σ1, . . . , ck, σk) and produces a
signature σ on h. Then each Pi checks all signatures in h, produces a signature
σ′i on h and sends (ri, σ
′
i) to P . Finally, P checks all signatures σ
′
i and sends
(r, r1, . . . , rk) to P1, . . . , Pk. The outcome of the coin toss is s := r⊕r1⊕. . .⊕rk.
To achieve these security bounds, both protocols require a full mesh network overlay
which is also extremely costly to maintain in practice, especially for large networks. This
contradicts the efficiency and scalability requirement. Using a DHT overlay instead of a full
mesh solves the problem of communication efficiency/scalability. However, this impacts the
optimal bounds of both protocols. For the first protocol, the security cost increases from 0
to up to A since a verifier node which does not “know” any of the actors has to verify their
certificates to be sure that the actors are genuine PDMSs (to avoid Sybil attacks). Similarly,
for the second protocol, the security cost increases to 2(C + 1) + A for the same reason, i.e.,
checking that participant and selected actors are genuine PDMSs. Even worse, the optimal
security effectiveness can no longer be guaranteed since with a DHT, there is no secure way
of associating the random values to the nodes unless using secure DHT techniques[99] with a
large impact on performance.
3.2.2 Overview of the Proposed Solution
To address all these problems, we propose a protocol that reaches maximal security effective-
ness at a security cost of 2k. k is called the security degree and is very small. Also, our protocol
builds directly on a classical, efficient DHT overlay without requiring any modifications. We
describe some important features in SEP2P which make this possible and then sketch the
protocol.
Imposed and uniform distribution of node location: the node ID, used when insert-
ing a node in the DHT, is imposed in SEP2P, in a way that leads to a uniformly distributed
node location in the DHT virtual space. Consequently, colluding nodes are also evenly dis-
tributed in the DHT, thus avoiding spatial clusters. We use extensively this property to
drastically reduce the cost of security by taking localized decisions (see below), i.e., limited to
the nodes located in “small” regions in the virtual space. Achieving imposed node location is
easy, based on the public key of the certificate of each node. We compute a cryptographic hash
of this key, which is, by construction, uniformly distributed, and use this hash for insertion in
the DHT virtual space. The advantages of using the public key are (i) its uniqueness; and (ii)
the node location can be checked with a single signature verification.
Probabilistic guarantees: Given the imposed, uniform node location which applies in-
distinctly to honest and colluding nodes, we can have probabilistic guarantees on the maximum
number of colluding nodes in a DHT subspace of a given size, called DHT region hereafter.
We can compute the probability of having at least k colluding nodes (see Section 3.2.3)
and choose the DHT region size such that the probability is very close to 0. In our context,
we want to have a probability smaller than α, the security threshold. The main idea is to set
α so that the probability of having k colluding nodes in the same region becomes so low that
we can consider that it “never happens”, e.g., α = 10−6 (see Section 3.3.1). Such a guarantee
is used in the protocol sketched below and then detailed in the following subsection.
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Sketch of verifiable selection protocol of A actors (see Figure3.1)
(1) Run a distributed protocol inspired from CSAR[12] to generate a verifiable random
value, i.e., proven to have been truly randomly generated by k nodes if at least one is
honest (see Section 3.2.4). The k nodes are selected in a DHT region R1, centered on the
triggering node (Q), whose region size rs1 is set such that we have probabilistic guarantees
to “never” (probability < α) have k or more colluding nodes, i.e., at least one of the k
nodes is honest.
(2) Map the hash of that random value into coordinates to define a location p in the DHT
virtual space and contact through the DHT the node, called execution Setter (S),
managing this location.
(3) S then selects k nodes (the actor list builders) in a region R2, centered on p, using
probabilistic guarantees, such that we “never” have k or more colluding nodes. Given the
uniform distribution of the node on the virtual space, we have rs2 = rs1.
(4) Each actor list builder then selects A nodes in a region R3, centered on p, whose size rs3
is such that R3 includes at least A nodes with high probability (see Section 3.2.6 and 3.3.3
for rs3 tuning).
(5) Run a distributed verifiable selection protocol in the spirit of [12] such that the k
nodes selected in (3) can: (i) check the validity of the random value generated in (1); (ii)
build the actor list securely; (iii) sign both the random value and the list of A actors. This


















Figure 3.1: Sketch of verifiable selection
The result is a list of A actors that is signed by k nodes, among which at least one is
honest. Doing so reduces the security cost to 2k asymmetric cryptographic operations: k to
check the certificate of the k list builders, verifying that they belong in the region R2, centered
on p; and k to check each builder signature.
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Notation Explanation
kpubn Public key of node n
certn Trustworthy certificate of node n
signn Signature by node n (includes certn)
QLi execution Trigger Legitimate node i
RND i Random number generated by QLi
(V )RNDT (Verifiable) random generated by Q
SLj execution Setter Legitimate node j
RNDS Random generated by S
CLj Partial candidate list of legitimate nodes w.r.t. R3
CL Candidate List of legitimate nodes
(V )AL (Verifiable) Actor List
Table 3.2: Main notations for Sections 3.2.3 to 3.2.5
3.2.3 Providing Probabilistic Guarantees
To generate verifiable random values or validate the query actor selection, SEP2P employs
distributed computations between a small subset of the nodes thanks to the notion of node
legitimacy and probabilistic guarantees defined below using the notations in Table 3.2.
Definition 4. Legitimate nodes. Given a region R in the virtual space of a DHT, for any
node i we say that node i is legitimate w.r.t. R if and only if hash(kpubi) ∈ R.
To be able to provide probabilistic guarantees as explained in Section 3.2.2, we need to
estimate the number of nodes in a region:
Lemma 1. Let R be a DHT region of size rs in a virtual space of a DHT of total size 1 (i.e.,
normalized) and let N be the total number of network nodes with a uniform distribution of
the node location in the virtual space. The probability, PL, of having at least m legitimate
nodes in R is:







· rs i ·(1− rs)N−i (3.1)
Proof (sketch): Let us consider a partition of the N nodes into two subsets containing i
and N − i nodes. Since the distribution of nodes is uniform in space, the probability of having





possible combinations of generating this node partitioning. The probability of having at least
m nodes in R is equal to the probability of having exactly m nodes plus the probability of
having exactly m+1 plus. . . the probability of having N , which leads to the equation in(3.1).

Application to colluding nodes: Let C < N be the maximum number of colluding
nodes. We can apply formula 3.1 to compute the probability, PC of having at least k colluding
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nodes in R:







· rsi · (1− rs)C−i (3.2)
We can notice that this probability only depends on C. It does not depend on the region
center since we have a uniform distribution of the nodes on the virtual space.
3.2.4 Verifiable Random Generation
Our goal is to generate a random value, using k nodes and to guarantee that none of the
k nodes can choose the final computed random value (or any of its bits). Any node in the
system should be able to check the validity of this random value (i.e., to have proofs that it
has been correctly generated). This is possible as soon as at least one of the k nodes is honest,
this guarantee being obtained thanks to equation (3.2) by choosing the adequate size for the
DHT region R and by using k legitimate nodes with regard to R.
A node Q wanting to generate a verifiable random, selecting a region of size rs1 with
PC (rs1) < α centered on itself, executes:
Verifiable random number generation protocol
(1) Q contacts any k legitimates nodes QLi (i ∈ [1, k]) w.r.t. R1.
(2) Each QLi sends hash(RND i) to Q, where RND i is a random number (on the same domain
as the hash function, e.g., 224 bits) QLi generates.
(3) Once Q has received the k hashes, it sends back the list L of hashes to the QLi:
L = (hash(RND i))i∈[1,k]
(4) Each QLi checks that hash(RND i) ∈ L, and, in the positive case, returns signi(L) and
RND i.
(5) Q gathers the k messages and builds the verifiable random:







Figure 3.2: Verifiable random
The above random generation protocol is adapted from [12] which includes a formal proof.
Note that the protocol in [12] does not include the notion of node legitimacy and thus needs
3.2. SEP2P: Secure Actor Selection 46
C+1 participating nodes instead of k. Intuitively, the nodes commit on their selected random
value by sending its hash (Step (2)), and all the hash values are known by each of the k nodes
before providing the final signature (Step (4)). Therefore, an attacker controlling k − 1QLi
nodes cannot influence the final random value since these nodes cannot change their random
values (committed at Step (2)). Thus, the correct random value of a single honest node is
enough to obtain a truly random final value RNDQ.
To obtain and check the verifiable random value, any node must: (i) check certQ and
compute L by hashing all RND i; (ii) for i ∈ [1, k], check cert i, check the legitimacy of QLi
using certQ and validate signi(L). The final random value is:
RNDQ = RND1⊕RND2⊕ . . .⊕ RNDk
In (i), we verify that Q is a genuine PDMS, retrieve the center of the region R1 and
compute L, both being necessary for the next verification; (ii) starts by confirming that each
QLi is genuine, then it ensures that they are legitimate w.r.t the location of Q and R1, after
which it confirms the hash list by checking the signatures, and finally, it computes RNDQ.
3.2.5 Distributed Secure Selection Protocol
The main goal of the proposed protocol is to select the A actors such that this selection cannot
be influenced by colluding nodes.
Definition 5. Execution Setter. The execution Setter (S) is chosen randomly based on
a verifiable random generated by Q. Its role is to coordinate the selection of the computation
actors and to setup the execution by sending the appropriate information to each actor.
In the following, we assume that each node n in SEP2P keeps a node cache, called cachen,
of the IP address and certificate of legitimate nodes w.r.t. a region of size rs3 centered on node
n location. The cache size and the cache maintenance cost are discussed in Section 3.2.6 and
evaluated in 3.3.3.
SEP2P distributed secure actor selection protocol
(1) Q generates the verifiable random VRNDQ (see Section 3.2.4).
(2) Q maps hash(RNDQ) into coordinates and contact S through the DHT.
(3) S contacts any k legitimates nodes w.r.t. R2, SLj (j ∈ [1, k]) and sends to each VRNDQ
(see Section 3.2.4).
(4) Each SLj sends hash(RNDj ‖CLj) to S, where RNDj is a random number SLj generates,
and CLj is the set of nodes from cachej which are legitimate w.r.t. R3.
(5) Once S has received the k hashes, it sends back the list L1 of hashes to all SLj :
L1 = (hash(RNDj ‖CLj))j∈[1,k].
(6) Each SLj checks that its own hash(RNDj ‖CLj) ∈ L1 and, in the positive case, returns
RNDj and CLj .
(7) S gathers the k messages and sends to all SLj the list L2 = ((RNDj ,CLj)j∈[1,k]).
(8) Each SLj does the following:
(a) Checks VRNDQ and computes RNDQ (see Section 3.2.4).
(b) Checks that each (RNDj ,CLj) from L2 is consistent with the corresponding
hash(RNDj | CLj) from L1.
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(c) Computes the union, after removing possible duplicates, of all CLj to obtain a can-
didate list of legitimate nodes CL.
(d) Computes the RNDS = RND1⊕RND2⊕ . . .⊕ RNDk.
(e) Sorts CL on kpubn⊕RNDS (where kpubn is the public key of a node n ∈ CL) and
selects the A first candidates to build the actor list AL.
(f) Checks the legitimacy of AL nodes w.r.t. R3.
(g) Signs (RNDQ,AL) and sends it to S.
(9) S gathers k results and builds the verifiable actor lists:
VAL = (RNDQ,AL, (signj(RNDQ,AL)))j∈[1,k]
The goal of steps (1) and (2) is to displace the DHT region, where actors are selected,
from Q to S with three benefits: (1) Q is likely to be corrupted (as any node is allowed to
trigger a computation) while S is chosen randomly using the verifiable random protocol; (2)
it distributes the potential leaks in a different region for each computation; (3) it balances the
load on the whole SEP2P network thus improving the overall performance.
Steps (3) to (6) are similar to steps (1) to (3) of the verifiable random protocol, except
that the signature by SLj is delayed to step (8)g. Delaying the signature allows SLjs to check
and attest the validity of VRNDQ (step (8)a). The protocol cost is increased (since k nodes
verify VRNDQ) but the verifying cost is reduced accordingly since having k SLj signing RNDQ
(step (8)g) means that it is correct (remind that at least one of the k SLjs is honest).
Steps (8)b to (8)e are dedicated to the actor list building (AL) based on the candidate
list (CL) and deserve a more detailed explanation: in our context, in order to securely build
the actor list, the k participants first have to agree on a common basis and then execute,
in parallel, a procedure that is unpredictable and gives identical results to all participants.
Since it is unpredictable we are certain that the inputs cannot be manipulated beforehand
so as to influence the rest of the procedure. Since it gives identical results for all actor list
builders, and since at least one node is honest, we are sure that no colluding node can alter
the results. By sorting the nodes in CL using a verifiable random number and the public keys
of the nodes fulfills both requirements: the random number takes care of the unpredictability,
while the commitment of each SLj on their intermediary lists in step (4), coupled with the
XOR operation on the public keys of CL nodes, is a simple yet effective way of producing
identical results.
In steps (8)f and (8)g, k SLjs check the validity of the result, i.e., that any actor of
AL belongs to R3 and attest it by signing the results. Note that this check is not necessary
for any actor n in AL that was found in kCLj since this fact attests that at least one honest
node possesses n in its cachej . Assuming cachej contains only genuine nodes (we say that
cachej is valid — see Section 3.2.6) and since rs3 > rs2, most of the actors in AL are found in
kCLj , thus diminishing drastically the actor list building cost. Actually the validity of cachej
is necessary to ensure that a colluding node selected as SL cannot hide honest nodes with the
hope of having a larger proportion of colluding nodes in AL. Indeed, at least one of the SL is
honest and provides its full cachej that is thus included in CL. We can observe that cachej
can be actually seen as the relevant part (for node j) of a full mesh network, which offers its
benefits without paying the whole maintenance cost.
To check the verifiable actor list (VAL), any verifier node must do: for j ∈ [1, k], check
cert j , check the legitimacy of SLj using RNDQ and validate signj(AL). Thus, the verifying
cost is limited to k certificate verifications and k signature verifications, i.e., 2k asymmetric
crypto-operations. We show in Section 3.3 that k is generally lower than 6.
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3.2.6 Protocol Implementation Details
In this section we discuss a few important implementation issues of the proposed actor selection
protocol.
Sparse DHT regions: Despite the uniform distribution of nodes on the DHT virtual
space, there is no absolute guarantee of not having sparse DHT regions. This can have two
negative impacts on the SEP2P protocol: during the selection of kQL in R1 (or k SL in R2)
and of the A actors in R3. Both cases exhibit interesting trade-offs:
Choosing R1 (or R2) region size: on the one hand, a small rs leads to a smaller k value,
which in turn reduces the protocol security cost. On the other hand, setting rs too small can
lead to situations in which nodes have less than k legitimate nodes in their R region and as
such cannot participate in the actor selection protocol (as querier or execution setter) which is
problematic. For this reason, in SEP2P we provide a table of couples (ki, rs i), named k-table,
which allows any node to find ki legitimate nodes in the region of associated rs i size. The
k-table is computed thanks to PL and PC (equations 3.1 and 3.2) to ensure that whatever the
couple chosen, the probability of having k or more colluding nodes remains equal. The largest
k of the k-table corresponds to the region size allowing any node to find those legitimate nodes
with a very high probability, i.e., 1-α, while lower values allow to reduce the security cost in
denser network regions. Thus, the k-table optimizes the overall cost of the SEP2P protocol
and warrants that any node can be selected as triggering node or execution setter.
Choosing R3 region size: Choosing a too small rs3 has a negative impact on the system
performance. If the SL cannot find enough nodes in R3, they can attest it (e.g., in step (8)c
in SEP2P protocol) and S can use the k signatures to displace the actor selection to another
region (e.g., selected by rehashing the initial RNDQ). This mechanism allows the protocol
to be executed successfully even if some network regions are sparser. However, there are two
drawbacks. First, the cost of the actor selection increases since (part of) SEP2P protocol must
be executed twice (or more times). Second, this also introduces an unbalance in the system
load since the sparse regions cannot fully take part in data processing. Finally, setting rs3 to
very large values (see Section 3.3.3) is not an option since the maintenance cost of the cache
increases proportionally when nodes join or leave the network.
Joining the network and cachej validity: As mentioned previously, any node must
maintain a consistent node cache despite the natural evolution of the network. Thus, a node
joining the network must ask its neighbors to provide their node cache attested by k legitimate
nodes in a region of size rs1 centered on their location. The new node can then make the
union of these caches and keep only legitimate nodes w.r.t. R3 centered on its location. The
resulting cache contains only genuine nodes and is thus valid since it has been attested by at
least k nodes in a region of size rs1 centered on the neighbors of the new node (a recurrence
proof can be established).
Reusing an actor list: If there is no mechanism that prevents an attacker from reusing
an actor list, then she only has to keep generating such lists until she obtains one she deems
satisfactory. To counter this behavior, we put in place two mechanisms: (i) a timestamp and
(ii) a limit to the number of triggered executions a node can make. With (i) we prevent any
node from reusing an actor list: QLs and SLs add a timestamp to their signatures which are
respectively checked by the SLs and the data sources. If the timestamp is too distant, the
computation is canceled. Enforcing (ii) is possible thanks to the node cache and the k-table:
the QLs solicited by Q first check if Q chose the smallest possible number of QLs (as their
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node cache contains, by construction, R1 centered on Q, they are capable of judging), thus
forcing Q to choose the same QLs. They then only have to monitor and limit the number of
queries Q does in a given amount of time.
Failures and disconnections: In the most complex case of node failures (i.e., unexpected
disconnection) of a QL, SL or S, either RNDQ or AL cannot be computed and the protocol
must be restarted (i.e., Q generates a new RNDQ). However, the probability of failures during
the execution of the secure actor selection being low in our context, such restarts do not lead
to severe execution limitations as mentioned above. The case of “graceful” disconnections is
easier: we can safely force nodes involved in the actor selection process to remain online until
its completion, thus avoiding the restarts. If a node, selected as actor wants to disconnect (or
fails), the impact is mainly on the result quality since part of the results is missing.
3.3 Experimental Evaluation
This section evaluates the effectiveness, efficiency, scalability and robustness of the SEP2P
actor selection protocol.
3.3.1 Experimental Setting
Reference methods. To better underline our contributions and to provide a comparison
basis, we implemented three strategies in addition to the SEP2P actor selection protocol. We
discarded the baseline cost-optimal and security-optimal protocols from the evaluation since
the former does not provide any security while the latter is much too costly and not scalable
(w.r.t. N and C) to be used in practice. Hence, we used for comparison more advanced
actor selection strategies based on these protocols but using our verifiable random generation
protocol with k participants (see Section 3.2.4).
The first two strategies use the verifiable random to designate the execution Setter (S)
which freely chooses the actor list (as in the cost-optimal protocol). These strategies differ only
in the verification process. The first one, ES.NAV (for Execution Setter, No Actor Verification)
requires verifying the legitimacy of S but not of the actors. The second one, ES.AV requires,
in addition, to verify that actors are genuine PDMSs. ES.AV is expected to provide better
security effectiveness than ES.NAV at a higher security cost. The third strategy, M.Hash (for
Multiple Hash) is derived from the security optimal protocol, but uses a DHT instead of a full
mesh network. Verifiers must check that actors are genuine PDMSs and that they are “near”
the random values determined by the initial verifiable random, hashed as many times as there
are actors.
Simulation platform. We identified all the parameters that may impact the security
and efficiency of the proposed strategies and considered all the metrics (see Table 3.3) that
are worth evaluating to analyze the strengths and weaknesses of the proposed strategies, i.e.,
security effectiveness and cost, setup cost, scalability, robustness w.r.t. failure or disconnec-
tions. Let us note that a real implementation of the SEP2P distributed system is not very
useful if we consider the above listed objectives of the evaluation. Also, measuring the scala-
bility for very large systems (e.g., 10M nodes) with many parameters is practically impossible.
Therefore, as in most of the works on distributed systems [75, 89], we base our evaluation on a
simulator and objective metrics. That is, the latency is measured as the number of asymmet-
ric crypto-operations and exchanged messages between peers instead of absolute time values.
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Strategy Description
ES.NAV Execution Setter with No Actor Verification
ES.AV Execution Setter with Actor Verification
M.Hash Multiple Hash (with Actor Verification)
SEP2P Proposed protocol (see Section 3.2.5)
Param. Description Values (default)
N Number of nodes 10K;100K; 10M
C% % of colluding nodes 0.001%; 0.01%; 0.1%; 1%; (10%)
A Number of actors 8; 16; 32; 64; 128; 256
α Security threshold 10−4; 10−6; 10−10
| cachej | Node cache size 48 or varying from 8 to 32K
MTBF Mean time between failure from 1h to 5 days
Metrics Units & comments
Security effectiveness Ratio (1 = ideal, C/N = worst)
Security cost Number of asymmetric crypto-operations
Latency of setup cost Number of exchanged messages and
number of asymmetric crypto-operations
(per minute for the maintenance overhead)
Total work setup cost
Maintenance overhead
Security degree (k) Ratio (1 = ideal, C/N = worst)
Table 3.3: Strategies, parameters and metrics
This allows for a more precise assessment of the system performance than time latency, which
can greatly vary in our context because of the node heterogeneity (e.g., TEE resources or
network performance).
Our simulator is built on top of a DHT network. Currently, we implemented Chord and
CAN as DHT overlays and use Chord for the results presented in this paper. The simulator
allows to force choosing a given Execution Setter (by artificially fixing the value of RNDQ).
We used this feature to obtain the exhaustive set of cases for a given network setting, each node
being the Execution Setter, and then capture the average, maximum and standard deviation
values for our metrics. The parameters and metrics of the simulator are described in Table 3.3.
Values in bold are the default choices and their tuning is discussed throughout this section.
Note that (1) the security cost is given by verifier node; (2) the latency indicates the “duration”
of the protocol executed in parallel; (3) the total work indicates the cumulative number of
cryptographic operations and communications during the execution of a protocol.
Security threshold value: Generating several networks and varying the security thresh-
old α, we experimentally observed that for α = 10−4, an attacker never controls k or more
nodes. However, given the importance of this parameter for the system security, we set
α = 10−6 and show in Figure 3.6 the impact of choosing α = 10−10 on a small (10K) and
large (10M) network. Indeed, if an attacker could master by chance k colluding nodes in
a region of size rs1 = rs2, then she could completely circumvent the security mechanism of
SEP2P since, for example, she can obtain k signatures from these regrouped colluding nodes
for an actor list of her willing. Note that increasing α reduces the probability accordingly but
increases the security cost in a logarithmic way (as discussed below in Section 3.3.3).
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Figure 3.3: Sec. Effectiveness vs Verification
Figure 3.3 represents the security effectiveness (Y axis) versus the verification cost (X axis)
for the four measured strategies and with C% varying from 0.001% to 10%. Note that the
value of 10% is not realistic: it would lead to large disclosure even with an optimal random
actor selection protocol, and as mentioned in Section 3.1.4, is equivalent to state-size attack.
We have however run the simulation with 10% to understand its impact on the security
effectiveness and cost.
Security effectiveness: SEP2P achieves an ideal security effectiveness, i.e. as good as
a trusted server, independently of the number of colluding nodes. Indeed, the selection of
actors is truly random, thus providing the same results as the ideal case. In addition, the
security cost (2k) is also very low (4 to 8 asymmetric crypto-operations for C% ≤ 1%). Not
surprisingly ES.NAV has the same security cost than SEP2P, but the cost of ES.AV or M.Hash
is much larger (2k + A + 1 and 2k + A respectively) since both must check the certificate of
each actor in the list. This check allows ES.AV to have better security effectiveness than
ES.NAV when C is very small (C < A). With respect to security effectiveness, ES.NAV,
ES.AV and M.Hash are far from offering an adequate protection. Let us explain the cause for
the poor security effectiveness: while RNDQ value is correctly chosen, an attacker mastering
a corrupted node located “sufficiently near” from hash(RNDQ) can claim to be the Execution
Setter and then select a list of actors including a maximum number of colluding nodes. Here,
“sufficiently near” means that it satisfies the check made by the verifiers. Note that we tuned
the system parameters such that we can be “sure” to have always a node sufficiently near
of any random value to allow executing the actor selection protocol for any RNDQ. The
same problem arrives with M.Hash for each new random destination, thus explaining the poor
security effectiveness. Hence, increasing the number of verifications or selecting each actor in
a different network region does not solve the intrinsic limitation of these strategies. Note also
that this behavior does not affect SEP2P. Indeed, even if the Execution Setter is a corrupted
node, it cannot influence the actor list selection since it is done by k SL (S only routes the
messages between the SL).
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Figure 3.5: Setup communication costs
Setup costs: Figures 3.4 and 3.5 show the setup costs (Y axis in log scale) in terms of
asymmetric crypto-operations and exchanged messages respectively, once more with respect to
the security cost (X axis). Curves with empty symbols represent latency while plain symbols
represent total work. The results show that SEP2P is the slowest in latency and has the
higher total setup cost for crypto-operations. These “bad” results are the consequence of two
design choices: (1) to increase the security effectiveness, we run our protocol on k SL nodes
thus increasing the total setup cost; and (2) we voluntarily make most of the checks during
the setup (e.g., checking the actor certificates or verifying their availability) in order to reduce,
as much as possible, the subsequent security cost. Since the verification process is potentially
performed by a (very) large set of nodes (e.g., data sources), it is in our best interest to
reduce it to avoid overloading the entire system. Figures 3.4 and 3.5 illustrate this aspect:
our non-optimal setup cost is balanced by an optimized security cost (and ideal disclosure
in Figure 3.3). Note also that most operations are done in parallel (either by kTL or SL),
thus leading to a reasonable setup latency (around 20 crypto-operations and 30 exchanged
messages). We can also note in Figure 3.5 that M.Hash achieves the worst total work for
setup (exchanged messages), because of the A routings in the DHT. Finally, we can remark
the almost identical latency of ES.NAV, ES.AV and M.Hash on both metrics. Indeed, they all
run the same initial protocol to compute RNDQ. With respect to communication, the results
are also identical because all DHT routings for M.Hash are done in parallel.
3.3.3 Scalability and Robustness
We now concentrate on SEP2P to study its scalability and its robustness to node failure.
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Figure 3.6: k versus C (N and α vary)
Scalability: To study the scalability, we compute the averaged k value varying C and
N . Indeed, k is the main factor in the verification cost, setup latency and total work (since
everything is done k times). As seen in Section 3.2.6, depending on C and N , we can compute
a k-table which gives several increasing values of k with increasing region size. We have
considered small (10K) to very large (10M) networks and four values for C%, leading to
eight different SEP2P network configurations. For each configuration, we have computed, for
each node, the minimal value for k with respect to the k-table and then averaged the results.
Figure 3.6 shows the average k (Y axis) versus the C% (X Axis in log scale) for several network
size considering two values for α: 10−6 and 10−10. We also plot on the same figure the value
of k without k-tables (the grey curve) to highlight the benefit brought by k-tables (only shown
for the large network with α = 10−10). This figure offers many insights. (1) SEP2P is highly
scalable w.r.t. N : Indeed, k values are identical for small and large networks independently
of α if we consider the percentage of colluding nodes and not the absolute value (e.g., 1%
colluding nodes is equivalent to absolute values of C = 100 and C = 100K for the small
and large networks). Indeed, scaling N and C in the same proportion leads to reducing the
rs1 = rs2 size accordingly. Note that with a single corrupted node, the k optimization is
useless (k = C + 1 in that case) regardless of the α value. (2) k increases slowly when
C% < 1%: k remains smaller than 6 even with α = 10−10. For N = 10M and C% = 1%, the
k-optimization reduces the number of participants in the verifiable random generation from
100K to 6. (3) α has a small influences on k: increasing α by four orders of magnitude
increases k from 1 unit (e.g., 1K colluding nodes for N = 10M) to 5 units (e.g., 1K colluding
nodes for N = 10K or 1M colluding nodes for N = 10M). (4) the k-table optimization
is important: k-tables allow reducing k by 1 unit up to 9 units (for 10% colluding nodes).
Number of actors: We also studied the impact of the variation of the number of actors
(see Section 5.2.3). Overall, this results in a linear increase in the total work in terms of
communications as the k SL must check for the availability of A legitimate nodes to construct
their respective list of potential candidates.
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Figure 3.7: Setup costs varying R3 size
Node cache size: We now focus on adapting the node cache size to the maximum
number of required actors. Our goal is to evaluate the impact of the cache size on the global
performances. To do so we take a reference network with N = 100K, C% = 1% and A = 32
and vary the average cache size on the whole network (we compute rs3 easily dividing the cache
size by N). Figure 3.7 shows the results (Y axis in log-scale). For each cache size, we simulated
an execution on each node of the network and computed the average values for our metrics.
Our measures show that with a very small cache, the probability of relocating the actor
selection process is high (the SL do not find enough legitimate nodes in their cache w.r.t. R3),
which then leads to an increased latency and total work. When choosing a cache size greater
than A, the query is almost never relocated (see Figure 3.7), giving better performances. This
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Figure 3.8: Maintenance overheads
Maintenance costs: We also evaluated the impact of the cache size in the presence of
node disconnections and, more generally, the impact of disconnections. To observe it, we
simulated disconnections and measured their cost depending on the size of the node cache
(cachej) using the default values for C, N , α and resulting k. We then considered those
costs as a baseline and computed the global impact in a network where nodes disconnect (and
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reconnect) every x hours (“mean time before failure” or MTBF). We represent this cost in
terms of asymmetric crypto-operations (see Figure 3.8 — Y axis in log scale). The number
of exchanged messages is not shown because the graphs are very similar. We also computed
these metrics for large node cache sizes (up to 32K) to confirm that full mesh networks cannot
be an alternative to DHT. Our results show that an overestimated cache is excessively costly
even with an MTBF of 5 days: it consumes a large portion of the overall computing power
of the entire system just to maintain it up to date. With small MTBFs, the network would
be probably not maintainable. Since the number of actors for a computation is likely to be
relatively small (e.g., few hundred, see Section 5.2.3), we can safely set the node cache size
around 512 which leads to a reasonable maintenance cost (less than 1 signature per node per
minute on average for MTBF = 1 day) and with this value relocations are never triggered (see
Figure 3.7).
3.4 Conclusion
Building a fully-distributed and secure query processing system based solely on PDMS nodes
is arduous. First and foremost, the PDMS nodes must possess strong security guarantees: we
choose to equip them with a Trusted Execution Environment to achieve a high level of security.
At the same time, imagining that a security mechanism is perfect and building a solution on
top of this assumption would be disastrous if it were to be false. Following this reasoning we
introduced the threat model we consider: an attacker can conduct lab attacks on its PDMS
nodes and fully control up to a small percentage of colluding nodes, nodes that act like covert
adversaries. It is important to underline why we consider this percentage to be small: (i)
because of the inherent difficulty of conducting a lab attack and (ii) because the discretion
required to keep the nodes covert is in contradiction with a large organization (that needs
visibility to attract new participants). Additionally, considering a fully-distributed protocol
in a system harboring a vast quantity of colluding nodes would inevitably lead to massive
leaks.
These considerations led us to define the first four requirements our solution should meet:
(i) imposed randomness — to ensure that no attacker can influence the selection of actors;
(ii) knowledge dispersion — to ensure that no node controls too much information; (iii) task
atomicity — to maximize the task separation; and (iv) hidden communications — to protect
the information from an attacker eavesdropping the network. Applying all four requirements
has as a main objective to minimize the risk of a leakage and to minimize the impact of one
such leak, if it were to happen.
We then introduced our first contribution: SEP2P a protocol that securely builds a veri-
fiable random list of actors. By leveraging the DHT on top of which our network is built and
CSAR, an algorithm that produces a verifiable random number as long as one honest node is
involved, we showed that we can generate a verifiable list of actors and only involve a very
small number of nodes — especially when we compare it to the number of colluding nodes.
Our simulation-based experimental evaluation effectively indicates that our protocol leads
to minimal private information leakage, i.e., increasing linearly with the number of colluding
nodes and that, at the same time, the cost of the security mechanisms depends only on the
maximum number of colluding nodes and remains very low even with wide collusion attacks.
This first step lays the foundation for secure, efficient and scalable execution of distributed
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We envision three categories of queries: (i) mobile participatory sensing, (ii) subscription
to information flows based on preferences or user profile, and (iii) queries over personal data
contributed by a large set of individuals.
Mobile participatory sensing is used in many smart city applications for urban monitoring
such as traffic monitoring (e.g., Waze or Navigon), evaluating the quality of road infrastruc-
tures, finding available parking spaces or noise mapping [94]. In these scenarios, the community
members act as mobile probes and contribute to spatial aggregate statistics (density, averaged
measures by location and time, spatial interpolation [94]) which in turn, benefit the whole
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community. As an alternative to the classical centralized architecture, the distributed PDMS
paradigm increases the privacy guarantees for the users, thus encouraging their participation.
A mobile user can generate sensing data (e.g., using her smartphone or vehicular systems)
which is securely transmitted and recorded into her PDMS (e.g., a home box). This way each
PDMS becomes a potential data source in the system. These data can then be aggregated
by a small subset of data processor nodes to produce the required spatial aggregate statistics,
which can be broadcast to all the participating nodes.
Subscription to information flows based on preferences or user profile resembles RSS feeds,
specific product promotions or ads. Traditionally, users subscribe to or are enrolled in a
publication server that allows targeting of the interested nodes. We propose to distributively
store and index profiles (or declaration of interest) in our system, in order to greatly improve
users’ privacy. By leveraging the DHT on which our system rely, storing and searching this
information becomes straightforward: to find all the nodes matching a certain profile, a DHT
search is launched, then a set of randomly selected data processors filter the results to only
keep the (potentially) interested nodes. Finally, the information is sent to the selected targets.
Queries over the personal data contributed by a large set of individuals can be used, for
examples, to compute recommendations or make participative studies. To achieve a high
degree of pertinence and avoid flooding the system, such queries should target only a specific
subset of the nodes, i.e., the nodes exposing a given user profile. Query examples are numerous,
e.g., get the top-10 ranked movies by academics from Paris, or find the average number of sick
leave days of pilots in their forties. The query processing is done in two steps which roughly
correspond to the category (ii) combined with (i). First, the relevant subset of nodes, which
match the query profile, must be discovered (category (ii)). Then, the selected subset of target
nodes become data sources which supply the required data (e.g., number of sick leave days)
to compute the query result (category (i)). The main differences are that only the selected
nodes provide data and that the result is transmitted only to the querier node and not to the
entire system.
In the rest of the chapter we thus consider queries matching the third category as it covers
the other two. To arrive at our proposed solution, we first clarify the data and query model:
which information is available and how we intend to query them. We then gradually construct
a protocol that satisfies all the constraints we fixed. We start with a Naive version showcasing
the feasibility of obtaining a distributed query protocol. As this Naive protocol has obvious
limitations — an all-knowing central actor — we follow up by improving this first version
and propose the Compartmentalized protocol that applies the knowledge dispersion and task
atomicity principles. This version also being imperfect — an actor still has access to more
data than needed and some nodes can be identified — we build upon it and notably apply the
hidden communications principle to obtain the core of our final version, Dispers. To arrive at
the final iteration, we discuss possible attack scenarios, the corresponding countermeasures we
integrated and even some optimizations, eventually leading to Dispers. We leave the in-depth
security analysis and the evaluation of Dispers for the next chapter.
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4.1 Query and Data Model
4.1.1 Data Model
Great care must be taken when querying a potentially large number of nodes. In addition to
the sensitive data manipulated, the ability to not hinder the primary purpose of a PDMS is
also crucial. Indeed, preventing the PDMS to function normally would cause users to refrain
from participating in the distributed computations. The random (and uniform) selection of the
actors in the network already partially contributes towards that objective. A complementary
measure we can take is to ensure that not all the network is involved in a computation but
only a small subset. However, poorly choosing this subset can lead to uninteresting results
or no results at all: imagine asking for restaurant recommendations in Toronto and none of
the participants live there. It is for that purpose that a profile is associated to each PDMS: it
is used to target relevant nodes and thus limit the amount of participants. A profile can be
sensitive and as such requires protection, as explained in Section 4.3.1.
Definition 1. Profile. A profile p is a set of concepts p = {c1, c2, . . . , ck}.
Definition 2. Concept. A concept c is the concatenation of one or more metadata terms
mi describing its semantics and a value v, i.e., c = m1|m2| . . . |mp|v.
Examples of concepts are: location|Paris, sex|male. Multiple metadata terms can
be used to indicate a concept at different granularity, allowing for a structured organiza-
tion. For instance, location at the city level: location|city|Paris or at the country level:
location|country|France.
The profile is supposed to be an accurate description of the owner of the PDMS. Its
generation can be achieved by different means: automatically by the PDMS according to
the data it contains, manually by the owner by selecting attributes she finds fitting, or both.
Beside the profile, the user may contribute with part of her stored personal data (e.g., shopping
preferences, graded movies, physical activities stats, etc.) to allow for aggregated data queries
from other users. We assume that the profile and the user’s data are structured to allow for
easy query formulation and processing.
Still, specifying the nodes that should answer a query thanks to a profile might not be
enough: there is no guarantee that this filtering will be sufficient (e.g. with a very inclusive
profile). To remedy this problem we sample the participants: we randomly select a subset
and only query it. Enforcing sampling yields several benefits: (i) we achieve an overall better
privacy as, in case of a leakage, a smaller subset is impacted, (ii) we remain efficient in all
situations and (iii) the quality of the end result is not necessarily worse — mathematical
statistics show that under certain conditions1, an adequate sample is as representative as
the entire population. Although we will not specifically come back on this step later in this
chapter, since its application does not need further explanations, we want to stress here its
importance: sampling brings additional benefits and is a key component in our approach.
Hence, to summarize, the data model we consider is comprised of two elements: the stored
personal data and the profile of a user.
1See Hoeffding’s inequality[39]for example.
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4.1.2 Query Model
To understand how we propose to decompose a query, we use the following example as a basis:
let us suppose that we want to know the average rating of the latest romantic movie given
by people who live in Paris and who usually enjoy comedy. For conciseness, we can translate
this request into a query: “average rating of the latest romantic movie as per people living in
Paris and enjoying comedy”.
This query exposes a profile to respect: “people living in Paris and enjoying comedy”. If
we use the concept terminology, this would equal:
profile = (movie|comedy) ∧ (location|city|Paris)
This profile is the first part of a query, the target profile:
Definition 3. Target profile (tp). The Target Profile is a logical expression of concepts
indicating which nodes qualify to answer a given query.
Defining this profile prompts us to define its corollary, a target :
Definition 4. Target (T). A Target is a node whose profile matches the target profile.
The following part is the data each target should provide to the distributed computation:
“rating of the latest romantic movie”. We call it the local query :
Definition 5. Local query (lq). The Local Query is the expression of the query to be
computed locally by each Target.
The final part describes the function that should take as inputs the local results and provide
the final result: “average” in our example. We call it the aggregate query :
Definition 6. Aggregate Query (aq). The Aggregate Query, aq, is an aggregative ex-
pression applied over the results obtained by the Local Query.
By “aggregative expression” we consider classical aggregate queries (e.g., average, count,
min, max, top-k, group-by, etc.). More complex queries can also be considered as soon as its
execution can be decomposed in a local query and an aggregate query. We leave open the query
expressiveness issue for future work, the focus here being on a secure and privacy-preserving
query evaluation.
Hence, in our system, we define a query as:
Definition 7. Query. A query q is a triplet: q = (tp, lq , aq).
Let us consider three examples of query that can be formulated in our system: a closed
item list query where the participants’ answers concern an already defined list of items, an
open item list query where there is no fixed set of answers, and a statistical query.
• Closed item list: “given a set of movies find their average grade as given by researchers
or professors who live in London”.
tp = (location|London) ∧ ((occupation|researcher) ∨ (occupation|professor))
lq = select grades for movies in {item list}
aq = average
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• Open item list: “get the top-10 ranked movies by users that are researchers or profes-
sors and live in New-York”.
tp = (location|New-York) ∧ ((occupation|researcher) ∨ (occupation|professor))
lq = select top-10 in {movies}
aq = top-10
• Statistics: “What is the average number of sick leave day in 2017 of researchers or
professors living in Paris”.
tp = (location|Paris) ∧ ((occupation|researcher) ∨ (occupation|professor))
lq = {number of sick leave days in 2017}
aq = average
Now that we have seen which data are available, the structure of a query and how both
can be leveraged to constrain the number of nodes involved, we can take a look at how we can
execute a distributed query in a privacy-preserving manner.
Notes on the threat model. In the previous chapter we explained that we consider an
adversary capable of conducting lab-attacks on the PDMS in its possession, leading to a
situation where it controls a (very) small percentage of nodes in the network.
To not confuse the reader with all the possible ways these colluding nodes can be
coerced into obtaining sensitive information, we consider up until Section 4.5 a sealed-
glass model: the colluding nodes do not deviate from the protocol, i.e. they obediently
execute the tasks they were attributed, but they observe the information they manipulate.
Also note that this does not exclude the possibility of spying on the communications of
other nodes.
4.2 Naive Protocol
The aim of this first iteration is to assess the feasibility of simply executing a distributed query
using all the data structures at our disposal. As defined in Section 3.1.1, we call Querier the
node originating a query.
After generating its query, q = (tp, lq , aq), Q has to start by finding the relevant nodes
that match the target profile it specified. To achieve this we can leverage once again the DHT
upon which the network is built: the main purpose of a DHT is to create optimized routing
mechanisms to efficiently store and retrieve pairs of (key, value). Adapted to our situation
and needs, the key is a concept and the value is a list of the IP addresses of the nodes
possessing that concept in their profile. We call Concept Indexer every node responsible for a
concept in the DHT:
Definition 8. Concept Indexer (CI ). A Concept Indexer is a node storing one or more
pair·s of: (concept, {IP addresses}).
With the addition of the CI , a Querier now has all that it needs to execute a query:








Figure 4.1: Naive Query Execution
Naive protocol
(1) The querier, Q, executes a DHT search for each concept in the target profile tp. Each
concept search is routed in the DHT until it reaches the adequate CI .
(2) Each CI replies to Q with the list of IP addresses corresponding to the searched concept.
(3) Q receives the list of IP addresses for each concept from each CI . It then applies the
target profile logical expression on the concept IP lists, obtains the final IP list of the
targets (T ) and samples it.
(4) Q contacts directly each sampled target node T and sends it the local query lq . Each
target computes the local result for lq .
(5) Each target replies to Q with the local result. Q gathers the local results from the target
nodes until all T have replied.
(6) Q applies the aggregate query aq on the local results to obtain the final query result and
to present it to the PDMS owner.
This naive query execution protocol shows that the proposed query model can indeed be
supported by our system. However, this protocol has three major shortcomings, two of them
resulting from the central position of the querier. First, since any node can issue queries, a
single node level attacker can use this corrupted node to issue a query and thus have access to
the list of nodes matching any of the concepts of the target profile (i.e. before applying it and
before the sampling), the local query results of the targets and the association between targets
and local results, i.e., all the sensitive data! Second, this protocol is not efficient since the
querier is a bottleneck. Third, a corrupted CI can access the list of IP addresses corresponding
to the concepts it is responsible for as they are stored without any kind of protection.
These shortcomings prompt us to apply two of our design principles: knowledge dispersion
to prevent a corrupted CI from learning the IP addresses and task atomicity to prevent any
node from accessing a significant portion of the sensitive data.
4.3 Compartmentalized protocol
4.3.1 Knowledge dispersion
Enforcing knowledge dispersion to prevent the CI from directly manipulating the IP addresses
can be easily achieved with Shamir’s Secret Sharing Scheme[84].
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Proposed in 1979, and also known as a (t, n)-threshold scheme, Shamir’s Secret Sharing
Scheme consists in dividing some data D into n pieces D1, . . . , Dn in such a way that:
(i) knowledge of any t or more Di pieces makes D easily computable; but (ii) knowledge
of any t − 1 or fewer Di pieces leaves D protected (not even providing any information
about it).
To achieve these properties a random polynomial q(x) of degree t− 1 is generated:




. . . ,
Dn = q(n).
With enough Di, i.e. with t or more, the coefficients of q(x) can be evaluated by
interpolation and D retrieved by evaluating D = q(0). Whereas with less than t Di, the
coefficients cannot be computed and D remains protected.
By splitting their IP address into shares and assigning each share to a different CI ,
the PDMS nodes can greatly decrease the probability of having their IP address leaked. For
instance, in a network harboring c% of colluding nodes and where the IP addresses are split
into n shares (t are required to recompose the secret), the probability of obtaining the list of







× ci: as the concepts and the
node’s position in the DHT cannot be influenced and as they are uniformly distributed (see
Section 3.2.2), the probability for an attacker to obtain a single list of shares for a concept
is c and, as the probability of obtaining another share is independent of the probability of





× ct. The final probability
is the sum of the probabilities of having t, t+1, . . . , n sets of shares. With c = 1%, n = 5, t = 3
this probability is equal to P = 0.0000100501. Setting the values for n and t is discussed in
Section 5.2.3.
Note that we do not take the instability of the DHT into account when computing this
probability: although we assume that nodes in our system will, for the vast majority, stay
online (the purpose of a cloud, let alone a personal one, is to be available all the time), it is
likely that some of them might punctually disconnect while others might join, thus changing
the shape of the DHT. We posit that this has a very limited impact on the probability and
discard it.
Introducing this method to store the concepts in the DHT raises several questions: how
can one know which shares go together? How are the shares securely inserted in the DHT?
How are the different CI designated?
Shamir’s Secret Sharing Scheme does not give an indication on how to know if a set of
shares are related to the same secret, we thus have to provide a “marker” that signals this
relationship. Furthermore, as there are possibly many shares for as many different secrets,
this marker has to be unique per secret to not mix shares that do not belong together. We
call this marker a Concept-Target Identifier :
Definition 9. Concept-Target IDentifier (CTID). A Concept-Target Identifier is a
unique identifier associated to all the shares that, together, recompose into an IP address. This
identifier must be unique per concept, i.e. for any two concepts ca and cb possessed by the same
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Figure 4.2: Example of CI index entries
node, the CTID associated are such that CTIDca 6= CTIDcb; and for any two nodes n and m
and any two concepts ci and cj, the CTID associated are such that CTIDn,ci 6= CTIDm,cj .
Generating such identifier can be easily achieved with a hash (e.g. using the public key of
the node, the concept and a random: CTIDc = hash(kpub | c | RND)). We thus assume that
each node generates one such identifier for each of its concepts and associates them, correctly,
to the shares — as illustrated in Figure 4.2.
Securely inserting the shares in the network is a matter of preventing an attacker from
tying an insertion to a node. According to assumption 4, listening to the communications
of a CI is possible, the only difficulty being in finding its IP address (to know “where” to
listen). As we cannot keep the CI anonymous, we can safely posit that an attacker can, and
eventually will, acquire this knowledge and is thus able to intercept its communications. This
has three major implications: during an insertion the communications with the CI must be
anonymized, encrypted, and verified at risk of disclosing the association (concept ⇐⇒
IP address). This process is illustrated by Figure 4.3.
Anonymization. By simply observing the incoming communications at the different CI
indexing the shares of a concept, an attacker knows with certitude that the sending node
possesses said concept. To hide this, nodes must employ a proxy to anonymize these exchanges
(node P and step (1) in Figure 4.3). Still, if an attacker can intercept all the shares then it
can uncover the IP address of the node, effectively nullifying this protection.
Encryption. With encrypted communications the attacker can no longer access the shares
of the CI under its scrutiny. However this is not enough as, as shown in Section 3.3.2, an
attacker can impersonate the CI if some of its colluding nodes are “close” enough to them




Figure 4.3: Insertion of a concept in the DHT
(one for each CI ). An additional security measure is hence required.
Verification. To prevent an attacker from pretending to be a CI we propose to leverage once
more the “k close neighbors” property: if k close neighbors (i.e. we have the certainty that
one of them is honest — nodes CL in Figure 4.3) of a node are attesting the fact that it does
manage the concept then this node’s claim can be considered as true. Therefore, whenever
a node looks up a concept it first checks the k attestations provided by the answering node
before continuing (steps (2), (3), and (4) in Figure 4.3).
The only remaining problem is how to find the different CI responsible for a concept. In a
DHT, finding out which node is responsible for a key is done by hashing the key. We propose
to apply the same reasoning and to hash recursively the key, its hash, the hash of its hash,
etc. . . to designate (and find) as many CI as necessary.
Hence, to summarize, by applying the knowledge dispersion design principle the nodes
protect their association (concept ⇐⇒ IP address). For that purpose they: (i) split their
IP address into n shares (t ≤ n shares being required to recompose it), (ii) store each at a
different CI , and finally (iii) make sure to protect these communications (through anonymiza-
tion, encryption and verification). Doing so greatly reduces the probability of a leak (if not
completely nullifies it) as the only possible course of action for an attacker is to hope that its
colluding nodes will manage the shares of the concept·s it is interested in.
4.3.2 Task Atomicity
When we look at the different steps of the Naive protocol, we can identify three roles accu-
mulated by the querier: (i) Step (1): initiating the query by contacting the CI s, (ii) Step (4):
finding the targets, and (iii) Step (6): executing the aggregate query.
Leaving the initiation of the query to the querier is the best option: if it had to delegate it to
a random node then it would need to provide it with the necessary information to bootstrap
the query and, if this random node were to be corrupted, this would disclose potentially
sensitive information to an attacker. Roles (ii) and (iii), however, have to be delegated to
other actors: knowing which nodes match a given profile and which results they contribute is
specifically what we aim to protect. Applying the task atomicity design principle leads to the
definition of the following new actors:
Definition 10. Target Finder. A Target Finder (TF) recomposes the IP addresses based
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on the shares, applies the target profile to determines the targets, selects a sample, and sends
the local query to the sampled targets.
The querier has to provide a TF with the target profile so it can apply it on the recomposed
IP addresses. Yet, giving the profile as is simply moves part of the problem: a TF is still
able to know which nodes match a given profile. A solution is to provide the TF with
a pseudonymized version of the target profile: if we keep our illustrative example from
Section 4.1.2, instead of receiving (movie|comedy)∧ (location|city|Paris), they receive (x∧
y). Associating a concept to its pseudonym and transmitting them is done by Q: when it
contacts the CI it gives them the pseudonym corresponding to the looked-up concept and the
CI only transfer the pseudonyms (with the list of shares) to the TF .
Definition 11. Data Aggregator. The role of a Data Aggregator (DA) is to aggregate
the local results according to the aggregate query.
Similar to the target profile, a DA does not have to know the nature of the data it manipulates.
The querier will thus send it a pseudonymized version of the aggregate query. With our
illustrative example there is nothing special to do, since computing an “average” does not
disclose anything more than what the data-set itself does.
To further reduce the potential data disclosure (and to avoid performance bottlenecks), we
consider having several TF and DA. The number of TF and DA are two system parameters
that are discussed in the experimentation section, see Section 5.2.3. However, having several
TF and DA requires adjustments.
Considering several TF in addition to using shares leads to a small complexity when it
comes to distributing these shares to the TF : to determine a given target, at least t shares
for each concept involved in the target profile must reach the same TF . Thus, the CI need
to store, together with the share and the CTID , a value that ensures that they all direct the
shares to the adequate TF . This value, called the “selector”, is chosen randomly by each node
and permanently associated to all its shares. The CI leverage it to select one of the TF —
by computing a modulo with regard to the number of TF . The value of this selector should
be chosen such that it is greater than the maximum number of TF in any query and, at the
same time, small enough to favor collisions — which avoids permitting a node identification
and would thus nullify the interest of using shares. We can set:
selector = hash(kpubi) mod max(|TF |)
to ensure a uniform distribution.
Considering several DA requires the definition of another actor responsible for the final
aggregation, as none of the DA possesses all the results:
Definition 12.Main Data Aggregator. The role of theMain Data Aggregator (MDA)
is to perform the final aggregation on the partially aggregated results sent by the DAs, and to
transfer the final result to the querier.
We could wonder if there are any benefits in having multiple MDA and organize them
following a predefined hierarchy. We argue that there should only be a single MDA that
centralizes all the partial results of the DA and computes the final result. This statement is
motivated by two reasons: (i) as the partial results are less sensitive than the local results
the number of DA should be maximized so as to minimize the impact of a leakage, and (ii)
the MDA performs less operations than the DA (unless the number of DA is superior to the
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number of results — a situation that should not occur), hence introducing multiple levels of
MDA increases the latency and the total work. It is thus in our best interest to designate a
single MDA.
To fully comply with the task atomicity design principle, we (obviously) impose that an
actor can only play a single role in the protocol, i.e. Q ∩ {TF} ∩ {DA} ∩MDA = ∅.
4.3.3 Compartmentalized Query Processing
Figure 4.4 illustrates the execution of a query with the previous additions. Its process is as
follows:
Compartmentalized query processing
(0) (Not shown in Figure 4.4) The Querier, Q, transmits the query metadata to the actors: the
pseudonymized target profile and local query to the TF and the pseudonymized aggregate
query to the DA.
(1) Q looks up the concept in the DHT and provides the CI with the pseudonym of the
looked-up concept.
(2) Each CI checks the actors list (distinct nodes) and distributes to the several TF , using
the selector associated to each entry in their list to ensure a correct distribution, the secret
shares and their CTID .
(3) Each TF recomposes the received shares, using CTID , for each pseudonymized concept
to obtain the IP addresses of the nodes. It applies the pseudonymized target profile to
determine a subset of the targets and samples it to reduce their number. It then sends
the local query to each sampled target.
(4) Each target computes the result for the received local query, randomly selects a DA and
sends it its result.
(5) Each DA receives a subset of local results, applies the pseudonymized aggregate query
and sends the partially aggregated result to the MDA.
(6) The MDA gathers all the partially aggregated results, computes the final query result and
sends it to Q.
This compartmentalized protocol offers a welcome first round of enhancements: no actor
centralizes all of the sensitive data, the querier is no longer a bottleneck, and the introduction
of multiple TF and DA distributes the load, introduces parallelism and reduces the impact of
leakage (more actors need to be corrupted to obtain a sensible amount of information).
Note that we did not discuss how the actors are selected: as one can imagine, leveraging
a list of nodes that can be shown to have been randomly established, following SEP2P, is the
best course of action and the one we evidently follow.
Nonetheless, without making a full security analysis (see Section 5.1), this protocol pos-
sesses evident security pitfalls. First, as the TF recompose the IP addresses before applying
the target profile, if one were to be corrupted it would learn a subset of the IP addresses as-
sociated to each of the individual concepts mentioned in the target profile, i.e. regardless
of the final selection and the sampling! Second, in accordance with the assumption 4, while
the target list computation or the local result aggregation benefits from the TEE protection,















Figure 4.4: Compartmentalized Query Execution
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this is not the case for the communications going to and coming from the targets: a malicious
user could observe the local network traffic of her PDMS and may infer that (i) it has been
selected as TF since it contacts simultaneously a large number of nodes and (ii) the contacted
nodes are targets — all of this without conducting a lab attack! Symmetrically, a DA can
be concomitantly contacted by a significant number of nodes, which can be interpreted by a
malicious user in the same way. Additionally, none of these exchanges are said to be encrypted
leaving the data completely exposed.
To solve these issues we propose in the next section the core of our final contribution: the
DISPERS protocol.
4.4 DISPERS
4.4.1 Splitting the Target Finder Role
As explained, the TF role accumulates two problems: it has access to the IP addresses of the
nodes matching any concept of the target profile, and an attacker can learn the IP addresses
of the targets by simply listening to its communications. We leave aside the last problem as
we answer it in Section 4.4.2 and focus here on finding a way to reduce the knowledge it has
access to.
The first observation we can make is that to prevent a node from learning the IP addresses
of the nodes matching not just the target profile but any of its concepts, the target profile must
be applied on something other than the IP addresses. Our solution consists in having each
node generate a unique pseudonym (i.e. the equivalent of an identifier), the Target Identifier :
Definition 13. Target IDentifier (TID). A Target Identifier is a unique pseudonym
associated to and generated by each node.
Similar to the CTID , generating a TID can be achieved with a hash (e.g. using the public
key and a random: TID = hash(kpub | RND)). However, unlike the CTID , the TID has
to be associated to all concepts and, like the IP address of the node, it cannot be stored
unprotected as, because it is unique, it can be leveraged to reconstruct the full profile of a
node. Hence, we also protect the TID by applying Shamir’s Secret Sharing Scheme and store
it exactly like the shares of the IP addresses — i.e. the CTID signals the shares that belong
together, a different set of shares is created per concept, and the shares are stored at the
different CI responsible for the concept.
The introduction of the TID gives a glimpse of a possible separation of the TF role: (i) a
first sub-role taking care of recomposing the TID and applying, on them, the pseudonymized
target profile, and (ii) a second sub-role that only recomposes the IP addresses of the nodes
that match. Dissociating both actions achieves our objective: a corrupted node doing (i)
learns some TID without being able to link them with IP addresses, and a corrupted node
doing (ii) learns only the IP addresses of a portion of the targets, which is the lowest possible
leakage at that step and for that role. We define these roles as follows:
Definition 14. Profile Sampler (PS). A Profile Sampler recomposes the TID based on
the shares sent by the CI , applies the target profile to determine the targets, selects a sample
and transfers the information of the sampled targets to a Share Recomposer.
Definition 15. Share Recomposer (SR). A Share Recomposer reconstructs the IP ad-
dresses of the sampled targets based on the information it received from a Profile Sampler.
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Figure 4.5: New version of the CI index entries
Let us now clarify the information both roles require. To apply the pseudonymized target
profile the PS need the TID . Hence, they need the shares of TID and the accompanying
CTID (to know which shares go together). Applying the same reasoning with the SR is,
however, impossible: providing them the shares of IP addresses and the CTID would make
them able to reconstruct the IP addresses of all the nodes that match any of the concept of
the target profile — which is exactly what we want to prevent.
A potential solution would be to separate the shares of IP addresses into two, give the
first half to the PS , the second to the SR and make the PS only send to the SR the shares
of the nodes that match the target profile. That way, without the shares of the PS , the SR
cannot learn any IP addresses and we attain our objective. Unfortunately, the intrinsic nature
of the shares prevents this strategy: an attacker could successively collect them (one of its
colluding node is an SR, then, for another query, another is a PS , etc. . . ) until it has enough
to reconstruct the IP address. Plus, grouping compatible shares represents no difficulty if the
CTID are transmitted together with the shares.
To not disclose the CTID and to prevent an attacker from blindly amassing shares, we
propose the following procedure (illustrated by Figure 4.6):
Recomposing the IP addresses
(1) Each CI encrypts the shares of IP addresses that are to be transmitted with symmetric
keys. A different symmetric key is generated per share (and encrypted with it).
(2) The CI send to the PS : the share of TID and the symmetric key used in the previous







Figure 4.6: PS and SR roles
(3) The PS recompose the TID , apply the pseudonymized target profile on these and select
a sample.
(4) The PS send the symmetric keys of the sampled targets to the SR. The symmetric keys
corresponding to the same set of shares are bundled together.
(5) The SR decipher the shares and reconstruct the IP addresses of the sampled targets.
Encrypting the shares of IP addresses in step (1) prevents an attacker from collecting
them. Using symmetric encryption additionally makes this operation inexpensive. Sending,
in step (2), the keys to the PS and the encrypted shares to the SR separates the information:
in step (5) the SR are only able to recompose the IP addresses of the sampled targets, because
they only receive these keys in step (4).
Also, as shown in Figure 4.6, there is a one-one relationship between the PS and the SR:
we arrange the list of actors to have the same quantity of PS and SR such that the PS do
not need the selector value to determine to which SR they should transfer the temporary
symmetric keys. They simply transfer them to the SR that share the same position (each in
their respective list).
Hence, with this addition we solve the problem of the TF role, as unless both a PS and
the corresponding SR are colluding, only a subset of the targets’ IP addresses are leaked: the
PS work on TID and do not manipulate any IP address, while the SR can only decipher the
shares for which they received the corresponding decryption keys.
This leaves us with the communications: which exchanges should be encrypted?
4.4.2 Hidden Communications
When considering the messages exchanged during the execution of the protocol, two elements
need to be considered: (i) the data itself and (ii) its metadata counterpart. Indeed, in accor-
dance with assumption 4, an attacker can spy upon the communications of a limited set of
nodes. If we assume that the querier is corrupted and has enough time to prepare, we can
posit that it will listen to all the communications of the different actors: PS ,SR,DA, and
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MDA. We leave apart the communications from the nodes to the CI (to store concepts) as
we have already established that they have to be encrypted in Section 4.3.1, although the
conclusions drawn here are very similar.
Having access to all the communications of the actors means that the attacker knows all
the sampled targets and which target produced which local result. Indeed, spying on the
SR gives away the IP addresses of the sampled targets — every communications containing
the local query is destined for a target; and spying on the DA gives away the association
target⇐⇒ local result — every communication coming from a previously identified target.
Two complementary approaches are to be employed to completely seal off this information
leakage: encryption and anonymization.
Encrypting the Communications
To encrypt the communications the different actors first need to be able to produce encryption
keys. This can either be done through a shared symmetric key known in advance, or by
exchanging one using public key encryption — also known as hybrid encryption. Given our
efficiency requirement, a symmetric encryption scheme is the preferred option. However,
exchanging a key while making sure that no attacker intercepts it and without relying on
asymmetric encryption is difficult.
At the same time, performing asymmetric encryption is simple: the only requirement
is to possess the public key of the recipient, key that can be broadcast unencrypted. For
that reason, whenever it is impossible to use symmetric encryption to transmit information,
hybrid encryption is performed: the sender encrypts the data using a symmetric key, the
symmetric key is in turn encrypted using the public key of the recipient and the whole is sent
to the recipient. Naturally, nothing prevents nodes from exchanging symmetric keys at the
beginning of the protocol, as opposed to during its execution, to speed up the process.
Note that, no matter how the actors are selected, obtaining their certificates (and thus
their public key) is within reach: the querier simply has to add this information to the list of
actors — as that list is already transferred to all the participating nodes (see Section 4.5.7).
Hybrid encryption compared to TLS? The Transport Layer Security (TLS)[77] is a
protocol that establishes a secure communication channel between a client and a server.
This protocol is two-phased: in the first phase, the client and the server collaboratively
create a secure connection and, in the second, the actual communication takes place. The
first phase is the most complex out of the two as, among other, the client and the server
operate a handshake during which they choose an encryption algorithm and a key size.
In our system, the encryption algorithm and key size are global parameters, which
only leaves the actual encryption and decryption to the exchanging nodes.
Hence, which communications should be encrypted and how? Evidently, the communica-
tions between the CI , the PS and the SR have to: if not, an attacker spying on the PS and SR
can reconstruct all the IP addresses. Similarly, the communications between the DA and the
MDA are encrypted: if the final aggregation necessitates the local results instead of partially
aggregated ones (e.g. to compute a median), they need to be protected. In both situations,
hybrid encryption is the only option: the actors are picked randomly during the setup phase
and do not know each other, requiring them to create a secure channel then.
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Figure 4.7: Final CI index entries
Transferring the query metadata (the pseudonymized target profile, aggregate and local
query, the concepts and their pseudonyms) from the querier to the actors and the CI should
also be done securely: an attacker can use the metadata to infer information about the targets.
For instance, a local query asking for tumor markers, coupled with the concept (age| ≤ 30)
and a pseudonymized target profile (a ∧ b) tells an attacker that the targets are less than
30 years old and suffer from cancer. Again, hybrid encryption is required to protect these
exchanges.
As showed previously, the incoming and outgoing communications from the targets disclose
sensitive information. The messages coming from the SR reveal the local query, and the
messages going to the DA the local results. Knowing the local query and the fact that a
target replied (i.e. without even knowing the local result) means that the target possesses
the specific data requested; while knowing the local result might unveil the nature of the
local query or, worse, disclose information regarding the profile of the target (solely based on
the nature of the local result). For these reasons, we encrypt both. Choosing the type of
encryption is not as straightforward as for the actors: a substantial number of nodes might be
targeted, which implies as many cryptographic operations if hybrid encryption is elected. On
the one hand, as the targets should not reveal themselves to the DA (see Section 4.4.2), there
is no other option but to perform hybrid encryption. On the other hand, it is possible for the
nodes to transmit a symmetric key to the SR without additional hybrid encryption: exactly
like the shares of the IP addresses, shares of a symmetric key can be stored in the distributed
index, encrypted by the CI and split between the PS and the SR so that only those belonging
to the targets are decrypted. The only subtlety with this method is that nodes have to store
a different key with each concept, to not recreate a second TID . A selector is also associated
with each key so the nodes can easily retrieve the key with which some data was encrypted.
Figure 4.7 gives a possible implementation although other variations, with, for instance, shares
that regroup information are entirely viable.
Hence, leaving the communications open to interceptions seriously endangers the privacy of
the participants, especially more so because the actors are known in advance which gives time
for an attacker to prepare. Yet, limiting the protection of the communications to encrypting
the data is not enough: anonymizing some of these communications proves to be a necessity.
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Anonymizing the Communications: Proxies
Three sets of communications require our attention: (i) those emanating from the CI , (ii)
those from the SR to the targets and (iii) those from the targets to the DA. Note that we
focus here on which nodes are communicating, we do not consider the data being exchanged.
In (i), we have to consider the point of view of an attacker that is not the Querier and that
listens to a PS or a SR. Because it is not at the origin of the query it does not know the target
profile. Still, uncovering the concepts composing the target profile is achievable if the CI are
not hidden. This problem stems from the conjunction of the use of Shamir’s Secret Sharing
Scheme and the DHT: because the IP addresses associated to a concept are split into several
shares, as many CI are contacted; and because the process to designate the CI responsible
for a concept involves the computation of a hash — that is both a deterministic operation
and gives a unique value, the combination of CI responsible for a concept is also unique. This
produces a situation where knowing which CI were contacted is equivalent to knowing the
looked-up concept.
Cases (ii) and (iii) are identical: if an attacker (be it Querier or not) listens to the com-
munications of either a SR or a DA it knows the targets, as they are either the destination or
the source of the exchanges.
To solve all these problems we propose that the CI , the SR and the targets choose proxies:
Definition 16. Concept indexer Proxy (CP). A Concept indexer Proxy is a node ran-
domly chosen by a Concept Indexer which only goal is to forward data to the specified Profile
Sampler and Share Recomposer.
Definition 17. Before Proxy (BP). A Before Proxy is a node randomly chosen by a Share
Recomposer which only goal is to forward data to the specified target·s.
Definition 18. After Proxy (AP). An After Proxy is a node randomly chosen by a Target
which only goal is to forward data to the specified Data Aggregator.
Using proxies greatly reduces the impact of the spying of the communications of either
actor: as an attacker does not know which nodes to listen to, as none of the proxies are chosen
during the setup phase but dynamically during the execution, it would have to listen to the
entire network to obtain the same results. Managing a wiretap on such a large scale requires
resources only accessible to a state-size attacker, a threat that is outside of the scope of this
work.
We do not enforce any kind of restriction on the nature of the proxies, they can be node
belonging to the system (e.g. part of the node cache of any of these actors, see Section 3.2.6)
or any node on the Internet — given that it is willing to do the actor’s bidding. The only
constraint there is concerns the Before Proxy : they must possess a genuine certificate so as to
receive the IP address of their designated target encrypted. Otherwise, an attacker listening
to the communications of the SR would learn them, which defeats the purpose of having a
proxy in the first place.
Proxies compared to Onion routing? Onion routing[76, 96] is a way of routing
messages over the internet that is resistant to both eavesdropping and traffic analysis. The
core mechanism of this technology is to route every communication through a sequence
of machines called onion routers where each onion router can only identify the previous
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and next hop along a route.
A proxy can be assimilated to onion routing where there is only a single layer. It is
thus both simpler and less expensive as there is only round of encryption/decryption to
perform.
Given our current threat model, if the proxies are correctly chosen then a single level
is enough. Employing “real” onion routing can be considered under other more invasive
threats (e.g. an attacker able to spy on a large portion of the network).
Counting on the proxies to hide the identity of the CI and the targets, we now possess a
framework that is able to protect the sensitive information against a “passive” attacker. Let
us the detail the current state of our solution and of the query execution process.
4.4.3 DISPERS: Core Solution
Figure 4.8 illustrates the query execution process. The number of CI has been reduced to not
make the figure too dense. A step by step description is as follows:
DISPERS Query execution
(0) (Not shown in Figure 4.8) The Querier, Q, transmits the query metadata to the differ-
ent actors: the pseudonymized target profile to the PS , the local query to the SR, the
pseudonymized aggregate query to the DA and the list of all actors (containing their
certificates) to all of them.
(1) Q looks up the concepts in the DHT and provides the CI with the pseudonym of the
looked-up concept and the list of actors.
(2) Each CI :
(a) encrypts the shares of the targets’ IP address and symmetric key with “temporary”
symmetric keys;
(b) determines, using the selector associated with each entry, to which PS and SR the
shares should go;
(c) encrypts (hybrid encryption) the information destined to the PS : the shares of TID ,
the CTID , and the corresponding temporary symmetric keys;
(d) encrypts (hybrid encryption) the information destined to the SR: the encrypted
shares of the targets’ IP address and symmetric key;
(e) asks as many proxies, CP , as it seems fit to transmit the information to the PS and
the SR.
(3) The CP forward the information to their designated PS and/or SR.
(4) The PS decipher the shares and the CTID , reconstruct the TID , apply the pseudonymized
target profile, select a sample, and send, encrypted (hybrid encryption), to the PS the
temporary symmetric key associated to the sampled targets.
(5) The SR decipher the shares, reconstruct the IP addresses and their matching symmetric
keys, encrypt the local query and the list of actors (symmetric encryption based on the
reconstructed keys) and ask BP to forward the information to the targets.
(6) The BP decipher the IP addresses of the targets and then forward them the information.
(7) The targets decipher the local query and list of actors, apply the local query, choose a DA,
























Figure 4.8: DISPERS core protocol
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(8) The AP forward the results to their designated DA.
(9) The DA decipher the local results, apply the pseudonymized aggregate query (whenever
possible), encrypt (hybrid encryption) the partial results for the MDA and forward them.
(10) The MDA deciphers the partially aggregated results, compute the final result, encrypts
(hybrid encryption) it for Q and finally sends it to Q.
It is interesting to look at the information accessed by each actor with this new iteration
of the protocol, summarized in Table 4.1 below. The CP and AP are omitted as their only




- the (pseudonymized) target profile: concepts + pseudonyms;
- the local query;
- the (pseudonymized) aggregate query;
- the list of actors;
CI
- the list of actors;
- a concept and its pseudonym;
PS
- the list of actors;
- the pseudonymized target profile;
- the concepts’ pseudonyms;
- a subset of CTID (one per concept for each “node”);
- a subset of TID ;
SR
- the list of actors;
- the local query;
- a subset of the targets’ IP addresses;
- a subset of the targets’ symmetric keys;
BP - a target’s IP address;
T
- the list of actors;
- the local query;
DA
- the list of actors;
- the pseudonymized aggregate query;
- a subset of local results;
MDA
- the pseudonymized aggregate query;
- the partially aggregated results;
- the final result.
Table 4.1: Information accessed by the actors
We can see that each actor receives the minimum amount of information. Indeed, if only
a single information is missing for any actor then they cannot perform their task: the CI are
asked to transmit their lists and for that purpose only receive the concept, its pseudonym and
the recipients (via the list of actors); the PS are supposed to apply the pseudonymized target
4.5. Additional Protections and Optimizations 78
profile and only receive the necessary elements to perform that task; the SR have to transmit
to the targets the local query and the list of actors, and receive exactly just that; and finally
the DA are requested to compute the pseudonymized aggregate query on the local results,
which is what they receive.
Additionally, as we already noted with the Compartmentalized protocol, distributing the
query processing on several distinct actors increases parallelism and thus query processing
efficiency. But, more importantly, DISPERS offers a maximum degree of task separation, i.e.,
inter-task, involving distinct dedicated actors for both target computation and data aggrega-
tion tasks; and intra-task, since several actors are designated for each query task.
Moreover, the task compartmentalization is complemented by a query metadata compart-
mentalization since only the required information is given to the query actors, and, when
possible, even pseudonymized. Finally, using proxies and encrypting the communications
drastically reduces the disclosure as an attacker no longer gain knowledge by simply spying
on the communications of the different actors.
Hence, DISPERS sets sound foundations for privacy efficient distributed query processing.
However, up until this point we have only considered attackers that opportunistically tries to
access information: by starting a query and then listening to the communications of the actors
or by analyzing the information coming on their compromised nodes. Considering other, more
pernicious, attack scenarios requires dedicated counter-measures.
4.5 Additional Protections and Optimizations
In this section we no longer consider a sealed-glass model: an attacker can alter, withhold,
replace or even discard the information manipulated by its corrupted nodes, all in the sole
purpose of gaining more knowledge about the targets. The major consequence of this state-
ment is that actors, in particular the CI and the targets, must perform verifications. The
first verification every node must make is the integrity of the list of actors: as they manipulate
sensitive information, it is mandatory that they communicate with the correct nodes. We thus
assume from here on that this check is performed.
After analyzing other obvious (and problematic) attack scenarios involving a corrupted
querier and then studying more subtle and opportunistic attacks, we discuss optimizations
that help reduce the additional cost of the newly introduced verifications.
4.5.1 Setting and Validating the Query
Given that the Querier decides all the query parameters — the target profile, the local query
and the aggregate query — it is the ideal role that a corrupted node must play in order to
maximize the benefits of a successful attack. In other words, it will shape the query so as to
target the nodes it is interested in and so as to learn the specific information it wants to learn
about them.
A first protection we can put up is to ask for a validation of the query before it is run in
the network. To do so, we establish a set of authorized queries (e.g. validated asynchronously
by trusted third-parties) and we force the querier to ask k of its close neighbors to attest,
through a signature, the validity of the query. As among the k close neighbors, we have an
extremely high probability of having at least one honest node (see Section 3.2.3), we know
that if the signatures match then the query is legitimate.
4.5. Additional Protections and Optimizations 79
However, the verification of this signature can be somewhat problematic: if this process
requires the raw query (i.e. without pseudonyms) then all the parameters must arrive to the
actors performing the verifications, effectively disclosing information. Hence, even though the
query is privacy-preserving, passing its parameters to the entire network is not. We thus have
to find a way to sign and check the signatures without revealing the query parameters and
while making sure that none were altered. Employing a Merkle Hash Tree for that effect solves
all problems.
Introduced by Ralph Merkle in [61], a Merkle Hash Tree (MHT) is a data structure
that can be used to produce a digital signature. As it name suggests, it is represented
as a tree where the leaves’ labels are hashes of data blocks and the remaining nodes (i.e.
non-leaves) are labeled with the hash of their children’s labels.
Checking if a data block was signed is a matter of computing the intermediary hashes,
starting from the leaf and going up to the root, and verifying that the computed root
matches the announced (signed) one.
Note that this verification process requires knowing only the concerned data block,
since only the missing intermediary hashes need to be computed.
In DISPERS, the data blocks will be the query parameters: the concepts and their
pseudonyms, the pseudonymized target profile, the local query, and the pseudonymized
aggregate query.
Hence, our first additional security mechanism is to mandate the Querier to compute a
Merkle Hash Tree representation of its query, ask k of its close neighbors to sign the root hash
of that MHT and finally propagate the signatures and the corresponding partial MHT with
the rest of the query parameters, to the appropriate nodes. By partial MHT we refer to the
original MHT that is missing the branches corresponding to the data blocks that one must
check. For example, the PS will receive a partial MHT where the hash of the local query is
missing. The propagation of the MHT is detailed in Annex A.
Signing the query with a MHT yields another benefit that needs to be stressed out: it
prevents an attacker from mixing queries. As the actors only have a partial view of the query
parameters (the PS only knows the pseudonymized target profile, the DA the pseudonymized
aggregate query), without this structure an attacker could have run several (validated!) queries
in parallel and provided each actor with the variant it saw fit, eventually making the system
execute a totally different and potentially harmful query.
4.5.2 Query Replay
Preventing a corrupted Querier from running a malicious query or a different one from what
it declared, is a first step in the correct direction. Nonetheless, a corrupted Querier still has
some room to maneuver. For instance, in the current state of the protocol, it can replay the
same query over and over: the only check performed is the verification of the signatures of the
query, so as long as these signatures are valid, the query can run. Moreover, an attacker has
more incentive to replay a query if the associated list of actors is favorable, i.e. if corrupted
nodes were selected as actors.
Three complementary protections are required to mitigate this: (i) associating an identifier
to each query, (ii) linking the query to the list of actors, and (iii) establishing a query budget.
4.5. Additional Protections and Optimizations 80
Query identifier. Providing each query with a unique identifier lets the participating nodes
check if they have already received a query and ignore it if necessary. We compute this
identifier as follows:
QID = hash(VAL | MHT | TS )
where | is the concatenation operation, VAL is the verifiable list of actors (obtained thanks
to SEP2P, see Section 3.2.5), MHT is the root hash of the MHT and TS is a timestamp
associated to the query.
Whenever a node is asked to perform a query related task it will first check if it has
not already received that query (by comparing the QID) and, if not, record the QID before
completing the task. The timestamp in this particular case is used as an expiration date:
once the timestamp has expired the QID can be safely removed from the node’s records, as an
outdated timestamp renders the query invalid. This specific use is detailed in Section 4.5.3.
A beneficial side-effect of associating identifiers to queries is to enable the execution of
multiple queries in parallel: by providing this identifier with all the transferred information,
actors are able to tell which processing should be performed on which data.
Linking the list of actors. Associating the list of actors to the query and preventing a
query replay severely limits the benefits of a “favorable” list of actors: it can only be used once
and with the declared query. Lacking this limitation would be detrimental for the systems
security: an attacker would simply have to keep generating list of actors until it obtains a
suitable one and then reuse it indefinitely.
Binding the list of actors to the query can only be achieved when the list is created. Given
how the QID is computed, it cannot be used for that purpose. In order to obtain a list,
the Querier supplies the root hash of the MHT and its signature by k close neighbors to the
list builders. Thus, when they produce the list of actors, they first check the validity of the
signatures and then incorporate the elements needed to generate the QID to their signatures
of the list of actors, effectively linking them.
Note that, with SEP2P, obtaining a “favorable” list of actors is an extremely rare occur-
rence. Furthermore, in our context, “favorable” means having a percentage of corrupted actors
(slightly) higher than the percentage of colluding nodes in the network — the higher the dif-
ference, the less likely it is. Hence, although this situation can happen, in practice, its impact
is limited.
Query budget. The main motivation behind this measure is to limit the capability of a node
to launch queries. Indeed, if we retain the same scenario as for the previous point, where an
attacker keeps on generating and executing queries, the leakage (ever so slightly that it is) will
keep piling up, eventually leading to a tangible amount of information.
We noticeably diminish the appeal of this attack with either a fixed number of queries or
a fixed number of targets (enforced by the PS during the sampling phase) allowed per period
of time: arriving at the same amount of leaked information will require a lot more time.
Once again, enforcing the query budget can only be done when the Querier asks for a list
of actors. Following the SEP2P protocol, the first step it performs is to ask its close neighbors
for a random number. Instead of directly replying to its request, they ask for an index that
indicates the number of queries it has done. They store that index (with a timestamp) and
every time they receive a request for a random number, they check this new value against
the one they have in their records. By forcing this index to only increase, the close neighbors
can detect if the Querier is trying to swindle the system and effectively implement the query
budget.
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As a corrupted node might have more close neighbors than needed (and even other cor-
rupted nodes among them) to do the first step of the SEP2P protocol, it has some leeway to
bypass the query budget. Still, this leeway is limited: by making the neighbors exchange the
values of the budget of the nodes they monitor they can detect anomalies and eventually ban
the fraudulent nodes.
With these three protections a corrupted Querier cannot take advantage of the system by
spamming queries or continuously generating list of actors. This concludes the most obvious
threat our system faces with a corrupted Querier. However, while describing the protections
we mentioned a timestamp used as an expiration date. As we will see, this timestamp is in
fact a means to alleviate more subtle attacks related to timing.
4.5.3 Timing Attacks
As discussed in Section 4.4.2, with enough time to prepare an attacker can properly set up
its means of attack. For instance, it can adapt its spying capabilities and focus on the actors
of a query. Unfortunately, this types of attacks are not limited to spying. By postponing
the transmission of key pieces of information it is possible to isolate a target, some results or
both. If an SR sends the local query to a target sufficiently late or if a corrupted BP does the
same directly with the local result, this target’s result will be processed after the main batch,
probably separately and ending up being disclosed.
For this reasons, we force the Querier to emit a timestamp when it contacts its close
neighbors to start the generation of a list of actors, and we make all the nodes involved in the
execution of the query check its validity. Hence, if the timestamp has expired, i.e. if the value
obtained after subtracting the timestamp from the current time is superior to a threshold, then
the actors will drop the query. Setting the value of this threshold is left to implementation
as our simulations do not take into account the fluctuations in latency we can observe on the
Internet.
There is only one remaining issue that we have to deal with, that relates to the isolation
of nodes. What should happen if not enough targets contribute?
4.5.4 Targets Lower Bound
First note that this situation might happen regardless of the involvement of a corrupted actor.
If the query is specific enough or if the targets have disconnected their PDMS, we might end
up in the same situation.
Because of the distributed nature of our query processing, actors can only take localized
decisions. Contacting the other nodes playing the same role is fruitless as, if they are corrupted,
they will blatantly lie and misdirect their interlocutor into pursuing the execution. Hence,
we define a system parameter expressing the lower bound each actor should check for, when
processing targets’ related data. This lower bound is checked by each actor: the PS verify
the number of TID , the SR double-check with the number of IP addresses (in case a PS is
corrupted), the DA check the number of local results they receive and the MDA after them.
The value of this lower bound should be carefully set as if it is set too high then a few
actors might drop their task even though the total number of results is sufficient to guarantee
privacy. Conducting this study is orthogonal to this work as it is dependent on the nature of
the computation to be performed.





Figure 4.9: Augmented SEP2P setup phase
4.5.5 Additional Protections: Summary
Figure 4.9 and the following protocol summarize the different additions we have made to the
generation of the list of actors as the different protections are enforced then. We focus here
on the extra information exchanged.
Augmented SEP2P setup phase
(1) The Querier asks k of its close neighbors for a random number, in order to designate the
Execution Setter. It supplies with its request the MHT, the query metadata, a timestamp
and its current query index. If all are present and the query is valid, the QL proceed with
the process and ultimately add the root hash of the MHT and the timestamp to their
signatures.
(2) The Querier locates the Execution Setter in the DHT and forwards it, in addition to what
is normally sent, the timestamp and the root hash of the MHT.
(3) The SL additionally check the extra elements before generating the list of actors. They
add to their signatures the timestamp and the root hash of the MHT.
(4) The Execution Setter finally sends to the Querier the verifiable list of actors, containing
the augmented signatures.
As we can see, when implemented, the protections translate into verifications and sig-
natures: the QL enforce the budget and validate the query and the timestamp, they then
add these elements to their signatures so that the SL can finally check the signatures before
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adding the elements to their own signature of the list of actors. The different nodes involved
in the execution of the query then only have to check the verifiable list of actors that regroups
everything: i.e. the MHT and the timestamp.
What is important to notice is that these new verifications are performed during the
generation of the list, as opposed to during the execution of the query. Once again, by doing
them during the setup we reduce the workload of both the actors and the targets, which are
perceptibly more numerous than the QL and SL.
Another remark we can draw is that we are able to move these verifications during the
setup thanks to the “k close neighbors” property. As we will see next, this property can
actually also be leveraged to optimize the execution by removing redundant verifications.
4.5.6 Optimizing the Execution
Indeed, two optimizations can be done at the PS and DA levels. It is important to first recall
that (i) the Querier sends to the actors a partial MHT corresponding to the query parameter
they must check and that (ii) all the actors check the list of actors to know with which node
they should communicate next.
We argue that by asking their predecessors in the execution process, respectively the CI
and the targets, to transmit the root hash of the MHT and the certificate of the next node with
which they should communicate, we can skip these verifications without any supplementary
cost and still attain the same security.
The rationale is that if more than k nodes transfer the same information, then this infor-
mation can be trusted as at least one of these nodes is honest, despite the fact that they are
not close neighbors. For this statement to hold only one condition must be met: the nodes
transferring the information must not be picked by an attacker. If they are not picked by an
attacker then it is as if the nodes where randomly picked and the same probabilities than for
the close neighbors can be applied, as (on average) the proportion of corrupted nodes among
them will be the same as in the entire network.
In fact, we even propose to go further than this and make the PS and DA drop their task
if a single information differs from the others.
This last enhancement is the final touch we appose on the DISPERS protocol. The next
section summarizes the additions before concluding this chapter.
4.5.7 DISPERS: Complete Protocol
Figure 4.10 gives a complete overview of the protocol with the new protections, associated
verifications and the data exchanged. The notations used in the figure are detailed in the
table below. A summary of all the information accessed by each actor is provided in Annex A
as a complement.
Notation Explanation
VRNDQ Verifiable random generated by Q’s close neighbors.
pMHTq The root hash of the MHT attesting the query.
MHT /X The partial MHT destined to X.
TSQ The timestamp provided by Q to its close neighbors.
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VAL
The verifiable list of actors generated by the close neighbors of S.
VAL = AL+ pMHTq+TSQ+{signSLi(VAL), certSLi}1≤i≤k
QID
The unique identifier of the query.
QID = hash(pMHTq | AL | TSQ)
c A concept.
c◦ The pseudonym of the concept c.
saltX The salt used to hide the hash of X in the MHT.
CTID The Concept-Target IDentifier.
TID The Target IDentifier.
ktmp The temporary symmetric key generated by the CI to encrypt each
share in their list (one per entry).
Tshare
The different shares of the targets information:
Tshare = (IPT +kT + selector(kT ))share
kT The symmetric key generated by T .
selector(kT ) The selector T associated to the symmetric key.
tp◦ The pseudonymized target profile.
lq The local query.
aq◦ The pseudonymized aggregate query.
resT The local result produced by T .
resDA The partial result produced by DA.
J. . .KX Hybrid encryption at the destination of X.
[. . . ]k Symmetric encryption using the key k.
Table 4.2: Notations of Figure 4.10
Note the introduction of the salt in the data exchanged and in the generation of the
MHT. We introduced this element to correctly hide the information: as the vocabulary of the
different query metadata (concepts, local query, pseudonymized target profile, pseudonymized
aggregate query) is limited, an attacker could have performed a dictionary attack against these
hashes and uncover the underlying metadata. Hashing with a salt prevents this, as without
knowledge of the salt building the dictionaries is extremely difficult.
4.6 Conclusion
With SEP2P we gave the foundation for a secure and efficient fully-distributed query process-
ing system. But this foundation is indeed only a foundation and we needed to complement it
with a coherent query processing protocol.
In that respect, we started by defining the data and query models to assess what and how
we can query. In our system, the nodes make accessible part of their personal data and a




















Figure 4.10: DISPERS complete protocol
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aggregate query. The main goal of the (target) profile is to limit the number of participants
while maintaining relevance. As this filtering may not be sufficient, we augment it with a
sampling to not overflow the actor nodes.
Building on top of these element, we then showed the feasibility of a fully-distributed
query protocol with a Naive version. Although it validated our approach, its shortcomings
are far too serious for us to consider it as a viable solution. More specifically, it does not
respect any of the requirements we defined in SEP2P. Hence, by successively applying each
and every requirements we construct a solution respecting them: knowledge dispersion is
enforced at the Concept Indexer (CI ) level and requires the nodes to split the concepts they
store in the DHT using Shamir’s Secret Sharing Scheme; applying task atomicity a first time
leads to the Compartmentalized protocol which splits the execution of a query among several
Target Finders (TF ) and Data Aggregators (DA); applying task atomicity a second time,
to split the problematic Target Finder role, leads to the definition of the Profile Sampler
(PS) and Share Recomposer (SR) roles as well as the core of our solution: the DISPERS
protocol; finally, applying hidden communications to address the lack of security with regards
to the communications calls for the encryption of all the exchanges and the anonymization
of the outgoing communications of the CI and the outgoing and incoming communications
of the targets through proxies — Concept indexer Proxy (CP), Before Proxy (BP) and After
Proxy (AP). We ultimately discussed an optimization strategy to help reduce the number of
cryptographic operations performed by the PS and DA before detailing the complete DISPERS
protocol.
Hence, iteratively applying our requirements logically leads to DISPERS: a fully-distributed
query processing protocol based on profiles that aims at minimizing the impact of a leakage.
We actually even argue that the leakage induced by DISPERS is under-linear with regards to
the number of colluding nodes, as we show in the next chapter.
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The first objective of this chapter is to illustrate that, under the conditions we have
established, this protocol minimizes both the risk of a data leakage and the impact of one such
leakage (if it were ever to happen). Following that objective, we start by providing a thorough
security analysis that explains which mechanisms and properties DISPERS takes advantage
of in order for us to make that claim. We then evaluate DISPERS in terms of disclosure level,
setup and total work costs (in number of cryptographic operations and communications) by
comparing it to other alternative solutions. We conclude this evaluation by taking a closer
look to the parameters composing DISPERS and their impact.
The second objective of this chapter is to present two environments in which DISPERS has
either been presented or a degraded version has been implemented: during the demonstration
session of the VLDB conference held in 2019[54] and in the context of the PerSoCloud ANR
project within the Cozy Cloud service as an experimental feature.
5.1 Security Analysis
In this section, we provide a general security analysis of the guarantees provided by the SEP2P
and DISPERS protocols. After defining more precisely the data that could be leaked and
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quantifying this leakage, we demonstrate that SEP2P guarantees with near-certitude (i.e., very
high probability) a private information leakage that is, on average (i.e., for a significant number
of queries), linear with the maximum number of colluding nodes of an attacker. Subsequently,
we show that employing DISPERS in conjunction with SEP2P guarantees with near-certitude
the private information leakage to be, on average, under-linear with the maximum number of
colluding nodes of an attacker. Finally, a finer analysis of this under-linear data leakage is
provided in the following section.
5.1.1 Definitions and Analysis of the SEP2P Protocol
To make this study clearer we differentiate the data present in our system into two groups:
the data-at-rest and the data-in-use.
Definition 1. Data-at-rest. The data-at-rest is comprised of all the information that are
stored locally by the PDMS, i.e. the data owned and produced by the node and the distributed
index created in the context of the DHT (the associations concept ⇐⇒ {IP addresses}).
Definition 2. Data-in-use. The data-in-use is composed of all the data that are exchanged
during the execution of the query. Hence, whenever a data stored locally leaves the PDMS, it
becomes a data-in-use.
Having defined and differentiated the data, we can now define the “categories” of leakage
our system faces, according to their proportion.
Definition 3. Linear data leakage. The data leakage is said to be linear w.r.t. some given
system computation or data-at-rest indexing, if an attacker controlling c% of colluding nodes
in the system can obtain at most a part of the total private data supplied by the data source
nodes which is proportional to c%.
Example. If we consider the DISPERS protocol, the data-in-use for a given computation and
a given data source node i is composed of:
datai = (profile, IP) | (local query , local result)
The leakage is linear if the attacker can obtain at most c% of the {datai} supplied by all
the source nodes participating in the computation. Similarly, regarding the data-at-rest,
DISPERS requires each system node to distributively store couples of (concept, shares) for
each concept in the node’s profile. In this case, the leakage is linear if the attacker can obtain
at most c% of the lists of nodes’ IP addresses associated to the indexed concepts.
Definition 4. Under-linear data leakage. The data leakage is said to be under-linear
w.r.t. some given system computation or data-at-rest indexing if an attacker controlling c% of
colluding nodes can obtain at most a part of the total private data supplied by the data source
nodes which is proportional to (c%)p with p ≥ 2 (if p = 1 the leakage becomes linear).
Lemma 1. SEP2P leads to a linear leakage of the data-in-use. For a statistically significant
number of system computations, SEP2P guarantees a private information which is linear with
very high probability with the maximum number of corrupted nodes an attacker controls.
Proof : For any given system computation (e.g., a DISPERS-like query), SEP2P provides a
verifiable random list of actor nodes to process the computation. First, SEP2P guarantees
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(with very high probability) that for any given system computation, the center of DHT re-
gion where the actors are subsequently chosen is randomly selected. Second, the actor node
selection inside the given region among the legitimate region nodes is also guaranteed (with
very high probability) to be random. This double random selection makes that, on average,
the proportion of colluding actor nodes is the same with the proportion of colluding system
nodes, i.e., c/N . Therefore, on average, the number of colluding actors for a computation is
Ac = A× c/N . This implies an average leakage of Ac/A = c/N . 
As shown in the above lemma, the overall leakage for many computations is proportional
to the number of colluding nodes. However, using a single actor node to process a compu-
tation can locally lead to extreme private data leakage in case the randomly selected node
is corrupted. To remedy this problem, DISPERS generates a list of actor nodes and evenly
distributes the computation among them. This allows a better trade-off between the frequency
and the size of the leakages.
Lemma 2. Trade-off between the impact (size) and risk (frequency) of leakages. The number
of selected actors for a system computation allows to adjust between the frequency and the
impact of data leakages, i.e., a higher number of actor nodes reduces the impact of leakages
but increases their frequency.
Proof : Let us first consider that the actor list contains a single node. There are two possible
cases: (a) the node is honest or (b) it is corrupted. In case (a) the private information leakage
is 0% while in the second case it is 100%. For a significant number of computations the average
leakage is thus:
average leak := (0% · (N − c)
N






In other words, it is linear with the number of colluding nodes. However, the leakage variability
in between different system computation is maximum since it alternates between 0% and 100%.
Let us now assume that for any given system computation SEP2P provides a verifiable random
list of A actor nodes (A > 1) to process the computation and that the private information is
evenly distributed among the A actors. Since the actors are randomly selected, the probability
to select a corrupted node is still c/N but since there are A actors, the probability of having
a corrupted node in the actor list is A × c/N . Hence, the risk of leakage increases with the
increasing number of actors. At the same time, considering that the private data is evenly
distributed among the A actors, a corrupted nodes only receives 1/A of the total private
information required for a computation. Therefore, the impact of a leakage is proportionally
decreased with the number of actors. Thus, increasing the number of actors attenuates the
leakage between consecutive computations. 
Lemma 3. DISPERS leads to under-linear leakage for all private system data. The knowledge
dispersion and task atomicity in DISPERS lead to under-linear private data leakage for both
the data-at-rest and the data-in-use.
Proof : For the data-at-rest, the probability to leak the IP addresses for a given concept is
(c/N)s, where s is the number of shares. The leakage is under-linear for any s ≥ 2. Hence, the
probability of a leakage exponentially decreases with the increase of s. For the data-in-use,
to have access to the entire private data related to a subset of target nodes, the attacker has
to have at least a corrupted node among all types of actors, i.e., PS ,SR and DA. But the
probability for this is (c/N)3, so largely under-linear. We should also stress that even in the
very rare cases in which this happens, the attacker does not have any guarantee to be able
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to reconstruct completely the proportion of private data due to additional mechanisms (e.g.,
several actor nodes per task level, anonymized communications). 
While the private information leakage for the data-at-rest is simple to quantify given the
uniform data distribution provided by the DHT and the number of Shamir’s secret shares
required to obtain the private data, the leakage regarding the data-in-use requires a more in
depth analysis.
5.1.2 DISPERS
Let us take a closer look at the data-in-use that can be leaked during an execution of the
DISPERS protocol. What is important to notice is that the private information concerns the
targets in relation with the query q = (tp, lq , aq), and more particularly with the target profile
and the local query. These associations are summed up as follows:
1. Knowing the target profile and the fact that a node is a target (via its IP address), is the
most sensitive data leak in DISPERS since the attacker learns the association profile⇐⇒
node. A lesser version of this leak is the ability to associate a concept to a node.
Also note that this opens up the way for a subsequent identity attack by associating the
IP address to a “real” individual.
2. Knowing the local query, the fact that a node is a target, and its local result is another
sensitive data leak in DISPERS since the attacker can associate a local result to a node
and qualify it.
3. Knowing the TID and the IP address of a node can lead to subsequent disclosures: the
target profile or some concept·s. This is due to the fact that there is a bijective function
between it and the IP addresses.
Similarly, this reasoning can be applied to the CTID and the symmetric key (used to
encrypt the communications between the SR and the targets). The main difference for
both elements resides in the possible resulting disclosures: knowing the CTID can lead to
the TID and other CTID while the symmetric key is only directly tied to the IP address.
We do not mention knowing a local result in combination with the aggregate query as
unless both are extremely discriminative (which should be avoided thanks to the validation of
the query by a third-party authority), the disclosure will be severely limited.
Hence, as we can see, the leakage during the execution of a query revolves around the
ability of an attacker to put pieces of information together. To do so, corrupted actors must
participate in the process. In the following, the one/two/three level leaks refer to the number
of actor groups that have been hacked, i.e. a level one leak means that at least an actor in the
studied group is corrupted and a level two means that at least an actor in each group is cor-
rupted. Our analysis focuses first on the base collusion attack including the colluding hacked
nodes and then goes further by considering the additional leakage that can arrive following a
communication spying attack (i.e., which nodes are communicating and what information is
transmitted in clear). Finally, we conclude with the analysis of pure communication spying
attacks.
We also distinguish in our analysis between the directed attacks (i.e., in which the
initiator of a query is a corrupted node) and opportunistic attacks (i.e., in which the
initiator of a query is a honest node). In a directed attack, the attacker has direct access to
the query metadata since it is the query initiator. However, with a query budget, the extent
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of directed attacks can be limited. In a opportunistic attack, the attacker does not have direct
access to the query metadata, but tries to infer it if any of its colluding nodes is selected
during the query processing. Also, the extent of opportunistic attacks is much larger since it
affects most of the system queries.
One Level Leaks
1. PS — directed and opportunistic attack: the PS have access to a portion of
the TID . Using a two level attack it can, with certainty (directed) or with a certain
probability (opportunistic), additionally associate the target profile.
2. SR — directed attack: the associations profile ⇐⇒ IP address can be leaked with
a probability c/N . This is the most important private data leakage because of both
the data sensitivity and the significant probability to happen. The workarounds are
(random) sampling and query budget. Note that if the attacker controls c nodes, her
query budget is c× query budget.
3. SR — opportunistic attack: The attacker knows part of the sampled targets, the
local query but not the target profile. The local query might indirectly leak information
about the selected nodes’ profile but the inference is limited. A collusion with other
node·s is required to fully leverage the information (see Two level leaks below).
4. DA — directed and opportunistic attack: in the directed case, the DA knows the
local query and some local results but does not have direct access to the targets’ IP
addresses thanks to the after proxies (AP). Hence, associating a result to a target is as
hard as de-anonymizing the communications coming to the DA.
The opportunistic attack is similar in that the same conclusion can be drawn with the
single difference that the attacker does not have access to the local query.
We remark that communication spying does not bring any benefit to an attacker: the
different proxies prevent the identification of the targets or the concepts composing the target
profile (via the probably unique combination of CI indexing each concept).
Most importantly, we note that except for attack 2, possessing a single corrupted actor
does not yield any, directly, fruitful information: in 1, the attacker learns some TID without
knowing any of the concepts they match; in 3, a SR only learns the IP addresses of a subset
of the sampled targets, also without knowing their profile; in 4, the attacker accesses some
local results without knowing where they came from.
Two Levels Leaks
We focus here on the most problematic combinations, even though the other are equally
probable their information leakage is less beneficial as detailed afterwards.
1. SR +PS — directed and opportunistic: the attacker gets a part of the list of nodes
matching any concept of the target profile. For this attack to work, the PS and SR need
to be a matching pair. If the attack is directed then the attacker additionally knows
which concepts each node matches.
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2. SR +DA — directed and opportunistic: the attacker gets a probabilistic association
(i.e. inaccurate) between IP addresses and local results, knows the local query and the
pseudonymized aggregate query (and the target profile in case of a directed attack). The
uncertainty is due to the random selection of DA by the sampled targets: they can pick
an honest DA instead of the corrupted one·s. Hence, once again, precisely associating a
local result to a target is as hard as de-anonymizing the communications coming to the
DA.
3. AP +DA — directed and opportunistic: the attacker knows the IP address of (a
very small number, if not a single) sampled targets that chose the AP and the DA.
Consequently, the attacker knows these targets’ local results and the pseudonymized
aggregate query. However, the probability of this event is extremely low considering
that the AP are randomly chosen and not limited to nodes in the system.
A directed attack adds the remaining query parameters.
Among the other possible combinations there are those involving a CI or a CP : this
situation is only profitable if the querier is not corrupted as, otherwise, the knowledge provided
by both is redundant with the target profile since the CI gives a concept to the attacker and
a CP gives an indication about a concept.
Corrupted BP and AP bring the IP address of a target. However, as they do not know for
which query they are playing that role (the only information they have access to is to which
node they should forward), if no other corrupted node provides them with complementary
knowledge, they cannot benefit from it. Hence BP and AP must be paired with actors. At
the same time, unless these actors are in direct contact with them, they have no certainty
that they participate in the same query. This implicates that an AP has to be paired with a
DA and a BP with a SR. Since we have already studied the former, we focus on the latter.
Fortunately, this pair is redundant: they both learn the IP address of the same node·s.
As we can see, in some rare cases, a two levels attack can lead to significantly more
information leakage than a one level attack — especially when the querier is corrupted (but
the occurrence is even rarer). For instance, in 1 the leaked IP addresses are obtained before
applying the target profile and the sampling. However, the probability for this attack is very
low ( (c/N)2) since the attacker has to obtain a “perfect” configuration with a matching
pair of PS and SR. Hence, the increase in the leakage level is largely compensated by the
decrease in the probability of it happening.
Three Levels Leaks or Higher
Such attacks are not interesting for two reasons. First, compared with a two levels directed
attack involving a SR and a DA, it does not offer much additional benefits — a corrupted
DA might bring the exact source of a local result but, as discussed earlier, the probability and
the extent of this leak are severely limited. Second, the probability to happen is extremely
low: (c/N)3 or lower. Given the low probability, the one level and two levels leakages become
much more important due to their much higher frequency. Therefore, we choose to omit such
attacks in the discussion below.
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Discussion
Two levels leaks have a probability of occurring that is lesser or equal to (c/N)2, which is
much smaller than one level leaks. A directed attack involving a matching pair of PS and SR
leaks more data than a directed attack with only a single SR because of the lack of sampling
and filtering via the target profile. Nonetheless, given the much lower probability this scenario
can be considered as secondary. Combining three or more actor types does not bring much
more benefit for the attacker — only a trio of SR, AP , and DA can theoretically bring more
— while the probability continues to drop drastically.
Hence, the first major leak is at the SR side. To limit it, DISPERS employs two mech-
anisms: (i) the query budget associated to each node renders the directed attacks a lot less
frequent. Combined with the probability (c/N) for the attacker to have a corrupted node
selected as SR, the actual leakage plummets. (ii) For the opportunistic attacks, that are “un-
limited” for lack of a global query budget, DISPERS employs anonymized communications
from the CI to the SR (through the CP) effectively preventing an attacker from associating
a profile to the IP addresses it accesses.
Another important leak could happen at the DA side. The attacker could associate some
local data to a node’s IP address. Though it is possible, managing this attack is extremely
hard because of the anonymized communications between the targets and the DA: uncovering
an association requires spying a vast amount of nodes and hope that some AP are among
them.
In conclusion, we observe from this detailed analysis that the global leakage is clearly under-
linear with the DISPERS protocol. The leak that is closest to a linear leakage regards the
association target profile ⇐⇒ sampled target’s IP addresses with colluding SR and directed
attacks. However, as we have pointed out, this association represents only a fragment of
the total private data, as it happens after the sampling and within a budget. Additionally,
decomposing the task of finding the targets for a query with several actors (CI ,CP ,PS ,SR)
significantly limits the disclosure of this part of the private data. Similarly, anonymizing
the incoming and outgoing communications of the targets produces a separation between the
target finding task and the local data aggregation task, making it complex for an attacker to
associate the local results with eventually disclosed targets’ IP addresses.
5.2 DISPERS Security and Performance Evaluation
In this section, we provide an evaluation of the security and performance of the DISPERS
protocol. We start by evaluating the security of DISPERS and show that it attains an optimal
security in our context and under a realistic threat model. We then introduce two alternative
methods as competitors of DISPERS and continue with a detailed evaluation of the perfor-
mance of the three methods with a particular focus of the DISPERS protection mechanisms
and their respective cryptographic and communication costs. Finally, we conclude by present-
ing two proof-of-concepts of DISPERS.
5.2.1 Security Evaluation
Table 5.1 summarizes the average leakage each solution creates. The first two column qual-
ify the type of attacks: if the Querier is corrupted (“Directed?”) or whether the attacker is
eavesdropping on the network or not (“Spying?”). The different strategies we consider are as
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follows: Naive corresponds to the very first query processing protocol we described (not en-
hanced); CQP stands for Compartmentalized Query Processing and uses all the actors described
in DISPERS (PS ,SR,DA,MDA) without the setup phase (i.e. the Querier chooses the actors
as it pleases), any encryption or proxies; and DISPERS corresponds to the full version of the
DISPERS protocol.
Directed? Spying? Strategy Target Results Association
× × Naive 0% 0% 0%
X × Naive 100% 100% 100%
CQP (+SEP2P) c% c% c%
X X
CQP (+SEP2P) 100% 100% 100%
CQP (+SEP2P +ENC) 100% c% c%
CQP (+SEP2P +PROXY) 100% 100% ≤ c2%
DISPERS c% c% ≤ c2%
Table 5.1: Average disclosure per strategy
Between parenthesis are indicated the additional mechanisms DISPERS leverages: +SEP2P
tells that the list of actors was generated using SEP2P, +ENC signals that all the communica-
tions are encrypted, and +PROXY signifies that the different proxies are employed to hide the
communications of the CI and the targets. This also means that DISPERS is equivalent to
CQP (+SEP2P +ENC +PROXY).
The last three columns show the leaked information: “Target” stands for the IP addresses
of the targets, “Results” for their local results and “Association” means that the attacker can
tie a result to a target. Note that whenever an attack is directed, i.e. when the Querier is
corrupted, the profile is automatically leaked. Hence, whenever a target is uncovered the
attacker already knows the profile she matches. Obviously this situation is the worst possible,
that is why we focus on it for this study.
The first element we notice is that only the Naive strategy achieves the ideal disclosure
when the Querier is not corrupted and the attacker does not spy on the network. This
result is easy to explain: an honest node concentrates all the information and protects it.
Unfortunately, this strategy is a double-edged sword as, as shown in the second line, if we
consider that the Querier is corrupted then the disclosure is disastrous: everything is leaked.
More importantly this scenario requires a single corrupted node and is thus easy to achieve.
We then see that if the attacker is not spying on the network the disclosure is near-minimal:
the attacker accesses, on average, c% of all the sensitive data — the IP addresses, their results
and the associations. Once again, this near-optimal protection holds only if the attacker does
not spy on the network, as if it does then all the sensitive data are disclosed: none of the
communications are protected and an attacker learns everything. Although, this scenario is
not as easy to set up as corrupting a single node, it still does not require corrupting a large
amount of nodes.
This leads to the final lines of the table. The main purposes of the strategies CQP (+SEP2P
+ENC) and CQP (+SEP2P +PROXY) is to show their synergies when they are applied together
in DISPERS. Encrypting the communications prevents an attacker from learning the local
results and the associations (result ⇐⇒ target) but not from learning all the targets’ IP
addresses. Anonymizing the communications of the targets (in this scenario anonymizing the
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communications of the CI yields no benefits as the Querier is corrupted and the target profile
has already leaked) effectively prevents an attacker from associating a result to a target but,
as none of the communications are encrypted, it still learns their IP addresses and results.
Note that, in this case, the leakage of associations is ≤ c2% and not c% since, to uncover
an association, the attacker has to have a corrupted DA and BP and “hope” that a target
randomly chooses both (which, in practice, gives an average leak that is much smaller than
c2% but impossible to generalize).
As DISPERS leverages both strategies we can see that it achieves the minimal leakage under
a realistic threat model: c% of the targets’ IP addresses, c% of the local results and ≤ c2% of
the associations (result ⇐⇒ target). Furthermore, these results must be nuanced because of
two additional protections we set: the query budget and the sampling. With the query budget
the directed attacks are less frequent: up to c× query budget (assuming the attacker controls
c nodes). With the sampling, whenever the disclosure of the targets’ IP addresses occurs at a
SR, only the sampled subset is leaked.
5.2.2 Considered Alternative Methods
To underline the importance of the security mechanisms in DISPERS and their impact on
performance, we consider two alternative protocols to evaluate queries in our system. Since
to our knowledge, no alternative protocol for DISPERS exists, we consider as competitors
two query protocols “derived” from DISPERS. We only focus on the query protocol (i.e., the
protection of the data-in-use) since we consider that the solution we propose for the data-at-
rest (i.e., employing the Shamir’s Secret Sharing Scheme in conjunction with the distributed
DHT storage) is much less questionable due to its simplicity and effectiveness.
Naive protocol. The first protocol (see Figure 5.1) is based on the naive protocol introduce in
Section 4.2. This protocol has the advantage to propose a simple solution for query processing
in our system. However, to prevent data leakages in opportunistic attacks, we enhance the
initial naive protocol with protection techniques inspired from DISPERS: CI s have to provide k
attestations toQ from their close neighbors to prove that they are indeed the legitimate holders
of the searched concepts and thus avoid leaking the searched target profile; the communications
between Q and the CI and between the targets and Q are encrypted to avoid spying; and
finally, the different proxies (CP ,BP ,AP) are present, in order to protect the identity of the









Figure 5.1: Enhanced Naive Query Execution
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Parameter Value Parameter Value
Security margin (α) 10−6 Shamir degree n = 5
t = 3
Number of nodes 1, 000, 000 Percentage of 1%colluding nodes
Number of concepts 3 Number of targets 2000in the target profile (sampled)
Number of PS ,SR 32 Number of DA 32
Table 5.2: Simulator default values
Security-wise, we expect this protocol to be extremely risky since hacking a single node
allows the attacker to access large amounts of private data. Performance-wise, we expect this
protocol to have a good overall cost (i.e., total work) but large latency (since Q acts as a
bottleneck).
Ideal security and cost-optimal protocol. The second protocol is based on a simplified
version of the DISPERS protocol. The idea is to have an “ideal” protocol both from the
performance and security viewpoints. Regarding performance, we need a distributed protocol
to avoid bottlenecks as with the naive protocol. For this reason we employ a version based on
DISPERS. Regarding security, the objective is to have a protocol that reduces to a minimum
the security overheads. To this end, we consider that the system contains an oracle node
capable of supplying a random list of actors. This way the relatively costly setup phase
of DISPERS (i.e., the SEP2P protocol) is avoided. This leads to the following protocol as
depicted in Figure 5.2.
Obviously, having such an oracle node clearly contradicts the fully-distributed aspect of
our work. This kind of protocol is however interesting since it offers a lower bound for the
security overhead in our system and thus offers a better perspective on the (necessary) security
overhead in DISPERS implied by the covert adversary attack model.
5.2.3 Performance Evaluation
Notes regarding the metrics. We measured with our simulator the number of exchanged
messages and the number of asymmetric cryptographic operations (as with SEP2P). Still, in
order to better grasp the measurements, it is important to note the following points. (i) The
number of messages does not include the messages resulting from the creation of the secure
channel or the acknowledgments. (ii) Regarding latency, we consider that we can send a large
number of messages in parallel. (iii) The number of asymmetric cryptographic operations
takes into account the creation of a secure channel. More specifically, it counts two operations
for this: one to encrypt the session key and another to decrypt it. (iv) We assume that
these cryptographic operations cannot be executed in parallel and are thus included in the
cryptographic latency.
The default configuration of our simulator is described in Table 5.2.















Figure 5.2: Oracle Query Execution
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Influence of the Number of Colluding Nodes
Figure 5.3 below shows the cryptographic latency in the default configuration, we only varied
the number of colluding nodes, C from 10 to 100, 000 (the last value meaning having 10%
of colluding nodes which is unrealistic, but interesting to see the trend). On the one hand,
we observe that the enhanced Naive strategy performs poorly because almost all the work
load is assumed by the Querier. At the same time the latency stays (almost) constant when
C increases because this strategy does not perform any verification (apart from the CI but
the impact is negligible). On the other hand, the Oracle strategy and DISPERS both have a
relatively low latency. The difference between the two resides in the setup phase which has a
minor impact. Similarly to the enhanced Naive strategy, these values do not depend on the
number of colluding nodes as the verifications are done in parallel by the CI and the sampled
targets.
Figure 5.3: Crypto. latency vs C Figure 5.4: Crypto. total work vs C
Figure 5.4 presents the total work with regard to the number of colluding nodes. Unsur-
prisingly, DISPERS has worst performances than the Oracle strategy which is itself worst than
the enhanced Naive strategy. This good result has to be put into perspective: the enhanced
Naive strategy is extremely weak against a single corrupted node, since if the Querier is cor-
rupted all the sensitive data are leaked. We observe that the difference in total work between
the enhanced Naive strategy and the Oracle is of, roughly, 6, 000 cryptographic operations,
which is 3 times the number of sampled targets. This difference is relatively easy to explain:
in the enhanced Naive strategy, the Querier has to create a secure channel with the BP to hide
the address of the sampled targets. The latter, however, can use their symmetric key (kT ) to
transmit their local results. Hence, only two asymmetric cryptographic operations per target
are required in the enhanced Naive strategy. In the Oracle strategy, the sampled targets have
to additionally establish a secure channel with the DA (via the AP) and they have to check
the signature of the list of actors produced by the Oracle. This adds up to 3 supplementary
asymmetric cryptographic operations per target.
DISPERS has the same behavior as the Oracle strategy but the CI and the sampled targets
additionally have to check the k signatures of the list of actors, VAL, and the k certificates
of the signatory nodes, totaling 2k operations per target instead of 1. For instance, with
C = 1, 000(0.1%) we measured (see Section 3.3.3 and the k-table) that the average k is equal
to 2.6. It goes up to k = 3.9 with C = 10, 000(1%). This explains the difference between the
Oracle strategy and DISPERS, and highlights the importance of minimizing k.
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Figure 5.5: Comm. latency vs C Figure 5.6: Comm. total work vs C
Figure 5.5 presents the latency in terms of number of messages. We observe that it is
independent of the number of colluding nodes. Indeed, this latency is only related to the
structure of the execution. The security degree, k, influences the number of QL and SL
required to generate the list of actors VAL but all these communications are done in parallel.
Overall, the latency in terms of number of messages is low, notably because the DHT is only
solicited once (to locate the CI ) in the enhanced Naive and Oracle strategies, and twice for
DISPERS (the Querier has to locate the Execution Setter (S)).
Regarding the total number of messages exchanged during an execution, as shown in
Figure 5.6, we notice that the differences are not as pronounced as for the total number of
asymmetric cryptographic operations. This is explained by the fact that most of the exchanges
occur “around” the sampled targets. For each target, and for the three strategies, the com-
munication scheme is: BP → T → AP → DA(or Q), i.e. 4 messages per target, totaling for
8, 000 messages solely for this part of the execution. The remaining messages correspond to
the setup phase for DISPERS (and this number depends on the value of k, which explains the
increase when C = 10, 000), the communications from the DA to the MDA for DISPERS and
the Oracle strategy, and when the CI are looked up (for the three strategies).
Hence, to conclude this preliminary study, let us first remind that the enhanced Naive
strategy is extremely dangerous (unless a TEE is unbreakable), and that the Oracle strategy
is unrealistic: only DISPERS is actually applicable in a real world scenario.
Nonetheless, we noted as expected that the enhanced Naive strategy possesses a (huge)
bottleneck at the Querier level. This strategy is however economical as no verifications are
performed. The Oracle strategy and DISPERS differ because of the setup (although the cost is
relatively negligible) and mostly because of the verifications performed by the sampled targets
(2k instead of 1). This difference is inevitable as, in our context, it is impossible to trust a
single signature but, thanks to the SEP2P protocol, we minimize it as much as possible (going
from 2× (C + 1) to 2k).
Additional Cost of the Cryptography and the Proxies
For information purposes, we bypassed the creation of the secure channel and the proxies and
made measurements on the simulator, with DISPERS, in order to know the impact of these
mechanisms on the total cost of an execution.
The results show that the additional costs is mainly “around” the targets, i.e. the encrypted
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communications between the SR and BP and between the targets and the DA (via the AP).
Thus, there are, at least, 4 asymmetric cryptographic operations per target. We must add up
to these costs, the encrypted communications between the Querier and the actors and between
the CI and the PS ,SR, which can become important when the number of actors is too large
(see Section 5.2.3).
Also note that the encrypted communications between the SR and the BP are only present
if we use proxies. If not, the SR use the symmetric keys of the sampled targets (kT ) they
recomposed (which we do not count). Hence, the additional cost of the proxies, in terms of
cryptographic operations, is exactly 2 operations per target.
Influence of the Size of the Network (N)
Figure 5.7: Comm. latency vs N
The size of the network does not have any impact on the cryptographic cost of any of the three
strategies: the number of sampled targets and k stay the same. The impact on the latency
and the total work in terms of number of communications is minor thanks to the DHT — a
look up costs on average log2(N) messages.
Influence of the Number of Actors (PS ,SR,DA)
To simplify this analysis, we chose to have the same number of PS ,SR than of DA. We then
varied the number of PS ,SR and DA between 4 and 128 in order to observe and understand
the influence of that choice. We did not featured the enhanced Naive strategy as it does not
have these actors. We only show the cryptographic latency and the total work in terms of
cryptographic operations and number of messages — varying the number of actors has no
impact on the latency in terms of number of messages.
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Figure 5.8: Crypto. latency vs
nb of actors
Figure 5.9: Crypto. total work vs
nb of actors
Figure 5.10: Comm. total work vs
nb of actors
A first observation is that the cryptographic latency diminishes until a certain value, 32
for DISPERS, and increases again after (Figure 5.8). The reason is relatively simple and
can be easily comprehended thanks to Figure 5.11 that gives, for each role, the number of
cryptographic operations realized (note that the scale is logarithmic). Each series corresponds
to an increasing number of actors. We observe that when the number of PS ,SR increases,
Q and the CI perform more cryptographic operations. Indeed, they have to encrypt their
communications for more nodes. In contrast, the SR have less cryptographic operations to
do as the number of targets is constant but they are more numerous. Likewise, the DA have
to perform less decryption since they receive, on average, less messages. We can then easily
understand that the latency diminishes as long as the gains at the SR and DA levels outweigh
the additional costs imposed on Q and the CI . Hence, it could be interesting to have a number
of DA slightly superior to the number of PS ,SR.
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Figure 5.11: Nb of asymmetric crypto. operations per actor (varying PS ,SR,DA)
We can draw similar conclusions based on the same graph portraying the number of ex-
changed messages.
Figure 5.12: Nb of exchanged messages per actor (varying PS ,SR,DA)
We observe that the number of messages for the SL is subject to the highest increase. This
is explained by the fact that they have to ensure that the actors are online (through “pings”).
Moreover, the CP also have more work as they are the one that have to communicate with
the PS ,SR even though the encryption was done by the CI .
Note that we do not notice any diminution of the number of messages at the DA level.
This is only because this graph only takes into account the number of messages sent, and not
received.
Hence, it could seem tempting to have a high number of actors (to notably diminish the
impact of a corrupted actor), however increasing their numbers has an additional costs be it
at the at the execution or the setup (also see Section 5.2.3). Furthermore, as discussed in
the security analysis, increasing this number does not lessen the average leak (that stays on
average at c%).
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Influence of the Number of Sampled Targets
Figure 5.13: Crypto. tot. work vs nb of
targets vs C
Figure 5.14: Comm. tot. work vs nb of
targets
As expected given the previous conclusions we drew, the cost, in terms of number of messages
or cryptographic operations, is linear with regard to the number of targets. We can observe a
little flexion of the curves near the origin. This is due to a tweaking of the number of actors
when there is not enough targets, in order to not have too much PS ,SR or DA in comparison.
Influence of Shamir’s Secret Sharing Scheme
Figure 5.15: Crypto. total work w.r.t. Shamir’s Scheme
We only show the curve regarding the total work in terms of cryptographic operations as
the other curves are similar. As we can see, the impact of this parameter is minor. This is
not surprising considering that the majority of the cost is concentrated around the targets.
Additionally, as shown when we introduced this scheme (see Section 4.3.1), it is not necessary
to set a high threshold value.
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Setup versus Execution
Figure 5.16: Crypto. total work, Setup vs Execution
With this final graph we can see that the setup cost is negligible (logarithmic scale) compared
to the cost of executing the query, even with a large number of actors.
Conclusion
To conclude, we saw in this section the following elements: the enhanced Naive strategy is not
suited to our context, even if we only consider the performances (the bottleneck at Querier is
blocking). This forces a distribution of the knowledge and tasks. Moreover, this distribution,
as illustrated by the Oracle strategy, has a relatively low cost and leads to under-linear leaks
(in this regard the Oracle strategy is equivalent to DISPERS in Section 5.2.1). Unfortunately,
the Oracle strategy is unrealistic, calling for a viable alternative able to produce a trustworthy
list of actors.
At the same time, we saw that the setup cost induced by the SEP2P protocol is negligi-
ble compared to the execution cost. Plus, SEP2P helps drastically reducing the number of
verifications performed.
Additionally, although DISPERS has to be configured, the influence of the parameters on
the overall cost and latency is clear and enables us to set them appropriately.
Finally, we saw that DISPERS has a intrinsic cost that cannot be reduced: the targets
must verify the list of actors.
5.3 DISPERS: Proof-of-Concept
In this section we discuss two proof-of-concept implementations of the DISPERS protocol.
The first one is a web implementation for the purpose of showcasing its capabilities during the
demonstration session of the VLDB conference held in 2019. The second is an implementation
within the Cozy Cloud service as an experimental feature.
5.3.1 DISPERS Demonstration
The purpose of this demonstration is to illustrate the DISPERS system thanks to a simulator
and a graphical front-end; and to demonstrate the rationale of three of our requirements:
5.3. DISPERS: Proof-of-Concept 106
task atomicity, knowledge dispersion and imposed randomness. We decided not to include
the hidden communications requirements and the separation of the TF role (into pairs of
(PS ,SR)) for clarity — the lack of space and the complexity of the full DISPERS protocol
making for a bad combination.
Also note that, at the time, we decided to split the list of actors into two distinct parts:
the list of TF (VTFL) and the list of DA (VDAL). The rationale was to not disclose more
information than needed to the actors. The introduction of the Merkle Hash Tree to link the
list of actors to the query renders this separation impossible.
Other minor differences between the first screenshot and the following ones are due to im-
provements of the demonstration platform (in pursuit of a clearer and more explicit interface).
We introduce our approach using the graphical interface as depicted in Figure 5.17. At-
tendees can select or configure a query (top) and use the command panel (middle-right) to
execute one of the query protocols, change the system parameters (e.g., number of colluding
nodes), or run the protocol step by step. The last button allows exhibiting figures on the
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Figure 5.17: Demonstration platform
After explaining the demonstration platform, we focus on a given query and run protocols
of increasing complexity and resistance to attacks (Naive, Compartmentalized and DISPERS),
thus explaining the rationale of each requirement. Figures 5.18 to 5.21 illustrate the different
steps of an execution with DISPERS.
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Figure 5.18: DISPERS Execution: SL nodes are highlighted.
Figure 5.19: DISPERS Execution: CI and TF nodes are highlighted.
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Figure 5.20: DISPERS Execution: TF nodes and the targets are highlighted.
Figure 5.21: DISPERS Execution: the targets and DA nodes are highlighted.
Attendees can also try to hack the demonstration platform. The goal of this game is to
achieve a deeper understanding of DISPERS by trying to defeat its security, e.g., exhibiting
some confidential data of a given node. We expect them to defeat easily the naive protocol.
Playing with the queries, the parameters and inspecting the content of colluding nodes, the
attendee may also obtain the node’s data with the compartmentalized protocol but we are
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confident that this will be unfeasible with DISPERS.
5.3.2 Integration of DISPERS into Cozy Cloud
As of today and for the purposes of creating a solid user base (a commendable objective!),
the Cozy Cloud architecture is almost completely centralized. Few users possess their own
instances running on dedicated devices and the promise of equipping the PDMS nodes with
Trusted Execution Environment is not fulfilled — although most of the devices possess it. In
this context, implementing the DISPERS protocol and providing the same guarantees is then
difficult and, as such, compromises are to be expected.
Nonetheless, a degraded version of the DISPERS protocol, in the context of the French
ANR PerSoCloud, is currently being studied and an implementation — entirely realized by
Cozy Cloud — under way. The PerSoCloud project is a joint effort between the French
telecommunications corporation Orange, the Petrus research team (mixed from INRIA and
the University of Versailles Saint-Quentin) and Cozy Cloud. Its objective is to provide sharing
capabilities to the “Personal Cloud” paradigm — incarnated by the Cozy Cloud solution —
on three dimensions: (i) device sharing, letting users share their data between various devices;
(ii) peer sharing, letting users share their data with identified collaborating users; and (iii)
community-sharing, letting users share personal data among a large community. The second
objective of the project, of equal importance, is to ensure that these added capabilities come
with strong privacy guarantees.
Integrating the DISPERS protocol to the Cozy Cloud service serves towards the fulfill-
ment of the community-sharing capability by providing a framework to query the (logically)
distributed data. To detail the ongoing work we first describe the system parameters and then
give an overview of the altered protocol.
System Parameters and Threat Model
Given the context in which this study takes place, all the aspects of the DISPERS protocol
can and have to be questioned. In the following we then take a look at the query, the actors,
the threat model and the data model.
Query. The structure of a query remains identical: it is composed of a target profile, a local
query and an aggregate query. Given the lack of distribution and hardware protection, the
expressiveness of the profile and the possible computations are limited and the entire query is
validated by a trusted third-party.
Actors. The first and most important actor of a query, is the Cozy Cloud infrastructure,
referred to as the stack. The data of the users are stored in the stack. The stack possesses a
pair of asymmetric cryptographic keys.
To distribute the computations, the stack is assisted by several enclaves. They are trust-
worthy external servers, potentially certified, that possess a Trusted Execution Environment.
The different enclaves are isolated from each other and from the stack. They do not persist
any personal data and possess a pair of asymmetric cryptographic keys.
Five different enclaves are required in order to launch a query:
1. an enclave Querier (Q): the only entity able to launch a query and retrieve the result;
2. an enclave Concept Indexer (CI ): it is the only actor able to decipher the concepts;
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3. an enclave Target Finder (TF ): it applies the pseudonymized target profile on the list
of potential targets;
4. an enclave Data (D): it deciphers the addresses of the targets and applies the local
query on the data sent by the stack;
5. an enclave Data Aggregator (DA): it deciphers the local results and applies the aggregate
query (potentially pseudonymized).
Threat model. We assume the stack to be honest but curious: it can spy on the communica-
tions but respects the protocol and does not forge queries. We also aim at preventing a single
corrupted enclave from disclosing the associations target ⇐⇒ profile and target ⇐⇒ local
result. We do not consider a collusion of several enclaves.
Data model. Given the centralization of the data, the index in which the associations
concept ⇐⇒ addresses are stored is also centralized. To avoid disclosing those associations,
the enclave CI generates as many symmetric keys as there are concepts and whenever a
user wants to store a concept, she contacts (using a secure channel and from her device) the
enclave CI , providing the concept, which then replies with the concept encrypted with the
corresponding symmetric key. This encrypted concept acts as the key in the index, which
prevents the stack from associating it to the user but still lets the stack generate the index.
Similarly, to prevent the enclave TF from directly accessing the users’ addresses, the users
also contact the enclave D and ask for a symmetric key. They then encrypt their address with
this key before sending both the encrypted concept and their encrypted address to the stack.
To prevent the stack from learning the local results, they also have to be stored encrypted.
For that purpose, each user generates (directly on her device) a symmetric key and a unique
pseudonym (e.g. a salted hash of this key). They then encrypt the data they agree to share
with the symmetric key and this very same key plus the pseudonym with the public key of the
enclave DA. They finally ask the stack to store the encrypted data and to send to the enclave
DA the encrypted symmetric key and pseudonym. Proceeding that way lets the users choose
which data can be queried and effectively prevents the stack from knowing which information
is contributed. Additionally, asking the stack to transmit the encrypted pseudonym and
symmetric key hides the user.
Note that to retrieve the encrypted data corresponding to a local query we suppose that
some metadata information are still associated to the encrypted data and leveraged by the
enclave D to filter out the relevant parts.
Cozy-DISPERS Protocol
The objective of this protocol is to enforce a first level of task atomicity and knowledge dis-
persion to reduce the impact of a leakage — the risk should theoretically be close to zero if
the enclaves are indeed trustworthy.
Cozy-DISPERS protocol
(0) The query is validated by a trustworthy third-party authority.
(1) The enclave Q generates a pseudonym for each concept of the target profile. It sends
the associations pseudonym ⇐⇒ concept to the enclave CI . In parallel, it sends the
pseudonymized target profile to the enclave TF , the local query to the enclave D and the
pseudonymized aggregate query to the enclave DA.
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(2) The enclave CI encrypts the concepts with their matching symmetric key and asks the
stack to send the list of associations corresponding to the encrypted concepts to the enclave
TF and to replace the encrypted concepts with their pseudonyms.
(3) The stack retrieves the lists associated to the different encrypted concepts, and sends them
to the enclave TF — with the pseudonym in lieu of the encrypted concept.
(4) The enclave TF applies the pseudonymized target profile on the lists and sends the (sam-
pled) encrypted targets’ addresses to the enclave D.
(5) The enclave D deciphers the (sampled) targets’ addresses and asks the stack for the
encrypted data of these targets. Upon reception of the encrypted data, the enclave D
extracts the relevant part by applying the local query, and send the encrypted local results
to the enclave DA.
(6) The enclave DA deciphers the local results, applies the pseudonymized aggregate query








Figure 5.22: Cozy-DISPERS protocol
Let us study the impact of a corrupted enclave under this protocol:
• If the enclave Q is corrupted it learns the final result and the query parameters.
• If the enclave CI is corrupted it only has access to the concepts and, during an execution,
to the associated pseudonyms.
• If the enclave TF is corrupted then no sensitive information is leaked: it only has access
to encrypted addresses and to the pseudonymized target profile.
• If the enclave D is corrupted then the addresses of the targets are leaked but it cannot
tie them to a profile or to some local results.
• If the enclave DA is corrupted it can access the local results without being able to tie
them to a profile or to any target.
Moreover, the stack also sees very little information: it only knows which users are targeted
by a query as it provides their encrypted data to the enclave D. Since it does not know the
target profile or which data are extracted by the local query it cannot infer anything.
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Hence, under the considered, system parameters this first implementation achieves the ob-
jectives set in the PerSoCloud project: users can share personal data among a large community
and securely query them.
5.4 Conclusion
We started this chapter with a security analysis of DISPERS in which we saw that SEP2P,
the setup phase of DISPERS, leads to a linear leakage as there is, on average, the same
proportion of colluding nodes in the random list of actor than in the network. We then
saw that by correctly distributing the tasks and the knowledge, DISPERS renders this linear
leakage under-linear: to obtain information an attacker has to have certain combinations of
actors, the associated probability being c2. Furthermore, enforcing a query budget, sampling
the targets and hiding the targets with proxies severely limits the leeway of an attacker: it
cannot repeatedly query the network in hope of a favorable list of actors, it cannot uncover
the entire list of targets and it cannot associate a result to a target.
We then evaluated the security and performance of DISPERS. In accordance with our
analysis, the security evaluation shows that all the security measures are mandatory to reach an
under-linear leakage. The performance additionally showed that DISPERS is the only viable
solution as, even when enhanced, a Naive strategy is inappropriate because of the Querier
acting as a single point of failure and a major bottleneck. We then compared DISPERS to
an Oracle strategy providing a random list of actors to assess the impact of the different
parameters. This comparison shows that the distribution of the tasks and knowledge has a
minor impact on the overall performances, that the influence of the parameters is relatively
clear which argues for an easy tweaking, and finally that the only irreducible cost of DISPERS
is the verifications performed by the targets — which we already minimize via SEP2P.
The last section described two proof-of-concepts of DISPERS. The first takes the form
of a demonstration during which we presented an interactive graphical user interface where
attendees were invited to try to hack the system in order to uncover knowledge regarding
a specific node. The main purpose being to demonstrate the capabilities of our solution.
The second takes the form of a degraded implementation of the DISPERS protocol in the
Cozy Cloud service, in order to provide a community-sharing feature in the context of the
PerSoCloud project. This implementation relies on external trusted servers to provide the




6.1 Summary of the Contributions
Privacy is a growing concern in today’s society. The constant spying by few corporations and
the centralization that ensues can lead to drastic losses in terms of security and control of
our own lives. Hence, we have to propose viable alternatives: decentralized, privacy focused
solutions that are on par feature-wise with their centralized counterparts. The Personal Cloud
paradigm follows this trend and proposes a digital space, the equivalent of a digital home,
where users can regain control of their data. Building on this paradigm, this thesis proposes
to assemble a fully-distributed, secure and privacy-preserving query processing system on top
of a network of Personal Clouds. In particular, the different contributions are as follows:
1. We propose a set of four requirements detailing the specific features any solution, evolv-
ing in the same environment as the one we describe, should respect: imposed randomness
— preventing an attacker from influencing the selection of the actors in the execution;
knowledge dispersion — preventing any node from concentrating information it does not
own; task atomicity — splitting the execution in as many independent tasks as neces-
sary so as to minimize the sensitive information each actor has access to; and hidden
communications — protect the identity of the sensitive nodes as well as the content of
their communications, to prevent an attacker spying on the network from intercepting
sensitive data.
2. We propose SEP2P, a protocol that leverages the Distributed Hash Table overlay orga-
nizing the network and the CSAR protocol to enforce the imposed randomness require-
ment and generate a verifiable random list of actors. This protocol’s main advantage
resides in its ability to only require the participation of a limited set of nodes (extremely
small in comparison to the number of colluding nodes) to achieve its objective: by im-
posing the location of nodes in the DHT we are able to take localized decisions and
attain a very high probability of involving at least one honest node in the generation of
the list — which is our only condition to generate one.
3. We propose DISPERS, a protocol that applies the last three requirements to split and
distribute the execution of a query to a set of randomly selected actors. We define a
query as the combination of a target profile, a local query and an aggregate query. More
especially, the target profile has the dual objective of restraining the participants by
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specifying relevance criteria. We supplement this selection by a sampling that not only
enforces this limitation but does so while preserving, to some extent, the quality of the
result and actually limiting the impact of a leakage. To be able to retrieve nodes based
on the profile, concepts are stored in the DHT. As each concept can be sensitive we split
them in shares following Shamir’s Secret Sharing Scheme.
We then successively apply the requirements which leads to the definition of three dis-
tinct roles: Profile Sampler — which apply the target profile and operate a sampling;
Share Recomposer — which reconstruct the IP addresses of the sampled targets; and
Data Aggregator —which computes the aggregate query on the data sent by the sampled
targets.
These roles are complemented by proxies in order to hide, and protect, the identity of
the targets. Additional protections are put in place to severely limit attack scenarios
based on extensive generation of actors’ lists or query executions: a query budget limits
the number of queries and a Merkle Hash Tree coupled with the signatures of the list
builders links the list of actors to a specific query.
4. We finally propose an in-depth security analysis and performance evaluation of the
DISPERS protocol, as well as two proof-of-concepts. We show in the security analysis
that, although SEP2P selects a linear amount of colluding nodes among the actors (equal,
on average, to the proportion of colluding nodes in the entire network), the different
security mechanisms employed in DISPERS leads to an under-linear leakage: the optimal
leakage we could hope for given our assumptions! This fact is due to separation of
concerns and knowledge between the actors that makes an attacker only gain knowledge
when several roles are simultaneously played by colluding nodes.
The first proof-of-concept is a hackable graphical interface built for a demonstration
session during which attendees can try to bypass the security mechanisms present in
DISPERS, in order to better grasp our contribution. The second proof-of-concept takes
the form of a degraded implementation of DISPERS for the French ANR PerSoCloud
project. By adapting the requirements to a centralized context and bringing in secure
trustworthy external servers, called enclaves, we achieve a similar separation of concerns
than in DISPERS and bring community sharing capabilities to the Cozy Cloud service.
6.2 Future Work
Given the constant digitalization of our lives and being, to the best of our knowledge, the
first work tackling the issue of querying a fully-distributed network of Personal Clouds in
a privacy-preserving manner, there are many research directions that could be developed
following it. For instance, how to further protect the result of a query: it would be particularly
interesting to see how can we combine Privacy-Preserving Data Publishing techniques with
our protocol. Also, investigating optimizations for the aggregation phase of our protocol yields
interesting perspectives: although our approach is generic, specific computations could benefit
from specific approaches.
Nevertheless, we believe the following research directions to be the most promising:
• Understanding the duality that exists between integrity and confidentiality.
In this work we provided a way to preserve the confidentiality of the users and of their
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data: not knowing which node is at the origin of which data, not knowing the pro-
file associated to a node, and, when applicable, not knowing the nature of the data
manipulated. In other words, confidentiality means knowing as little as possible.
Conversely, integrity deals with being and making sure that nothing was altered during
a process: verifications are thus required. For instance, providing a hash and a signature
of a piece of information is an inexpensive and reliable way of checking that it was not
modified. But, in general1, to perform these verifications the original data is required.
Hence, in our context, providing confidentiality and integrity seems to involve a major
trade-off: either nodes know as little as possible to protect their confidentiality, at
the risk of losing precision or leaving some leeway for malicious nodes to slightly alter
the query; or either we cannot guarantee a complete confidentiality but we guarantee a
correct execution. An example of this trade-off in our protocol is the selection of targets:
as a target cannot verify if her profile matches the target profile (as she cannot access
the profile as it would disclose it to, at least, the Share Recomposer), a malicious node
could theoretically include other, “unwanted”, nodes as targets.
Therefore, better understanding the duality between integrity and confidentiality could
lead to the creation of alternative protocols that could focus on offering specific protec-
tions.
• Machine learning applications. Machine learning is an extremely active and prolific
research area. Industrials are also highly interested in this subject with new projects
and frameworks coming out regularly (Tensorflow, autonomous cars, automatic face
detection).
To train a Machine learning algorithm large amount of data are needed. More partic-
ularly these data-sets must respect three criteria: they should be big (as in Big Data),
they should be diverse and they should be real (as in real life data). Putting together
such a massive database poses several serious problems: first and foremost preserving the
privacy of the (willing or unwilling) participants, providing a way for the users to easily
contribute, and keeping the data as close as possible to its “real” value as anonymization
techniques lessens the quality of the data-set which then hinders the efficiency of the
training.
An architecture à la DISPERS appears to solve all these issues: the Personal Cloud
offers the perfect medium to ask for the consent of the users and through DISPERS
privacy-preserving query system it is possible to extract the relevant real data from a
large number of willing participating nodes — without revealing their identity, aggregate
them so as to render them compatible with the training process and finally train the
algorithm. However, decomposing a machine learning training phase in atomic tasks (a
requirement to provide a privacy-preserving execution) is an open and intricate question:
for example, training an algorithm usually assumes a lot of back and forth which raises
many confidentiality issues.
1We do not consider Zero-knowledge based solutions as they mostly rely on cryptography which, as stated
in Chapter 2, are not compatible with our environment.

Appendix A
Detail of the information accessed by
each Actor
In the following we detail for each actor, the information it receives — the input — and the
information it produces — the output.
For the input we detail from whose actor the information came, if it was sent encrypted,
if so with which encryption key and if a signature is checked upon reception.
For the output we detail to whom it will be sent, if it is encrypted, if so with which key
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Annexe B
Résumé en Français du manuscrit
L’évolution des technologies fait que de plus en plus de tâches de notre vie de tous les jours sont
automatisées. D’un point de vue « données », cette automatisation se traduit en une génération
croissante d’informations personnelles structurées — c’est-à-dire facilement exploitables par
un ordinateur et centrées sur nous.
Bien qu’elle permette une meilleure intégration de ces technologies, cette situation ne
soulève pas moins des inquiètudes, notamment concernant notre vie privée : la plupart des
interactions que nous avons avec ces technologies sont centralisées par les mêmes acteurs, ce
qui leur donne ainsi une vue très détaillée de ce que nous faisons et donc de qui nous sommes.
Heureusement tout n’est pas noir dans le paysage numérique actuel : l’évènement récent le
plus marquant a été l’adoption par l’Union Européenne du Règlement Général sur la Protection
des Données. Ce règlement oblige notamment les acteurs manipulant des données à caractère
personnel à définir explicitement comment celles-ci sont utilisées, à demander le consentement
des utilisateurs avant toute collecte et qui offre à ces derniers la possibilité de demander une
copie de leurs données.
Combiné avec l’initiative du Nuage Personnel (“Personal Cloud” en anglais), qui fournit
aux utilisateurs un espace numérique dédié et sous leur seul contrôle — comme ce que propose
la jeune pousse française Cozy Cloud, entreprise avec laquelle ces travaux ont été réalisés —
il devient possible de construire une plateforme respectueuse de la vie privée.
Cependant, cette plateforme reste mono-utilisateur et, sans un cadre adéquat, ne permet
pas de créer des applications multi-utilisateurs offrant les mêmes garanties. L’objectif de cette
thèse est donc de définir un tel cadre pour permettre, plus spécifiquement, l’exécution de
requêtes distribuées respectueuses de la vie privée sur un ensemble de Nuages Personnels.
Ainsi, pour répondre à la problématique exposée, nous faisons les contributions suivantes :
1. Dans le chapitre 2, nous commençons par établir les briques de bases de notre solution.
En effet, ces travaux sont à l’intersection de trois domaines de recherche : les Systèmes de
Gestion de Données Personnelles (dans lequel s’inscrit le Nuage Personnel), les Techniques
de Préservation de la Vie Privée et les Systèmes Distribués. Or, chacun de ces domaines
ne traite qu’un sous-ensemble des contraintes que nous avons : les Systèmes de Gestion de
Données Personnelles n’ont pas tous le même modèle de confiance et/ou fournissent des
fonctionnalités différentes ; les Techniques de Préservation de la Vie Privée peuvent être
divisées en deux catégories, celles basées sur du chiffrement et celles qui font de la « pu-
blication de données respectueuse de la vie privée » (Privacy-Preserving Data Publishing),
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qui ont chacune leurs avantages et inconvénients ; et les Systèmes Distribués répondent
principalement aux problèmes d’efficacité et de disponibilité dans un réseau pair-à-pair.
2. En s’appuyant sur les technologies identifiées nous définissons dans le chapitre 3 un ensemble
de quatre contraintes que n’importe quelle solution évoluant dans le même environnement
devrait respecter : (i) l’aléa imposé — pour empêcher un attaquant d’influencer la sélection
des acteurs lors de l’exécution d’une requête ; (ii) la dispersion des connaissances — pour
qu’aucun participant ne concentre trop d’informations ; (iii) les tâches atomiques — diviser
l’exécution d’une requête en un ensemble de sous-tâches de sorte à limiter au strict minimum
les informations accédées par chaque acteur ; et (iv) les communications « cachées » — afin
de protéger l’identité des participants ainsi que le contenu des communications.
3. Toujours dans le chapitre 3, nous proposons le protocole SEP2P qui utilise la Table de Ha-
chage Distribuée organisant le réseau de Nuages Personnels pour faire respecter la première
contrainte, l’aléa imposé, et générer une liste aléatoire et vérifiable d’acteurs. L’avantage
principal de ce protocole réside dans sa capacité à ne nécessiter qu’un nombre restreint de
participants (extrêmement faible par rapport au nombre de participants corrompus) pour
atteindre cet objectif : en imposant la localisation des Nuages Personnels dans le réseau,
nous sommes en mesure de prendre des décisions localisées tout en maintenant une très
forte probabilité d’impliquer au moins un participant honnête dans la génération de la liste
— ce qui est notre unique condition pour en produire une qui soit à la fois aléatoire et
vérifiable.
4. Nous proposons, dans le chapitre 4, le protocole DISPERS qui, pour respecter les trois
dernières contraintes, distribue l’exécution d’une requête entre différents acteurs (choisis
aléatoirement). Nous définissons une requête comme la combinaison d’un profil cible, d’une
requête locale et d’une requête d’agrégat. Plus particulièrement, le profil cible a le double
objectif de restreindre le nombre de participants en ne sélectionnant que ceux qui sont
pertinents pour la requête considérée. Pour réaliser cette sélection basée sur un profil, des
concepts sont conservés dans la Table de Hachage Distribuée — une combinaison logique
de concepts constituant un profil. Ces concepts pouvant être sensibles, nous les protégeons
en les chiffrant en utilisant la Technique du Partage de Secret de Shamir.
En appliquant successivement les différentes contraintes nous définissons les trois types
d’acteurs suivants : Profile Sampler — qui appliquent le profil cible et effectuent un échan-
tillonnage ; Share Recomposer — qui reconstruisent les adresses IP des participants sélec-
tionnés ; et Data Aggregator — qui calculent la requête d’agrégat sur les données envoyées
par les participants sélectionnés.
Ces rôles sont complétés par des proxy qui cachent et protègent l’identité des participants
sélectionnés. Des protections supplémentaires sont également mises en place pour sévère-
ment limiter des scénarios d’attaques qui reposent sur une génération excessive de listes
d’acteurs ou d’exécutions de requêtes : un budget limite le nombre de requêtes qu’un parti-
cipant peut faire et un Arbre de Merkle couplé avec les signatures des participants qui ont
généré la liste des acteurs lie une liste d’acteurs à une requête spécifique.
5. Enfin, dans le chapitre 5, nous proposons une analyse détaillée de la sécurité et des perfor-
mances de DISPERS ainsi que deux implémentations de type « preuve de concept ». Nous
montrons notamment dans l’analyse de sécurité que, bien que SEP2P sélectionne une quan-
tité linéaire de participants corrompus parmi les acteurs (égale, en moyenne, à la proportion
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de participants corrompus dans tout le réseau), les différents mécanismes de sécurité em-
ployés dans DISPERS conduisent à une fuite sous-linéaire : la fuite minimale qu’on pouvait
espérer étant donné nos hypothèses.
La première preuve de concept est une interface graphique réalisée dans le cadre d’une
session de démonstration où les personnes présentes pouvaient tenter de contourner les
mécanismes de sécurité mis en place (afin de mieux les comprendre). La seconde preuve
de concept prend la forme d’une implémentation dégradée de DISPERS pour les besoins
du projet ANR PerSoCloud. En adaptant les contraintes à un contexte centralisé et en
s’appuyant sur des serveurs tiers de confiance, appelés enclaves, nous pouvons mettre en
place une séparation similaire des tâches et donc des connaissances.
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Résumé : Dans un contexte où nous produisons de
plus en plus de données personnelles et où nous
contrôlons de moins en moins comment et par qui
elles sont utilisées, une nouvelle manière de les
gérer voit le jour: le  nuage personnel . En par-
tenariat avec la jeune pousse française Cozy Cloud
(https://cozy.io) qui développe une telle technologie,
nous définissons à travers ces travaux une manière
collaborative d’interroger ces nuages personnels qui
respecte la vie privée des utilisateurs.
Pour y parvenir nous détaillons dans cette thèse trois
contributions : (1) un ensemble de quatre prérequis
que tout protocole doit respecter dans ce contexte
particulier : l’aléa imposé qui empêche un attaquant
d’influencer le déroulement de l’exécution, la disper-
sion des connaissances qui assure qu’aucun par-
ticipant ne possède trop d’informations, l’atomicité
des tâches qui diminue au maximum le rôle joué
par chaque participant directement impliqué dans
l’exécution et les communications cachées pour
protéger l’identité des participants et les informations
échangées ; (2) SEP2P un protocole se basant sur
une table de hashage distribuée et CSAR, un protocole
permettant de générer un nombre aléatoire, afin de
générer une liste aléatoire et vérifiable d’acteurs en
accord avec le premier prérequis ; et (3) DISPERS un
protocole qui applique les trois derniers prérequis et
découpe l’exécution d’une requête de sorte à minimi-
ser les informations accédées par chaque acteur pour
minimiser l’impact d’une fuite au cas où un attaquant
aurait été sélectionné parmi ces mêmes acteurs.
Title : Distributed and Privacy-Preserving Queries on Personal Clouds
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Abstract : In a context where we produce more and
more personal data and where we control less and
less how and by whom they are used, a new way
of managing them is on the rise: the “personal clou-
d”. In partnership with the french start-up Cozy Cloud
(https://cozy.io) that is developing such technology, we
propose through this work a way of collaboratively
querying the personal clouds while preserving the pri-
vacy of the users.
We detail in this thesis three contributions to achieve
this objective: (1) a set of four requirements any pro-
tocol has to respect in this particular context: impo-
sed randomness to prevent an attacker from influen-
cing the execution of a query, knowledge dispersion
to prevent any node from concentrating information,
task atomicity to split the execution in as many inde-
pendent tasks as necessary and hidden communica-
tions to protect the identity of the participants as well
as the content of their communications; (2) SEP2P a
protocol leveraging a distributed hash table and CSAR,
another protocol that generates a verifiable random
number, in order to generate a random and verifiable
list of actors in accordance with the first requirement;
and (3) DISPERS a protocol that applies the last three
requirements and splits the execution of a query so as
to minimize the impact of a leakage (in case an atta-
cker was selected as actor) by providing to each actor
the minimum amount of information it needs in order
to execute its task.
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